— WSI_USA (@wsi_usa) March 17, 2016
Here are our excerpts concerning #GCI methodology, et al. of @wef’s The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 (w PDF).
CHAPTER 1.1 Competitiveness Agendas to Reignite Growth: Findings from the Global Competitiveness Index p5-11
Monetary policy is not enough: Insufficient competitiveness is a constraint for reigniting growth worldwide
… Figure 2 shows how economies that perform poorly in the GCI have seen their central banks boost their balance sheets more than better-performing economies, and yet those with higher competitiveness have recovered faster from the financial crisis and ensuing recession, achieving faster growth rates. The fact that monetary stimulus has been more effective and growth has been higher in more competitive economies, regardless of fiscal policies followed, suggests that the constraints may be on the supply side. Improving the conditions for businesses to flourish and increase their productivity is therefore the main policy challenge for advanced and emerging economies alike.
At the dawn of the Fourth Industrial Revolution era, technology and innovation are increasingly driving development
… Innovation and business sophistication are more closely associated with income levels in general, and in emerging economies and commodity-exporting economies in particular, than they used to be. Figure 3 shows how, since 2010, for these two groups, GDP per capita has become more closely correlated with the GCI’s technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovation pillars than it is with the infrastructure, health and primary education, and market-related pillars (goods markets efficiency, financial market development, and labor market efficiency). These results illustrate how sources of productivity within firms and production units that are related to their ability to incorporate new technologies into their production processes, and that change the ways in which those firms and units perform tasks, are playing a larger role than investment in basic physical and human capital and well-functioning factor and goods markets, frequently thought to be sufficient to reignite growth. It also shows how the price changes experienced since the end of the commodity cycle and faster technological change are creating incentives for firms and policymakers to engage in more innovative activities.
Declining openness is endangering future growth and prosperity
An open, trading economy generates incentives to innovate and invest in new technologies because firms are exposed to competition and new ideas and can benefit from the technology transfer that comes from mports and foreign investment. … protectionist measures, especially non-tariff barriers, have increased and global trade has not recovered since the global trade slowdown following the financial crisis. Figure 4 illustrates that, according to GCI data, economies in all income groups have become less open since 2007, driven mainly by non-tariff barriers, including increased legal and normative requirements. Figure 5 shows that economies that are open to foreign competition (as measured by the foreign competition subpillar of the GCI) are also more innovative, suggesting the importance of openness for innovation. …
Appendix A: Methodology and Computation of the Global Competitiveness Index 2016–2017 p35-37
1st pillar: Institutions
The institutional environment of a country depends on the efficiency and the behavior of both public and private stakeholders. The legal and administrative framework within which individuals, firms, and governments interact determines the quality of the public institutions of a country and has a strong bearing on competitiveness and growth. It influences investment decisions and the organization of production and plays a key role in the ways in which societies distribute the benefits and bear the costs of development strategies and policies. Good private institutions are also important for the sound and sustainable development of an economy. The 2007–08 global financial crisis, along with numerous corporate scandals, has highlighted the relevance of accounting and reporting standards and transparency for preventing fraud and mismanagement, ensuring good governance, and maintaining investor and consumer confidence.
6th pillar: Goods market efficiency
Countries with efficient goods markets are well positioned to produce the right mix of products and services given their particular supply-and-demand conditions, as well as to ensure that these goods can be most effectively traded in the economy. Healthy market competition, both domestic and foreign, is important in driving market efficiency, and thus business productivity, by ensuring that the most efficient firms, producing goods demanded by the market, are those that thrive. Market efficiency also depends on demand conditions such as customer orientation and buyer sophistication. For cultural or historical reasons, customers may be more demanding in some countries than in others. This can create an important competitive advantage, as it forces companies to be more innovative and customer-oriented and thus imposes the discipline necessary for efficiency to be achieved in the market.
7th pillar: Labor market efficiency
The efficiency and flexibility of the labor market are critical for ensuring that workers are allocated to their most effective use in the economy and provided with incentives to give their best effort in their jobs. Labor markets must therefore have the flexibility to shift workers from one economic activity to another rapidly and at low cost, and to allow for wage fluctuations without much social disruption. Efficient labor markets must also ensure clear strong incentives for employees and promote meritocracy at the workplace, and they must provide equity in the business environment between women and men. Taken together these factors have a positive effect on worker performance and the attractiveness of the country for talent, two aspects of the labor market that are growing more important as talent shortages loom on the horizon.
8th pillar: Financial market development
An efficient financial sector allocates the resources saved by a nation’s population, as well as those entering the economy from abroad, to the entrepreneurial or investment projects with the highest expected rates of return rather than to the politically connected. Business investment is critical to productivity. Therefore economies require sophisticated financial markets that can make capital available for private-sector investment from such sources as loans from a sound banking sector, well-regulated securities exchanges, venture capital, and other financial products. In order to fulfill all those functions, the banking sector needs to be trustworthy and transparent, and—as has been made so clear recently—financial markets need appropriate regulation to protect investors and other actors in the economy at large.
11th pillar: Business sophistication
Business sophistication concerns two elements that are intricately linked: the quality of a country’s overall business networks and the quality of individual firms’ operations and strategies. These factors are especially important for countries at an advanced stage of development when, to a large extent, the more basic sources of productivity improvements have been exhausted. The quality of a country’s business networks and supporting industries, as measured by the quantity and quality of local suppliers and the extent of their interaction, is important for a variety of reasons. When companies and suppliers from a particular sector are interconnected in geographically proximate groups, called clusters, efficiency is heightened, greater opportunities for innovation in processes and products are created, and barriers to entry for new firms are reduced.
12th pillar: Innovation
The last pillar focuses on innovation. Innovation is particularly important for economies as they approach the frontiers of knowledge, and the possibility of generating more value by merely integrating and adapting exogenous technologies tends to disappear. In these economies, firms must design and develop cutting-edge products and processes to maintain a competitive edge and move toward even higher value-added activities. This progression requires an environment that is conducive to innovative activity and supported by both the public and the private sectors. In particular, it means sufficient investment in research and development (R&D), especially by the private sector; the presence of high-quality scientific research institutionsthat can generate the basic knowledge needed to build the new technologies; extensive collaboration in research and technological developments between universities and industry; and the protection of intellectual property.
Appendix B: Global Competitiveness Index 2016–2017 rankings p43-50
CHAPTER 1.2 Modernizing the Measurement of Drivers of Prosperity in Light of the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Updated Global Competitiveness Index
p56-57 SELECTED ISSUES: DISCUSSION AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
According to the latest thinking, innovation occurs in an ecosystem where businesses, regulations, and social norms promote connectivity, creativity, entrepreneurship, collaboration, and the adoption of the latest technologies to generate new ideas and bring new products and business models to market. These concepts are measured by four pillars: technological adoption, market size, business dynamism, and innovation capacity. … As long as new ideas cannot find a practical implementation they might contribute to knowledge accumulation but they do not immediately translate into advances in human welfare. In some cases finding a practical application for a new idea is just a matter of time, because technological progress in other fields has to occur before these ideas can be put into practical use. It is, however, crucial for a country to develop the skills and the conditions that can ignite the process of transforming abstract innovation into new products and processes.
Appendix: Updated Global Competitiveness Index Structure p63-75
CHAPTER 1.3 The Executive Opinion
Survey: The Voice of the Business Community
Here are a part of articles concerning US Presidential Election 2016. Excerpts, et al. are on our own.
Has The American Public Polarized? (w PDF) | Morris P. Fiorina @HooverInst
p16 Maybe We’re Not Polarized Yet
… As social media, personalized search, and other technological “advances” proliferate, concerned observers have expressed the fear that Americans will isolate themselves in “ideological silos” or “echo chambers” that reinforce their views and insulate them from the views of the other side. Given these technological trends, is there a serious danger that Americans will balkanize into two non-overlapping universes, each of which has its own facts and its own interpretations
of reality? …
p19 … if Fox News had been removed from cable TV in 2000, it would have reduced the vote for George W. Bush in the average county by 1.6 percentage points …
p20 … although ideological segregation on the Internet is higher than in offline media, it remains low in absolute terms and is considerably lower than in people’s face-to-face networks. Part of the reason for the failure of the segregation hypothesis is that people with extreme views “tend to consume more of everything, including centrist sites and occasionally sites with conflicting ideology. Their omnivorousness outweighs their ideological extremity, preventing their overall news diet from becoming too skewed. …
p21 … Moreover, since the focus was the segregation hypothesis, people would have to visit “opinion” sites for their views to be affected. … Only a few Americans are even occasional readers of a Paul Krugman or George Will column. Although the trace element of those who visit opinion sites does show ideological segregation, the researchers conclude that the numbers are so small that the fears encapsulated in the segregation hypothesis are largely unwarranted.
… Twitter networks tend to be fairly heterogeneous politically, in part because many of those in them are connected by only “weak ties.” Contrary to the fears expressed by those worried about ideological segregation, social media actually may lessen people’s tendency to live in echo chambers …
p22 … “Ideologically one-sided news exposure may be largely confined to a small, but highly involved and influential, segment of the population. There is no firm evidence that partisan media are making ordinary Americans more partisan.” To which one can add, no firm evidence exists that ideological media are making ordinary Americans more extreme. …
The right’s Trump phenomenon: Why the left won’t spawn a policy-free demagogue any time soon | @SeanMcElwee @Salon
… @DouthatNYT challenges the progressives who have argued in favor of #NeverTrump. He claims that the decision is harder than it initially seems for conservatives, writing, “Asking Rs to vote for Hillary is a little like asking Ds to vote for Newt Gingrich running on Ted Cruz’s platform.” The analogy isn’t entirely accurate. …
However, there are structural, ideological and demographic reasons to believe that Trumpism is a phenomenon unique to the GOP. After all, Trump doesn’t have an ideology, and throughout his career has preferred whichever party is most expedient to him. …
… how the rise of Trumpism is rooted in structural differences between the two parties… @MattGrossmann and @DaveAHopkins… show that we can expect “Republican politicians to discuss policy in broad strokes and Democratic politicians to emphasize particular policies aimed at each constituency.” On the right, candidates are rewarded for commitment to ideology, while on the left candidates are rewarded for policy achievements. …
… differences in views about governance and compromise in the parties. Democrats are consistently more favorable toward compromise than Republicans… Democrats are also more likely to say they want party leaders to move in a moderate direction (rather than a liberal or conservative direction). Trump’s bullying, uncompromising stance plays far better with Republicans than a similar stance would with Democrats.
… how the Democratic coalition is an interest group network politicians must navigate. To win a Democratic primary… a candidate has to win over and woo a number of interest groups: abortion rights groups, labor, the NAACP, and others. On the right there isn’t a network of interest groups but rather a few powerful donors driven by ideology…
… ideologically, the Republican Party has moved dramatically right, while the Democratic Party has moved only modestly to the left… the Democratic moves to the left have largely coincided with public opinion …
… @LeahRigueur has argued, though the GOP has recognized its failure to win black voters for half a century, it has only dug itself deeper in a hole, ignoring dozens of reports suggesting ways the party could change.
… the GOP has remained incredibly white, even as the country has become more diverse. As political scientist @mtretail shows, Trump’s primary coalition was far more racially resentful, opposed to immigration and colder to Muslims than the Romney and McCain primary coalitions. Trump’s rise is rooted in white backlash to the Obama presidency…
… @DouthatNYT wants to imagine a Democratic Trump. However, the causal factors that give rise to him simply can’t be replicated on the Democratic side. …
… Trying to defeat Trumpism without ameliorating the structural causes that created him will only entrench the problem. …
Clinton or Trump: Who does China Want? | @ChathamHouse
– In Beijing’s eyes Clinton is no friend, but a Trump victory would open a new era of uncertainty, writes @nivincent
… There’s a reason for such hostility. Clinton’s advocacy of female leadership in the West has irritated many in China in the past two decades. In 1995, she declared in Beijing that ‘women’s rights are human rights; human rights are women’s rights’… And in 2010, her reiteration of the US’s right to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea provoked lingering anger in China.
Even after she stepped down as President Obama’s Secretary of State in 2013, she continued to cause controversy. For instance, when President Xi Jinping co-hosted a UN meeting on women’s rights last September… ‘shameless’.
In response to this remark, the Communist Party tabloid, The Global Times, claimed the Chinese people ‘despise her a little’. ‘It looks like Hillary is in a panicked frenzy, her eyes have turned red… She has started to copy Trump’s speaking style and allowed herself to become a fierce big mouth,’…
… ‘On a geopolitical level, if American allies in the region, namely Japan and South Korea, refuse to shoulder more financial responsibility for US military protection, it might provide China with a strategic opportunity to expand in the region.’…
And Trump as US president could also give the Communist Party a morale boost, Sun said. ‘On a domestic level, Trump’s controversial rise might reaffirm Communist Party leaders’ belief that China’s cadre selection process has more merit… it’s at least good for domestic propaganda.’ …
Here is an article, Celtic Tiger roars again – but not for the poor (7 October 2004) | @achrisafis @guardian. Italicization, underlines, et al. are on our own.
Darren Dent surveyed the concrete walkways of Stella Gardens, the low-rise Dublin estate…
Stella Gardens is on the edge of Dublin 4, the capital’s best postcode and the heart of Ireland’s economic miracle. Here the Celtic Tiger boom of the 90s roared its loudest and Dublin’s newly rich stepped into the satin slippers of the old British colonial masters, taking over redbrick villas now worth millions.
A tiny cottage costs at least €300,000 (£210,000), coffee costs the same as New York and fast food is among the most expensive in the world at €6.50 for a burger at a greasy spoon.
“All this wealth is sitting in one corner and we are sitting in the other,” Mr Dent said of the boom which transformed the country over the past decade. “We feel excluded, we’re not part of this great rich image.”
Just as Ireland’s economic glory days appeared to be levelling out, a leading economist predicted the dawn of a new “golden period” this week, dubbed Celtic Tiger II: The Sequel.
Ireland, once one of the poorest countries in Europe, could become one of the richest in the EU, according to Dan McLaughlin, the chief economist at the Bank of Ireland. He said employment would rise by 50,000 a year and Ireland would have to lure workers from the EU’s latest members in eastern Europe.
This second round of economic expansion would create huge budget surpluses for Ireland. Businesses would continue to flood in: Google opened its first headquarters outside the US in Dublin yesterday.
… According to the UN the Irish are the richest people in the world after Norwegians and Luxembourgers. Dublin – where house price rises have left many with no hope of owning a home – is one of the most expensive cities in Europe.
But the gap between rich and poor has grown so much that the UN said recently Ireland had the highest levels of inequality of all western countries except the US. In spite of its new-found prosperity, Ireland has the highest proportion of people at risk of poverty in the EU. Some single parent families survive on less than €150 a week. Many say they can’t pay for their children to go to the doctor when they are sick.
The elderly, disabled and young are particularly at risk, while immigrants who arrived with the boom often live in appalling conditions. A European report released last week said one in five Irish people was classed as poor: taking home less than 60% of the average wage. The OECD puts the poverty level at about 15%.
Inequality remains the great taboo in a young state with a recent memory of the injustices of colonialism. The church, anti-poverty campaigners and local councillors have criticised the government for underspending on welfare, health and education. Some say the authorities refuse to accept the facts about poverty while the hedonistic rich enjoy high-spending lifestyles.
The ongoing tribunals into Ireland’s culture of backhanders in the 80s have left many fearful of political greed and corruption.
Newspapers question why spending on social welfare is so low when the government has ploughed more than €250m into horse and greyhound racing over the past four years.
Father Seán Healy, the director of the Conference of Religious of Ireland Justice Commission, which issued a report on poverty this week, urged the government to raise its spending on social provisions, health and education, which currently falls below EU norms, and to offer free healthcare for every child.
He said the government was listening to him, despite the former finance minister, Charlie McCreevy, saying he was “spouting rubbish”. The government says it has measures in place to combat poverty.
Father Healy said: “The per capita income is one of the highest in Europe. But there is a realisation that some people are getting left behind.”
Daithí Doolan, a Sinn Féin councillor in Dublin, said people came to him after being evicted from their homes which were knocked down to make way apartment complexes.
Mr Dent, who counsels addicts from Stella Gardens, said: “I see the same people coming in with the same problems … In the poor areas, history is repeating itself.”
Evaluating Australia’s climate policy action (w PDFs; 12/04/2018) | Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter, Jasmin Cantzler, Fabio Sferra, Bill Hare, Gaurav Ganti, Matt Beer @ca_latest
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY – POLL 2018 | @lowyinstitute
State of the Climate 2018 – Australia’s changing climate | @BOM_au
CLIMATE POLICIES OF MAJOR AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES (PDF; 05/2019) | @climatecouncil
Speech: Climate Change and the Economy (12/03/2019) | Deputy Governor Guy Debelle @RBAInfo
AUSTRALIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE Address (07/07/1997) | The Hon Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs @dfat
State and territory government responses to climate change | Parliament of Australia
Climate change, health and wellbeing: challenges and opportunities in NSW, Australia (PDF; 12/2018) | Neil Hime, Aditya Vyas, Kishen Lachireddy, Stacey Wyett, Benjamin Scalley, and Carlos Corvalan @NSWHealth
CLIMATE-READY VICTORIA (PDF; 11/2015) | @DELWP_Vic
DRAFT: Climate change in Queensland (PDF; 2016) | @QldEnvironment
South Australia’s Approach to Climate Change (PDF) | Julia Grant @SAEnvirWater
Climate change and waterways | WA Department of Water and Environmental Regulation
Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Tasmania’s Terrestrial and Marine Biodiversity and Natural Systems (PDF; 08/2008) | Tasmania Department of Primary Industries & Water
CLIMATE CHANGE: MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY – DISCUSSION PAPER (PDF; 2018) | Northern Territory Government
Climate Change | @EnvironPlan
Climate change poses risk to Australia’s financial stability, warns RBA deputy governor (12/03/2019) | @murpharoo @guardian
Big Australian finance players sign on to fight climate change (27/03/2019) | @MaggieCoggan @ProBonoNews
Position on Climate Change | @ausbanking
The Economics of Climate Change (w PDF; 2014) | @ceda_news
Analysis: $130 billion per year benefit to GDP by avoiding climate change (w PDF; 24/04/2019) | @TheAusInstitute
How much will it cost to deal with climate change? (06/05/2019) | JOHN QUIGGIN @insidestorymag
Future proofing Australia from the impacts of climate change is an economic issue of significance. (10/09/2018) | @CarbonMarketIns
Transform our economy (w PDF; 11/2018) | @AusConservation
What Will Climate Change Do to the Economy? (w Video; 08/21/2014) | WILLIAM NORDHAUS @YaleInsights
Australia’s economy will suffer if we fall behind on climate action (06/18/2014) | Martijn Wilder @ConversationEDU
Economic consequences of alternative Australian climate policy approaches (PDF; 03/2019) | Brian S. Fisher @ BAEconomics
The political economy of climate change (05/30/2014) | Australian Independent Media Network
The Australian Response to Climate Change: business as usual or legal innovation? (PDF) | Nicola Durrant @QUT
How Climate Change Affecting Australia? (01/12/2019) | @climatereality
Climate Change Impacts on Australia (PDF; 2008) | Garnaut Climate Change Review
Impacts of Climate Change (Word) | Climate Change Authority @ Australian Government
A New Approach in Australia to Just Transition | Tony Maher @WorldResources
Post-political debate?: Expert dissensus and the failure of Australia’s ETS (PDF) | Beck Pearse @ppesydney
Australia is being devastated by climate change. So will it swing the election? (05/08/2019) | Hilary Whiteman @CNN
ClimateWorks is an expert, independent adviser, committed to helping the transition to net zero emissions by 2050. | @ClimateWorksAus
AUSTRALIA’S CLIMATE SECURITY | @centrepolicydev
Australia urged to take lead on climate change (22/02/2008) | Rachel Nowak @newscientist
Climate change | @dfat
Climate change: the case for action | Julie Styles @ Parliament of Australia
Climate change (2017) | Foreign Policy White Paper @ Australian Government
Australia and Climate Change Negotiations: At the Table, or on the Menu? (w PDF; 19/06/2015) | Howard Bamsey (@ANURegNet) & Kath Rowley (Climate Change Authority)
The Carbon Tax in Australia (05/05/2017) | @CPI_Foundation
Directors’ Liability and Climate Risk: Australia – Country Paper (PDF; 04/2018) | Sarah Barker @comclimatelaw
The Politics of Climate Change in Australia (PDF; 09/2013) | MARK BEESON (@MurdochUni) & MATT MCDONALD (@POLSISEngage) @ Australian Journal of Politics and History
Australian Climate Change Regulation and Political Math (PDF; 22/09/2018) | Tim Baxter, George Gilligan, Cosima Hay McRae @MelbLawSchool
A New ‘Normal’ for Australia and Indonesia on Climate Change | Arjuna Dibley @AsiaSociety
Australia, Climate Change and the Global South (PDF; 2011) | LORRAINE ELLIOTT @ANU_APCD
ICONS AT RISK: CLIMATE CHANGE THREATENING AUSTRALIAN TOURISM (PDF; 2018) | @climatecouncil
Climate Change (30/04/19) | @austmus
Australia’s Farmers Challenged by Climate Change: Farmers down under face the first serious threats from global warming (03/19/2015) | Brittany Patterson ClimateWire,@EENewsUpdates,@scientificamerican
Adapting agriculture to climate change (PDF) | National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility @Griffith_Uni
Australia court refuses coal mine project on climate change grounds (02/11/2019) | Erin McCarthy Holliday @JURISTnews
Climate adaptation in regional mining value chains: A case-study of the Goldfields-Esperance Region, Western Australia (07/2013) | Barton Loechel, Jane Hodgkinson, Suzanne Prober and Kieren Moffat @CSIROnews
Climate change and mining – A Foreign Policy Perspective (PDF; 06/2016) | Lukas Rüttinger (@adelphi_berlin) & Vigya Sharma (@energypovertyUQ) @ClimateDiplo
Arctic cold front to send temperatures plunging 10C across the entire country – as Melbourne and Sydney brace for a week of biting winds and rainfall https://t.co/PnOc6jA8u9
— Daily Mail Australia (@DailyMailAU) May 7, 2019
— BobdadQ+ (@Captbobdad) May 3, 2019
Wavy Jet Stream Update: Australia to feel the effect of less Solar Energy going into the Oceans with Antarctic Blast during Summer period.. https://t.co/gR0d6vMDoe link https://t.co/dUVuqMu4Dy this has nothing to do with CO2 pic.twitter.com/kKFoxUY959
— Climate Realists (@ClimateRealists) February 12, 2019
— John Pratt (@Jackthelad1947) July 1, 2017
— Nine News Sydney (@9NewsSyd) May 1, 2019
— Climate Council (@climatecouncil) May 22, 2017
— WorldSolutions light (@WSlightly) July 7, 2016
— WorldSolutions light (@WSlightly) February 1, 2015
— World Solutions (@_WorldSolutions) January 20, 2015
Here is a paper, WHAT WENT WRONG IN IRELAND? (PDF; May 1, 2009) | Patrick Honohan, Trinity College Dublin. Underlines, italicization, excerpts, et al. are on our own, not the author’s.
With its fiscal, competitiveness and banking crisis, Ireland is among the most severely affected countries in the global crisis. Yet its sustained growth achievement for almost two decades has been widely admired. This note explains how and why Ireland has entered the recession so poorly positioned. Until about 2000, the growth had been on a secure export-led basis, underpinned by wage restraint. However, from about 2000 the character of the growth changed: a property price and construction bubble took hold. This boom sustained employment and output growth until 2007 despite a loss of wage competitiveness. The banks fuelled the boom, especially from 2003, exposing themselves both to funding and solvency pressures. Successive Governments had bought industrial peace (and at first wage restraint), with tax reductions, relying increasingly on volatile sources of revenue, thereby making the tax base increasingly vulnerable to a downturn. Among the triggers for the property bubble was the sharp fall in interest rates following euro membership: within the euro zone also the disciplines of the market which had traditionally served as warning signs of excess were muted. Lacking these prompts, Irish policymakers neglected the basics of public finance, wage policy and bank regulation.
WHAT WENT WRONG IN IRELAND?
1. Introduction and overview
During the 1990s, Ireland emerged from a lengthy period of economic stagnation marked by high unemployment, emigration, and crippling public debt despite high tax levels. From 1988 to 2007 real GDP expanded by 6 per cent per annum on average (reaching double digits on average during 1995-2000). Even more astonishing, the unemployment rate shrank from 16 per cent…in 1994 to 4 per cent in 2000 – essentially full employment for the first time in modern history. Non-agricultural employment jumped from 33 per cent of the population in 1993 to 41 per cent in 2000 and 46 per cent by 2007…
But, after almost two decades of rapid growth, Ireland’s economy has collapsed more severely than almost all others in the current economic downturn. Real GDP fell by over 2 per cent in 2008 and is expected to fall 8 per cent in 2009 and a further 3 per cent in 2010. The downturn in the real economy has been reflected in the sudden emergence of a twin crisis in the banking sector and in the public finances. These in turn have fed back negatively into credit availability and rising tax rates deepening the output loss.
What went wrong? …combines hubris formed during the years of solid growth (before about 2000), the unprecedented experience on inward migration and the demonstration effect of financial excess in neighbouring countries. EMU membership plays a subtle role in the story in the way in which it lulled policy makers into a false sense of security. At the same time, having the euro has equally protected Ireland from an even worse financial collapse today.
It was always to be expected that Ireland would be particularly exposure to a global downturn, considering the exceptionally large contribution of exports to GDP and its vertical integration of much of Ireland’s manufacturing sector into the global production chains of major multinational firms. These were characteristics which, when combined with the sustained growth in World Trade contributed to a sustained output boom for over 15 years. Now they had gone into reverse.
Moreover, by mid-2008, the Irish export sector had to cope with a sharp slide in the value of Sterling – the currency of neighboring Britain, still a major trading partner. Indeed, the sudden fall in sterling left even the domestic retail sector exposed as households crossed the border into Northern Ireland to take advantage of suddenly lower prices.
But the Irish crisis from 2007 on was not merely an aspect of international pressures. Ireland was relatively poorly positioned heading into the global recession for three distinct but related domestic reasons: a home-grown banking crisis, a trend loss in wage competitiveness that had been underway since 2000 and a tax structure whose yield was far too heavily dependent on a continuation of the boom.
Two distinct growth phases
To understand what went wrong it is essential to distinguish between two different growth phases. Up to 2000 there was the true “Celtic Tiger” period of exceptional export-led growth with moderate wage and price inflation and healthy public finances. This began back in the late 1980s when, after several false starts, Government finally tackled its over-indebtedness with tough spending restraint, and managed to negotiate a series of centralized social partnership agreements which seem to have bought wage rate moderation in return for income tax concessions. This confidence-restoring policy package, given a competitiveness boost by the successful devaluation of 1986, launched the economy on a belated convergence in living standards towards the highest in Europe. An expanded flow of European Union structural funds amounting to as much as 3 per cent of GDP also helped fund sufficient public infrastructure in those years. The historic pattern of net emigration was dramatically reversed.
By 2000, the convergence phase was over, but rapid growth continued in Ireland – though now the sources of growth shifted sharply. An unsustainable decade-long property price and construction boom, which began before that of the US and UK and went further than these both in price and quantity, had taken over from exports as the main driver of Irish growth. Initially prompted by the increased household formation (related to unprecedented levels of net immigration) and by the sharp fall in interest rates that accompanied the transition to EMU membership, the property boom was increasingly financed after 2003 with foreign borrowing by the banks.
At the same time, the negotiated wage-restraint-for-income-tax-concessions bargain continued to be renewed. Government could afford to offer these concessions because of the buoyant revenue from the construction boom and from corporate profits, on which they became increasingly reliant, insouciant of the increasing vulnerability of the tax base to a downturn. But the apparent restraint in negotiated base wages began to lose relevance as workers negotiated supplementary wage increases. Although international competitiveness began to be eroded, the effects were not yet felt in aggregate unemployment while the domestic boom continued.
Poorly positioned for the global crash
Thus, the international pressures on the Irish economy since early 2008 have been strongly exacerbated by the unwinding of the property price and construction boom, and by the tax collapse and uncompetitive wage structures it has left in its wake.
Real residential property prices peaked in late-2006 and a strong reversal set in both in prices and in activity. The collapse of the construction and property bubble, has brought banking difficulties in its wake. This would all have resulted in a recession even without the global crisis, though the banks would have been better placed to survive without exceptional intervention, and the government would have been able to take offsetting fiscal action had it not been for the collapse in construction-related tax revenues. …
2. Fiscal crisis
The fiscal crisis has been driven partly by an autonomous surge in the share of spending in GDP (after 2004), but more spectacularly by a remarkable collapse in tax revenues in 2008-9. While tax revenue has shrunk in many countries in the recent economic downturn, the revenue collapse in Ireland has been much more pronounced.
Much of the reason for the revenue collapse lies in the systematic shift over the past two decades away from stable and reliable sources such as personal income tax, VAT and excises and towards cyclically sensitive taxes. There has been more and more dependence on corporation tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax (in that order). These three saw their share in total tax revenues rise steadily from about 8 per cent in 1987 to 30 per cent in 2006 before falling to 27 per cent in 2007 and just 20 per cent as soon as the economy turned down in 2008.
Although corporation tax is charged at a very low rate (currently 12½ per cent), revenue from this source grew from little over 1 per cent of GDP in the late 1980s to almost 4 per cent a decade later. A large fraction of this has come from multinational corporations in financial and non-financial sectors. Indeed, Ireland became quite a location of choice for firms seeking to shelter sizable profits from higher tax rates elsewhere. The surge on corporation tax was due not only to the property boom of the 2000s, but benefited significantly from internationally-oriented manufacturing and services, and from the high profitability of the domestic private service sector. …
To an extent, the growing reliance on these “fair weather” taxes has been an almost automatic albeit unintended consequence of the combination of the Social Partnership process combined with an almost unbroken period of rapid growth. From 1987, the former process of triennial tripartite national pay agreements was resuscitated with a view to achieving economic recovery. In each negotiation, in order to obtain or cement agreement of the unions to moderate basic pay trends, Government offered policy concessions, generally including an explicit or implicit understanding that income tax would be reduced. These tax reductions did help to buy wage restraint in the 1980s and 1990s, but left the government accounts exposed to a downturn. The sustained output, profit and asset price boom which extended for two decades from 1988 – with only two brief hesitations in 1993 and 2001/2 – lulled policymakers into a false sense of security as to the sustainability of the revenues from cyclically sensitive taxes, and induced them to take advantage of the extra revenues by narrowing the base of the personal income tax and lowering rates. To be sure, lower tax rates were in the air of international policy discussions from the 1980s, and this thinking also influenced policymakers in Ireland, but Ireland brought them further than most. Thus, at pay rounds, Government negotiators could offer concessions in those taxes that are felt by the working person — especially income tax but also some expenditure taxes. …
In 2008, tax revenue fell by almost 14 per cent — but the percentage fall in the cyclically sensitive taxes was much larger, at 36 per cent. The differential falloff in revenue continued and even intensified into the first two months of 2009.
Had Ireland’s tax structure been less cyclically sensitive, the fall in revenue would have been much lower. Indeed, if cyclically sensitive taxes had been back at their 1987 share of total revenue, the fall in revenue in 2008 would have been much lower: 8 per cent instead of 14 per cent.
…the sudden collapse in taxation. …the way in which Government spending had a strong upward momentum. It doubled in real terms between 1995 and 2007 for a real growth rate of 6 per cent per annum. With GDP and GNP growing even faster, this made for a generally falling or stable ratio until 2003, but thereafter the ratio grew, especially as soon as this started to slow in 2007.
Actually, spending grew by over 11 per cent real in both 2007 and 2008, reflecting an unfortunate late relaxation of spending which has worsened the deficit in the crisis just when it began to matter.
It is clear, then, that a return to budgetary stability requires not only a tax adjustment but also a reining in and rollback of spending; such a policy has been announced by the Government in the supplementary budget of April 2009.
3. The property bubble and the banking crisis
Even if the lower real and nominal interest rates from 1998 meant that any given income could support the servicing of much higher loans, the three-fold increase in average real property prices from 1994 to 2006 was the highest boom in any advanced economy in recent times. Long before it peaked, it looked unsustainable to most commentary. Nevertheless, from 2003 on, banks continued to ease loan conditions such as maximum loan-to-value ratios. These continued to fall right through 2006 despite the increasingly evident vulnerability of the bubble. Competitive pressure on the leading banks to protect market share came especially from reckless expansion by one bank, Anglo-Irish (whose market share among Irish-controlled retail banks jumped from 3 per cent to 18 per cent in a decade, as it grew its total portfolio by an average of 36 per cent real). Foreign controlled banks, especially the local subsidiary of HBOS also contributed.
Bank regulation, although on the surface compliant with international standards, was complacent and permissive. Certainly it should have impeded the growth of Anglo-Irish bank. And it should have acted more vigorously to restrain the relaxation of lending standards: by 2006, fully two-thirds of loans to first time buyers had loan-to-value in excess of 90 per cent; one-third were getting 100 per cent loans. Regulatory stress tests were too timid (for example employing only a 20 per cent fall in house prices). …
Banks funded the surging loan demand by huge foreign borrowings. By early 2008, net foreign borrowing by Irish banks had jumped to over 60 per cent of GDP from 10 per cent in 2003. Irish-controlled banks, long active in the retail market in Northern Ireland and in Britain, were also vigorous lenders in these and other property markets in Europe and North America during these years.
More or less simultaneously with Britain and the US, real residential property prices in Ireland peaked in late 2006. Loan demand slowed and construction – which had employed over 13 per cent of the workforce – began to contract.
At first, the banks were relatively unconcerned, their share prices peaked in February 2007, but remained high through the remainder of that year. Although they had become highly dependent on property-related lending (which now accounted for over 60 per cent of their total lending, up from less than 40 per cent only four years before), the perception was that most household mortgages would continue to be serviced even if house prices fell back by 20-30 per cent. The growing international banking crisis cast doubt on such complacency, and especially after the rescue of Bear Stearns, the liquidity of Anglo Irish bank came under repeated pressure. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, Anglo was unable to secure funding and effectively failed, requiring a government rescue.
Fearing a contagious reaction on confidence in the other banks, the authorities decided not to put Anglo into a government-controlled winding-up, but instead, extended a systemwide bank guarantee on, and with effect from end-September 2008.
The prospective budgetary cost if this guarantee (should it have to be called), together with the dramatic collapse in tax revenue which was becoming increasingly evident, began to put upward pressure on the secondary market yields of Irish Government securities. The spread over German Federal Government bonds at 10 years maturity jumped from about 30 basis points in September reaching 284 basis points in March 2009 before falling back.
Although all of the banks are currently reporting a healthy capital position, bolstered in the case of the two biggest ones by the Government’s injection in the form of preference shares of a total of €7 billion (or over 2 per cent of their aggregate balance sheet), there is a large discrepancy between these reported figures and the market’s assessment of the true value of equity shares in the banks, considering the likely scale of future loan losses beyond those currently acknowledged by the banks. The banks’ share prices have fallen to as low as 1 per cent of their peak value of just two years ago. …
The Government announced in April 2009 that a National Asset Management Agency would be created to acquire the development property portfolio of the banks at a written-down value. The book value of the loans to be purchased was put at €80-90 billion, or about 50 per cent of GDP. If (as seemed likely) the valuation process for the loans resulted in write-downs bringing capital below regulatory levels, the Government will inject common equity, likely taking a substantial majority stake in the banks, though they have indicated reluctance to become outright owners,
4. Loss of wage competitiveness
From 1986 to 2000, wage restraint, generally attributed in part to the effect of the centralized pay negotiations, but owing something also to the high initial level of unemployment and the dampening impact of immigration (econometric work is inconclusive on these points), helped generate and sustain an era of full employment.
But after 2000, wage competitiveness deteriorated. By 2008, hourly wage rates had raced ahead of those in competitor counties, when measured in a common currency, by as much as 36 per cent.
Sooner or later, this loss of wage competitiveness was sure to affect employment expansion, but this was masked and delayed by the construction boom. Employment in the construction sector itself grew strongly from about 6-7 per cent of total employment in the early and mid-1990s to over 13 per cent in 2007. This is what sustained overall employment levels despite the loss of wage competitiveness.
An interesting feature of this pay process was that public sector workers were able to maintain a significant average wage premium relative to private sector workers during the Celtic Tiger period. …
5. The subtle role of EMU membership
Although growth remained strong for most of the first decade of Ireland’s membership of the eurozone, the analysis we have presented suggests that the seeds of the crisis were sown around the time the single currency began at the beginning of 1999. But was this a causal factor or a coincidence?
Elements of eurozone membership certainly contributed to the property boom, and to the deteriorating drift in wage competitiveness. Low interest rates and the removal of exchange rate risk facilitated the boom; the insensitivity of the exchange rate and of interest rates to domestic developments removed a traditional external constraint or at least warning sign. The enlargement of the EU also meant that the boom could continue longer than otherwise, fuelled as it was by strong inward migration.
Specifically, real interest rates 1998-2007 averaged minus 1 per cent, compared with over 7 per cent in the ERM period (even excluding the crisis of 1992-3) and 3¾ in the floating rate period between the two. The fall in nominal interest rates was even steeper. No wonder long-lived assets like residential property, capitalized at permanently lower discount factors, seemed and were appropriately valued more highly than before. …
Up to 2003, the property boom was financed without significant recourse to foreign borrowing, but after then the banks started to borrow heavily from abroad. This was an effortless undertaking thanks to the removal of currency risk and went essentially unnoticed by analysts, the focus of policy attention having shifted away entirely from balance of payments concerns. Unlike imbalances of the past, overborrowing did not lead to interest rate increases, again because currency risk had been altogether removed. Only when credit risk became an issue after September 2008 did the financial markets belatedly sound a warning sign.
… To be sure, all of these imbalances and misalignments could have happened outside of EMU – indeed, similar problems were experienced in other non-euro countries in the EU and the EEA. But the policy antennae had not been re-tuned in Ireland, and corrective action that could and should have been taken (fiscal policy, bank regulation, centralized wage negotiations) were neglected as a result. A costly error that will not be repeated in Ireland and should not be repeated elsewhere..
6. Concluding remarks: Lessons
The Celtic Tiger period represented a solid convergence of Ireland to the frontier. But it ended in 2000, to be succeeded by an old-fashioned property bubble. The lengthy period of success lulled policy makers into a false sense of security, not to say invulnerability. Captured by hubris, they neglected to ensure the basics: a robust tax system, a mechanism for ensuring wage rates—especially those in the public sector and as such under government control—did not get out of line internationally, and above all, they largely ignored the need for conventional prudential regulation of the main banks, allowing a rogue bank’s reckless expansionism to destabilize the whole sector. …
Macro-modellers simulating possible recovery paths have concluded that the future path of GDP in Ireland will be lower than had been projected before the crisis by at least 10 per cent, and that, while recovery could begin by 2011, the economy will not have return fully to its equilibrium growth path before 2015. It should thereafter be possible to maintain the fundamental conditions that allowed the Irish Economy to reach the high levels of output and productivity attained by 2000, including the quality of education, social and physical infrastructure. The main domestic threats to this (that is, apart from the risk of a more prolonged global recession, especially if accompanied by protectionist policies abroad), would be the danger that policy is insufficiently decisive in correcting the public finances and cleaning-up the banks, and that wage determination processes are insufficiently flexible to deliver the declines in real wages now needed at a time when prices are falling.
On these matters, government, employers and trade unions are currently feeling their way towards politically and socially acceptable solutions.
Here is an article, Warning that house prices may fall by 80% (Jan 13, 2009) | Laura Slattery. Underlines, italicization, et al. are on our own.
HOUSING MARKET: IRELAND WILL see more demolition than construction of houses over the next decade, as the economy struggles to recover from the collapse of the housing market and the emergence of “zombie” banks, UCD economist Morgan Kelly told the conference.
In a presentation that drew several collective intakes of breath, Mr Kelly predicted that house prices would fall by 80 per cent from peak to trough in real terms.
“Construction, but not demolition, of residential and commercial property will fall to zero for the foreseeable future,” he said.
Low levels of education among those employed in construction – where worker numbers peaked at about 280,000 – meant retraining would not be straightforward.
Recovery will be slow: “It has taken us 10 years to get into this situation – it will in all likelihood take us 10 years to get out of it.”
Mr Kelly said he had been hailed as being extremely prescient as a result of his warnings in relation to the property bubble, when in fact he and a handful of other “amateurs” were merely stating what was obvious.
Sparing no blushes, he said professional economists in the Central Bank and the Economic and Social Research Institute “need to look very closely at their analyses of the Irish economy and figure out what went wrong”.
Mr Kelly said Ireland’s “reputational capital” had been damaged by “chancers” such as ex-Anglo Irish Bank chairman Seán FitzPatrick, who had been abetted by “buffoons” such as former financial regulator Patrick Neary, Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan and the Taoiseach.
In discussing the €110 billion given in loans to developers, Mr Kelly said a typical regional housing collapse in the US saw banks sustain a 20 per cent loss on these loans, but the narrowness of the Irish market increased the risk of “substantially larger losses” for Irish banks.
“The guarantees of Anglo and [Irish] Nationwide liabilities have a strong chance of being called in over the next 21 months,” he said. Extending the Government guarantee to these two financial institutions was “extraordinarily unwise” and could produce losses that the State cannot afford to repay.
The global financial crisis may have been positive for the Irish economy as it “stopped us dragging ourselves even deeper into our hole,” he said. “If it had taken another year or two, we would have ended up in an Icelandic-shaped hole, which is not to say that we won’t end up in one.”
Mr Kelly said the Government should abolish stamp duty on property, compile proper price and quantity statistics and restore competitiveness through a public sector pay cut of 10 per cent.
A paper by TCD economist Patrick Honohan on the banking crisis (What Went Wrong In Ireland?) argued that capital injections in the banks were a prerequisite for recovery. The financial regulator needed to decide now which banks had systemic importance to the economy – in other words, are “too big to fail”, and which are “zombie” banks.
“The goal is to avoid the continued operation of an undercapitalised, error-prone bank with a flawed business model and administrative practices, a problematic customer base and a compromised management facing distorted incentives,” the paper stated.
Here is an article, Entrepreneurship Takes Off in Ireland (JAN. 17, 2008) | JAMES FLANIGAN @nytimes. Excerpts, underlines, italicization, et al. are on our own.
DUBLIN — Ireland is now alive with enthusiasm for entrepreneurs, who seemingly rank just below rock stars in popularity.
For evidence, consider the Ernst & Young accounting firm’s award for Irish Entrepreneur of the Year. The award show was prime-time television fare in October. (The winner, Liam Casey, runs a business…
The change began when Ireland entered the European Union in 1973. In subsequent years, the government rewrote its tax policies to attract foreign investment by American corporations, made all education free through the university level and changed tax rates and used direct equity investment to encourage Irish people to set up their own businesses.
“The change came in the 1990s,” said James Murphy, founder and managing director of Lifes2Good, a marketer of drugstore products for muscle aches, hair loss and other maladies. “Taxes and interest rates came down, and all of a sudden we believed in ourselves.”
The new environment also encouraged Ray Nolan, who founded Raven Computing in 1989 to provide software for lawyers to keep track of billable hours. He sold that company and founded another that created software for companies to manage billing and receipts. And in 1999, he founded Web Reservations International to provide booking and property management for hostels that cater to backpackers and economy travelers.
“Hostel owners needed to keep track of people sharing rooms, and bookings for Americans coming to Dublin for three nights,” said Feargal Mooney, chief operating officer of Web Reservations. “Hostel accommodations go for 10 to 20 euro a night,” he said, or $15 to $30 at today’s exchange rates, “so booking reservations in them wasn’t profitable for the big travel companies.”
As the business grew — its 100 employees and banks of computers now handle reservations for some 50,000 hostels in 166 countries — Web Reservations was offered an equity investment by Enterprise Ireland. “But we said this is our baby, we didn’t want to give up equity,” Mr. Mooney said. …
Government help for Irish entrepreneurs grew out of an overall economic policy devised in 1987 that reduced personal taxes, said Kevin Sherry, a director of Enterprise Ireland who specializes in start-up companies.
Income tax rates in Ireland today are 20 percent on the first $50,000 of income and 41 percent on income above that. But there are value-added taxes of 21 percent levied on all goods and transactions, with the exception of health and medical services, children’s clothing and food.
The tax on corporate profits, though, is 12.5 percent, which is an incentive to own a business. And government helps out. “We have helped over 300 people or groups in the last dozen years or so,” Mr. Sherry said.
Enterprise Ireland has also put up initial capital for venture investment funds and supports research and development. “We must support new approaches, nanotechnology, biotechnology and other sciences,” Mr. Sherry said, “because we cannot succeed in the future using what got us here in the past.”
Colm O’Gorman, who teaches entrepreneurship in master of business administration courses at Dublin City University, said the government agency is at the heart of several trends. Enterprise Ireland “supports research and development at Irish companies and universities,” Professor O’Gorman said, “and it is encouraging more women to become entrepreneurs, as the role of women has changed in Irish life.”
One reason for many changes in Ireland is its membership in the European Union, which has brought new perspectives and regulations from its governing councils in Brussels.
Elaine Doorly, for example, founded Radiation Safety Ireland three years ago to advise industry on effects of radiation in building materials, scanners and other sources, an evolving field that is driven by regulation from Brussels.
Ms. Doorly runs her consulting company part time while also working as the health officer specializing in radiological protection for the University of Dublin-Trinity College, the institution that is a leading site of Irish scientific research. She has held that post for 10 years. …
Mr. Murphy, 46, of Lifes2Good is one of the entrepreneurs who has expanded his business beyond Ireland’s borders. He qualified as a chartered accountant in the 1980s and worked in several countries in Europe before returning to Ireland in 1991 looking to own a business. …
Mr. Murphy founded Lifes2Good in 1997. Using infomercials to promote micro-current pain relief and health and beauty aids, the business spread throughout Britain and the Continent and grew to 40 employees and $30 million in annual revenue. Now he is trying to expand in the United States. …
Mr. Sherry of Enterprise Ireland said the passion behind the efforts to support entrepreneurs comes from a desire to make Ireland a better place. “We’re old enough to remember when times weren’t good. We don’t want to go back there.”
Here is an article, The luck of the Irish (Oct 14th 2004) | @TheEconomist. Underlines, italicization, et al. are on our own.
The economic boom that spawned the “Celtic Tiger” has transformed Ireland. But, asks John Peet (interviewed here), can it last?
SURELY no other country in the rich world has seen its image change so fast. Fifteen years ago Ireland was deemed an economic failure, a country that after years of mismanagement was suffering from an awful cocktail of high unemployment, slow growth, high inflation, heavy taxation and towering public debts. Yet within a few years it had become the “Celtic Tiger”, a rare example of a developed country with a growth record to match East Asia’s, as well as enviably low unemployment and inflation, a low tax burden and a tiny public debt.
The Economist proved no better than anyone else at predicting this turnaround. Our most recent previous survey of Ireland, “The poorest of the rich”, published in 1988, concluded that the country was heading for catastrophe, mainly because it had tried to erect a welfare state on continental European lines in an economy that was too poor to support one. Yet only nine years later, in 1997, Ireland featured on The Economist‘s cover as “Europe’s shining light” [Ireland shines: Lessons and questions from an economic transformation (May 15th 1997)]. It goes to show how remarkable has been the transformation of a sleepy European backwater into a vibrant economy that in some years grew by as much as 10%.
That transformation has made the Irish republic, with just over 4m people, a place of great interest around the globe. Many rich countries, not least Ireland’s sclerotic neighbours in western Europe, would love to achieve a similar change of image. The eight central European countries that joined the European Union in May seem fascinated by Ireland. Civil servants and businessmen in Dublin talk wearily of a procession of visitors from such places as Vilnius and Bratislava, anxious to emulate Ireland’s leap from one of the EU’s poorest members in the 1980s into one of its richest. They all promise that they will make good use of EU money, as Ireland did, and avoid the fate of Greece, which in the 1980s was not far behind Ireland but has since been left standing.
Punching above its weight
The world’s interest in Ireland is not confined to its rags-to-riches story. Thanks partly to the Irish diaspora, created by a century and a half of emigration, the country has far more clout than its small population might suggest. It had a notable stint on the United Nations Security Council in 2001-02. And Europeans were impressed by the Irish presidency of the European Union in the first half of this year, which took in not only the eastward expansion of the EU and the choice of a new commission president, but also a deal on a new EU constitutional treaty, brokered by the Irish taoiseach (prime minister), Bertie Ahern. On a less elevated level, the main streets of cities the world over feature “Irish pubs” serving draught Guinness.
Over the border, Northern Ireland, which has a population of 1.7m, offers a valuable case-study in how to resolve an entrenched terrorist problem. The peace process in the province remains partial, bumpy and incomplete (only last month British, Irish and Northern Irish leaders failed yet again to agree on a precise formula for the revival of devolved government in Belfast). Yet ten years of painstaking diplomacy, by both the British and the Irish governments and by politicians and paramilitary leaders on both sides of the sectarian divide in the north, have largely put an end to the violence that for two decades disfigured Northern Ireland. Other countries with intractable terrorist problems might take note.
Peace in Northern Ireland has helped to boost the economy of the whole island. A visitor to Dublin, so lively and cosmopolitan today, would find it hard to believe that only a few decades ago it was gloomy and depressed. In the 1960s Ireland’s heavily agricultural economy, almost wholly dependent on exports to Britain, was only just emerging from the misguided protectionism that since the 1930s had been the main plank of Eamon De Valera’s ill-advised economic policy. Ireland had missed out almost entirely on Europe’s post-war boom; living standards were stagnating and emigration was in full flow. In 1960 the republic’s population was down to around 2.8m, the lowest in two centuries and a pale shadow of the 8m (for the whole island) in 1840, when this was one of the most densely populated countries in Europe. Many wondered if Ireland had a future.
In fact, the 1960s proved something of a turning-point. Corporate tax on foreign multinational companies investing in Ireland was cut to zero in 1957. Belatedly, the country embraced free trade with Britain and, by joining the European Economic Community in 1973, with much of the rest of Europe. The combination of zero corporate taxes, a low-wage economy inside the EEC and a shared language proved a strong lure for American manufacturers. Ireland’s long love affair with foreign direct investment (FDI) began in the 1960s. Free secondary education for all arrived in 1967, and after 1973 Irish farmers benefited from Europe’s munificent farm subsidies.
This promising start, however, was kyboshed by the two oil shocks of the 1970s, and even more by a knuckle-headed policy response. Successive Irish governments sought to offset the cut in living standards imposed by higher oil prices through fiscal and monetary expansion. The result, ultimately, was the high inflation, high unemployment, slow growth and even electoral instability that marred the 1980s. Emigration, especially of graduates, hit new highs. At the start of the third Haughey government in 1987, a grim joke made the rounds: would the last Irishman to leave please turn out the lights? Yet only a few years later the Irish miracle had arrived. What caused it? Can it be replicated? And can it last?
Here is an article, Cowen must be Mister Fix-It, not a master of disaster (28/12/2008) | RICHARD ALDOUS. Excerpts, underlines, italicization, et al. are on our own.
The year ended with the death of Conor Cruise O’Brien, arguably Ireland’s greatest public intellectual and a political force more honoured abroad than in his own country. As the most prominent anti-IRA member of the Cosgrave government, O’Brien would have had some sympathy for any government minister held hostage at gunpoint.
Like O’Brien, the TD in question, Dick Roche, showed a certain coolness in the face of danger. Perhaps it seemed like déjà-vu. For in 2008 the political establishment has spent most of the year with a gun to its head.
That’s certainly what the Mahon Tribunal felt like for the first four months of the year. In the end, then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern decided to pull the trigger himself for the sake of the political process and the country. Troubling questions remain about the democratic deficit involved in this turn of events. Politicians clearly must be held to account — that is why the tribunal was established in the first place. …
But Mahon was not the only assault on the political establishment this year. Declan Ganley, who many had laughed off, emerged as the most successful campaigner of the year. His triumph in the Lisbon referendum was in turn a humiliation for the political elite. The ‘Yes’ campaign’s message that the treaty was a tidying up exercise was dull to the point of inertia. Nobody seemed to be in charge. …
If the resurrection of the treaty remains a possibility, one death looks final and irreversible. The Celtic Tiger has now gone the way of the dodo. A year ago all the talk was of soft landings and money-making resilience. Now the only question is whether the country can avoid a depression.
In September, having been the golden haired child of EU economic vitality, Ireland became the first western European country to go into recession. Worse followed. Bank bailouts, rising unemployment and emigration, increased taxes (a.k.a. the ‘income levy’), a black hole in the public finances, shrinking taxation revenues, ballooning national debt, out of control public sector spending: all the news was bad with a promise of worse to come.
Global economic woes and the humiliation of Lisbon played havoc with Brian Cowen’s first hundred-plus days in office. …
The challenge now for Mr Cowen is to show that he represents Ireland’s future rather than the fag end of the Ahern years. Events further afield in 2008 will have given him cause for despondency and encouragement.
Who’d have thought that Offaly would produce both the sitting Taoiseach and the US President-elect? But Brian Cowen won’t like the precedent set by the victory of Barack Obama.
Obama was swept to power on a change agenda that saw off his own party establishment in the Clintons and then, in John McCain, crushed just about the only Republican able to claim a reform mandate. It is easy to forget that even as late as September, Senator McCain was narrowly ahead in the opinion polls. Then came the collapse of Lehman Brothers. McCain’s campaign went into instant meltdown and never recovered. Senator Obama may have been untested and offering the kind of liberal economic programme that in previous elections had seen Democrats like George McGovern trounced. The electorate didn’t care: change coupled with Obama’s personal dynamism was better than continuity of any kind.
That’s bad news for Mr Cowen after more than a decade of Fianna Fail government. For encouragement, he needs to look not across the Atlantic but instead over the Irish Sea.
For much of 2008, the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, found himself in a similar position to the Taoiseach. Opinion polls seemed apocalyptic. His performances in the House of Commons were leaden. Having been an impressive ‘Iron’ Chancellor of the Exchequer, the premiership appeared to have diminished him. It seemed only a matter of time before he was replaced.
Then the banking crisis hit. The prime minister found a new energy and purpose. He even took up yoga. Where previously there had been no direction, now there was vision and strategy. Gordon Brown visibly bucked up. Opinion polls reflected a sense that after all, he might be the right man for the job.
There’s a lesson in this. We forgive mistakes that come from brave decisions. It is inertia and despair that earns our contempt. Early on, the Cowen government took the courageous route. The guarantee to the banks was bold and imaginative. It drew international criticism followed by quiet imitation. Since then, however, there has been only drift.
Another lesson from Mr Brown is that bold decisions require political heft. When the British prime minister was polling badly, there was precious little of that in his cabinet. His response, to widespread amazement, was to bring his old foe Peter Mandelson back from Brussels. Blairite advisors Alistair Campbell and Jonathan Powell also returned to the fold. The turnaround in fortunes was immediate and dramatic.
Mr Cowen has plenty of talent in a young team, but the more experienced cabinet heavyweights, notably Micheal Martin, have been kept at an arm’s length from economic policy making.
If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, Mr Cowen could do worse than bring Charlie McCreevy back from Brussels. Like Mandelson, he is a controversial figure, but he has chutzpah and is a bold thinker. More than any other individual in Fianna Fail, Mr McCreevy has the ability to get the government on the front foot again. And to cheer everyone up.
That last point is more important than we might think. An observation often made of Mr Brown is that he has visibly perked up since the financial crisis began. That may seem odd in the middle of a global meltdown, but it reflects his renewed sense of confidence and purpose.
Some of that may be to do with the early morning yoga in Downing Street. More likely, it is because he finally believes he’s up to the job.
History teaches us that optimism is one of the most important aspects of political leadership when times are hard. Franklin D Roosevelt, whose New Deal steered the US through the great depression of the 1930s, is considered among America’s very finest presidents. Yet in reality the economy in that decade remained a disaster, with unemployment stuck at 20 per cent even as late as 1938. But Roosevelt, with his breezy fireside chats and sense that he was doing everything possible continued to be trusted — in 1936, he was re-elected with the greatest landslide in the history of the two-party system.
The Taoiseach needs to find a similar kind of optimism and direction. No-one is suggesting yoga in government buildings — although don’t knock it if it works — but what he does need to convey is the sense that he is the master not the servant of events.
Mr Cowen is not afraid of a fight. But he may need to mix it with a smile on his face.
He could find worse role models than Dick Roche and Conor Cruise O’Brien.
Here is an article, How Ireland Became the Celtic Tiger (June 2006) | Sean Dorgan (@Heritage). Underlines, italicization, et al. are on our own.
In just over a generation, Ireland has evolved from one of the poorest countries in Western Europe to one of the most successful. It has reversed the persistent emigration of its best and brightest and achieved an enviable reputation as a thriving, knowledge-driven economy.
As a result of sustained efforts over many years, the past of declining population, poor living standards, and economic stagnation has been left behind. Ireland now has the second highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita within the European Union (after Luxembourg), one-third higher than the EU-25 average, and has achieved exceptional growth.
One of the biggest successes of the Irish economy has been new job creation. From 1990 to 2005, employment soared from 1.1 million to 1.9 million. Economic growth, more Jobs, and rising living standards meant the resolution of the emigration problem, which had bedeviled Ireland for generations.
The population increased by almost 15 percent from 1996 to 2005 in a striking reversal of previous trends. In one year alone (July 2004 – June 2005), employment increased by 5 percent. Ireland is now seen as the land of opportunity by many workers from the 10 newest EU member states. Its unemployment rate of 4.4 percent is less than half the EU average. Public budgets are in balance, and foreign investment was equivalent to 17 percent of GDP in 2003.
Ireland achieved this success through a combination of sensible policies and pragmatism. At the heart of these policies was a belief in economic openness to global markets, low tax rates, and investment in education. While economic success over the past 15 years can be ascribed to a range of domestic and international factors, it was not a fluke. Ireland has long had, and intends to sustain, low tax rates to attract investment. Its current 12.5 percent corporate tax rate evolved from the zero rate on export sales in the 1950s and the 10 percent rate on manufacturing and some internationally traded services introduced in 1980.
Ireland’s transformation was national in scope, with individuals, businesses, institutions, and government sharing the same ambition. It involved parents deciding that their children would have choices that they did not have and would not be forced to leave their home communities because of economic necessity. Political decisions were driven and sustained by the public will for success. There were some deviations from sensible policies at times, but through the many difficult years, the threads of consistent development can be seen. This paper explains how the transformation occurred.
For a generation after achieving independence from the United Kingdom in 1922, Ireland sought to be economically self-sufficient. It relied on small-scale agriculture, exporting primary produce to the U.K. market and manufacturing mainly for the home market of less than 3 million people. trade barriers such as high Tariffs and a policy of import substitution sought to make this reliance on economic nationalism successful. Inevitably, it failed.
Ireland’s population was just short of 3 million people when the new state was established in 1922. It fell marginally each decade thereafter until the 1950s, when 400,000 people (one-seventh of the population) emigrated in a single decade. There could be no clearer evidence of the failure of economic policies and opportunities and of the inadequate fulfillment of national aspirations.
By the mid-1950s, it was clear that economic nationalism was not sustainable. The stagnation and emigration, and the despondency they caused, were in stark contrast to other, fast-recovering economies of postwar Europe. As a result, radical policy change was introduced, and the previous protectionism was abandoned in favor of openness, driven by the need for progress from an intolerable position that offered few prospects for economic success.
The policy changes were drawn together in Economic Development, an official paper published in 1958 that overturned much previous policy thinking by advocating free trade, foreign investment, productive (rather than mainly social) investment, and growth rather than fiscal restraint as the prime objective of economic management. In 1956, to spur business development, tax relief on profits from export sales from Ireland was offered for the first time. In 1958, all controls on foreign ownership of businesses were lifted.
In the early 1960s, Ireland unilaterally lowered its import Tariffs and started to negotiate a free trade agreement with the U.K. This agreement was concluded in 1965, and Ireland joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and trade in 1967. In 1961, Ireland expressed its ambition to join the European Economic Community (EEC), which had been founded by the six member states in the previous decade. The U.K. had the same ambition, but this was thwarted by a French veto for some years, and Ireland’s application did not proceed. The U.K., Ireland, and Denmark finally joined the EEC in 1973.
These policy changes were facilitated by a transition from the generation that had won independence (although Sean Lemass, the political leader who made the most changes in a few years, was himself part of that generation) and by Ken Whitaker, the young and forward-looking head of the civil service, who led the Department of Finance from 1956 to 1969. Whitaker was the primary author of Economic Development.
The Transition to Openness
More open markets spurred improved economic performance in the 1960s, compared to the previous decade. Annual average growth in national income – both GDP and gross national product (GNP) – was 4.2 percent. The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) sought out new modern industry overseas, which benefited from the attractions of abundant English-speaking and low-cost labor and the exemption from corporation tax of all profits from exports. Pfizer, which established its first plant in 1969, was one of over 350 overseas companies that set up in Ireland by 1970.
However, this progress did not initially spur employment or stop emigration. In fact it came at a price: Many companies that had been set up in earlier years to serve the small closed national market were uncompetitive in the face of free trade. Moreover, Ireland still depended heavily on agriculture, which had low output and income levels, and the migration of people from the land was greater than job creation in new businesses. As a result, there was no net increase in employment in the 1960s, and net emigration from the country continued, although at a lower rate than in the 1950s.
The role of the state also increased during the 1960s. Public expenditure grew from 32 percent of GNP in 1960 to 42 percent in 1973. Social services and education, in particular, expanded with the state. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) sponsored an influential report on education in Ireland, Investment in Education, which was published in 1965. This report emphasized that education was key to the future of Ireland’s society and economy. Although not directly recommended in the report, beginning in 1967, the state paid for all secondary schooling and transportation to school. This measure resulted in a rapid rise in the level of education attained by the younger population.
Attempts were made to adjust to the new openness. The National Industrial and Economic Council, comprising government, business, and other interests, discussed the challenges of restructuring industry now faced with free-trade competition. Underlying the extensive processes of consultation and engagement was a clear commitment to change, even if that change had inevitable problems and costs.
With hindsight, the path to openness was irreversible, although it may not always have seemed so at the time. The establishment of the first (state-owned) television service in 1960 quickly facilitated debate on, and sometimes a questioning of, long-established societal norms and values. The country, which had been introspective and highly sensitized by its history, now began to see the possibilities that others enjoyed.
Joining Europe and Going Forward
When Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, its confidence and sense of its own status grew. Now it could deal with large and successful states as a partner, no longer burdened by its colonial history. Business now had free access to a much larger market, and exports could be diversified away from dependence on the U.K. Moreover, through the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy, agriculture gained from access to wider markets at good prices. An improvement in Ireland’s living standards and prospects lifted spirits.
The 1970s reversed past trends. For the first time since independence, the population increased, rising by 15 percent for the decade. National income increased at a sustained annual rate of about 4 percent. Unlike previous decades, employment increased by about 1 percent per year, although a large part of this increase was in the state sector, contributing to financing problems in subsequent years.
The IDA played a central role in the new drive for success. While still funded by the state, the IDA was established in 1970 with its own board, staff, and operating freedoms, separate from the Department of Industry and Commerce of which it had been a part. It was the first dedicated state agency in the world to undertake a massive and sustained campaign to establish a modern manufacturing base by attracting large-scale foreign investment.
The IDA adopted pragmatic, business-like, focused marketing methods. The key decision was to focus on companies that represented the future-high technology, high output, and high skills. The main targets included the computer industry, pharmaceuticals, and medical technology, followed by international services. Soon investments were won from leading companies, including Amdahl, Baxter Travenol, Digital, Merck Sharpe, Wang, and Warner Lambert. All of these companies were persuaded of the value of using Ireland as an export platform to serve Europe and other markets. By 1975, more than 450 foreign-owned industrial projects, covering a wide range of manufacturing sectors, accounted for two-thirds of Ireland’s total industrial output.
While the new multinational companies brought success, many older indigenous businesses had considerable difficulty in adjusting to the new open trading conditions. An apparent dichotomy in the performance of new and old, foreign and Irish companies would be the subject of debate and some policy reassessment in the following years.
The 1970s also saw a rapid expansion in public (state) expenditure on social welfare, health and education, housing, telecommunications and other infrastructure, and administrative services. Public-sector employment represented a third of the total workforce by 1980, partly because Jobs were created to deal with rising unemployment, which stood at 9 percent of the workforce in 1977.
All of this happened against a backdrop of high inflation, which averaged 13.6 percent per year from 1971 to 1980 and was driven partly by international factors such as oil crises and partly by domestic demand and an expansionary fiscal policy. Public budget deficits and high public borrowing were features of the latter years of the decade, creating the basis for the crises that erupted in the 1980s.
Unsolved, the underlying economic problems of the 1970s rolled over into the 1980s, producing disappointment. The causes were the return of high unemployment, emigration, steady worsening of the public finances, and the seeming inability of any government to manage the nation’s affairs and find a solution to the worsening situation. The atmosphere of the 1980s was more redolent of the dark years of the 1950s than of the optimism that had permeated the two decades in between.
The feeling of failure was exacerbated by the waves of emigration of young people, just as in a generation earlier. Whole classes of university graduates would frequently leave the country. There was a disheartening drain of human capital. A net 200,000 people left from 1981 to 1990. In the worst years, more than 1 percent of the country’s population fled. This was not what the policies of the previous 25 years had been designed to achieve. What had gone wrong?
A number of internal and external factors were conspiring to slow down progress and undermine confidence. Global conditions were weaker after the oil shocks of the 1970s. The momentum from EEC entry had faded. Persistent inflation averaged close to 11 percent per year between 1981 and 1986. Jobs created by new foreign investment, while substantial, were inadequate to employ the growing workforce and counter the failure rate of older businesses.
Attempts at government intervention proved to be no better. Continued increases in public spending, tax increases, and deficit financing through borrowing soured the investment climate and failed to raise employment while increasing the drag on the underperforming economy.
Between 1980 and 1986, total government expenditure grew from 54 percent to 62 percent of GNP, and public debt increased from 87 percent to 120 percent of GNP while annual budget deficits exceeded 10 percent of GNP. Over one-third of all tax revenue (over 90 percent of income tax revenue) was being used to service this debt. Meanwhile, the economic dependency ratio rose to 2.3 persons per person employed in 1985, and unemployment stood at 15 percent.
While the IDA continued to attract foreign investors (IBM, Lotus, Microsoft, and Bausch & Lomb, among many others) into the 1980s, some high-profile failures of recent investments raised questions about this strategy. In particular, a specially commissioned investigation by Telesis on behalf of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) raised some troubling issues.
Telesis found that the value of inward investments tended to be overstated-employment prospects were too often exaggerated at a time of high unemployment-and that promised linkages to the domestic economy were frequently weak. It also criticized what it saw as an excessive attention to overseas companies relative to indigenous businesses. While initially stung, the IDA responded well to the report and increased its attention to Irish-owned industry.
The political parties were not successfully addressing the gathering gloom. Fianna Fail, the opposition party since 1982, won the general election in 1987. When in government in the late 1970s, Fianna Fail had been largely responsible for the excessive and misguided public spending. This time, however, the party tried a different path. On election to government in 1987, they surprised many, including their own supporters, with a program of severe cuts in expenditure accompanied by some novel consensus-building and developmental measures. Within a few years, these steps began to show dividends, helped by a coincidence of other factors.
Recovery and Success
Smaller government became part of the road to success. There was surprise with the first moves to cut spending severely across a range of programs and abolish a number of government agencies. These steps were strongly criticized initially, especially when they seemed to affect (state-provided) health and social services, but the depth of the budgetary crisis allowed the momentum to be sustained. The government was assisted by a consensus that had been built in the NESC, comprising business, farming, trade union, and social interest groups. The main opposition party, whose leader had been minister for finance before the election, also supported any measures that restored fiscal discipline.
A second element of the new government’s action plan was moderate wage increases in return for modest reductions in direct income taxes, in effect allowing take-home pay to increase more than the pay raise granted by employers. This three-year Program for National Recovery involved government itself, employers, unions, and farmers. This helped to break the spiral of inflationary wage increases and ensured industrial peace. The program also served to create agreement on the nature of the crisis facing the state and on steps needed to deal with it. The wider benefits of consensus on development priorities and the shared efforts involved to achieve national goals proved to be of lasting value, and similar national partnership agreements have been put in place repeatedly up to 2005.
While cutting back on spending, the government took steps to promote business investment. A notable example was the adoption of a proposal to create the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in the old Docklands area of Dublin. The successful development of the IFSC shows the strength of cooperation between business interests and all parts of the state system that is such a strong characteristic of Ireland.
Development steps in financial services and other sectors were assisted by a series of investments in telecommunications from the 1980s onward, although the sector remained largely state-owned until the late 1990s. Late entry to heavy investment in this sector ultimately served Ireland well in that it provided the most advanced and comprehensive digital network in Europe (much as the relevance of the education system was also greater as a result of its late expansion).
Here is an article, The death of neoliberalism and the crisis in western politics: In the early 1980s the author was one of the first to herald the emerging dominance of neoliberalism in the west. Here he argues that this doctrine is now faltering. But what happens next? (21 August 2016) | @martjacques. Excerpts are on our own.
The western financial crisis of 2007-8 was the worst since 1931, yet its immediate repercussions were surprisingly modest. The crisis challenged the foundation stones of the long-dominant neoliberal ideology but it seemed to emerge largely unscathed. … Subsequent economic policy, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has relied overwhelmingly on monetary policy, especially quantitative easing. It has failed. …
… Although it failed the test of the real world, bequeathing the worst economic disaster for seven decades, politically and intellectually it remained the only show in town. Parties of the right, centre and left had all bought into its philosophy, New Labour a classic in point. They knew no other way of thinking or doing: it had become the common sense. It was, as Antonio Gramsci put it, hegemonic. But that hegemony cannot and will not survive the test of the real world.
… The effect of the financial crisis was to undermine faith and trust in the competence of the governing elites. It marked the beginnings of a wider political crisis.
… They go to the heart of the neoliberal project that dates from the late 70s and the political rise of Reagan and Thatcher, and embraced at its core the idea of a global free market in goods, services and capital. The depression-era system of bank regulation was dismantled, in the US in the 1990s and in Britain in 1986, thereby creating the conditions for the 2008 crisis. …
It should be noted that, by historical standards, the neoliberal era has not had a particularly good track record. The most dynamic period of postwar western growth was that between the end of the war and the early 70s, the era of welfare capitalism and Keynesianism, when the growth rate was double that of the neoliberal period from 1980 to the present.
… And the problem has grown more serious since the financial crisis. On average, between 65-70% of households in 25 high-income economies experienced stagnant or falling real incomes between 2005 and 2014.
The reasons are not difficult to explain. The hyper-globalisation era has been systematically stacked in favour of capital against labour: international trading agreements, drawn up in great secrecy, with business on the inside and the unions and citizens excluded…
As Thomas Piketty has shown, in the absence of countervailing pressures, capitalism naturally gravitates towards increasing inequality. In the period between 1945 and the late 70s, Cold War competition was arguably the biggest such constraint. …
… This popular revolt is often described, in a somewhat denigratory and dismissive fashion, as populism. Or, as Francis Fukuyama writes in a recent excellentessay in Foreign Affairs: “‘Populism’ is the label that political elites attach to policies supported by ordinary citizens that they don’t like.” …
…a cri de coeur from those who feel they have lost out and been left behind, whose living standards have stagnated or worse since the 1980s, who feel dislocated by large-scale immigration over which they have no control and who face an increasingly insecure and casualised labour market. …
… For many decades, the idea of the “working class” was marginal to American political discourse. Most Americans described themselves as middle class, a reflection of the aspirational pulse at the heart of American society. According to a Gallup poll, in 2000 only 33% of Americans called themselves working class; by 2015 the figure was 48%, almost half the population. …
The re-emergence of class should not be confused with the labour movement. …
The neoliberal era is being undermined from two directions. First, if its record of economic growth has never been particularly strong, it is now dismal. … Economists such as Larry Summers believe that the prospect for the future is most likely one of secular stagnation.
…the recovery has been so weak and fragile… the neoliberal era has delivered the west back into the kind of crisis-ridden world that we last experienced in the 1930s. … Second, those who have lost out in the neoliberal era are no longer prepared to acquiesce in their fate – they are increasingly in open revolt. We are witnessing the end of the neoliberal era. It is not dead, but it is in its early death throes, just as the social-democratic era was during the 1970s.
… From the mid-70s through the 80s, the economic debate was increasingly dominated by monetarists and free marketeers. But since the western financial crisis, the centre of gravity of the intellectual debate has shifted profoundly. This is most obvious in the United States, with economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, Dani Rodrik and Jeffrey Sachs becoming increasingly influential. … Thomas Piketty … Tony Atkinson and Angus Deaton … Ha-Joon Chang …
… But the zeitgeist had changed. The membership, especially the young who had joined the party on an unprecedented scale, wanted a complete break with New Labour. One of the reasons why the left has failed to emerge as the leader of the new mood of working-class disillusionment is that most social democratic parties became, in varying degrees, disciples of neoliberalism and uber-globalisation. …
But as David Marquand observed in a review for the New Statesman, what is the point of a social democratic party if it doesn’t represent the less fortunate, the underprivileged and the losers? New Labour deserted those who needed them, who historically they were supposed to represent. …
… Labour, like everyone else, is obliged to think anew. The membership in their antipathy to New Labour turned to someone who had never accepted the latter, who was the polar opposite in almost every respect of Blair, and embodying an authenticity and decency which Blair patently did not. …
Corbyn is not a product of the new times, he is a throwback to the late 70s and early 80s. That is both his strength and also his weakness. He is uncontaminated by the New Labour legacy because he has never accepted it. But nor, it would seem, does he understand the nature of the new era. …
… the condition of the Conservatives is not a great deal better. … It has no idea in which direction to move after Brexit. …
… Meanwhile, the Conservatives seem to have little understanding that the neoliberal era is in its death throes.
… Donald Trump … His message was straightforwardly anti-globalisation. He believes that the interests of the working class have been sacrificed in favour of the big corporations that have been encouraged to invest around the world and thereby deprive American workers of their jobs.
He proposes that US corporations should be required to invest their cash reserves in the US. …
… Given that their wages have been falling for most of the last 40 years, it is extraordinary how their interests have been neglected by the political class. Increasingly, they have voted Republican, but the Republicans have long been captured by the super-rich and Wall Street, whose interests, as hyper-globalisers, have run directly counter to those of the white working class. …
… As in the case of the Republicans, the Democrats have long supported a neoliberal, pro-globalisation strategy, notwithstanding the concerns of its trade union base. Both the Republicans and the Democrats now find themselves deeply polarised between the pro- and anti-globalisers, an entirely new development not witnessed since the shift towards neoliberalism under Reagan almost 40 years ago.
… He points to Japan and South Korea, and Nato’s European members as prime examples. …
…Trump’s position represents a major critique of America as the world’s hegemon. His arguments mark a radical break with the neoliberal, hyper-globalisation ideology that has reigned since the early 1980s and with the foreign policy orthodoxy of most of the postwar period. These arguments must be taken seriously. They should not be lightly dismissed just because of their authorship. But Trump is no man of the left. He is a populist of the right. …
Trump may well… But this does not mean that the forces opposed to hyper-globalisation… will have lost the argument and are set to decline. In little more than 12 months, Trump and Sanders have transformed the nature and terms of the argument. Far from being on the wane, the arguments of the critics of hyper-globalisation are steadily gaining ground. … And, above all else, what will continue to drive opposition to the hyper-globalisers is inequality.
Here is an interesting information:
Here is a paper, Economic Crises and the Changing Influence of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions @irishcongress on Public Policy (PDF, 2010) | Dr John Hogan, Dublin Institute of Technology @ditofficial. Underlines, italicization, excerpts, et al. are on our own.
This chapter examines the dramatic changes in the Irish Congress of Trade Unions’ (ICTU) influence over public policy during the latter half of the twentieth century. The chapter focuses upon the impact economic crises have had on the ICTU’s role in policy-making. The chapter concentrates, in particular, upon four periods, the late 1950s, 1970, the early 1980s and 1987, when the ICTU found its influence over public policy radically transformed. By the late 1950s the trade union movement was invited into the policy-making process by a government desperate to revive a sclerotic economy. During the following decade the ICTU played an integral part in the development of economic and social programmes. In 1970, due to concerns over inflation and the increasing level of industrial disputes, the ICTU, initially under government pressure, became a party to centralised bargaining. The National Wage Agreements that the ICTU was a party to during that decade were marked by their integration with government budgetary policy. With active state involvement in industrial relations came ICTU involvement in policy-making. However, by the early 1980s the Irish economy was in serious difficulties again. This, combined with trade union and employer disillusionment that the centralised agreements were not achieving their respective objectives of full employment and low inflation and a new collation government determined to remove the unions from the corridors of power, led to the collapse of the national agreements and ICTU finding itself shut out of the policy-making process. The years afterwards saw the economy continue to stagnate and the ICTU marginalised as a policymaking influence. By 1987, with Ireland teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, a new Fianna Fáil government came to power seeking to promote a three year national pay agreement with the unions and employers, in the hopes of reviving the economy. The ICTU, weakened through marginalisation and membership losses, favoured a return to centralised pay agreements. However, these agreements ultimately came to encompass a wide range of economic/social policy commitments that went far beyond the agreements of the 1970s.
Over the last half century, there has been a series of dramatic changes in the influence of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) on public policy. This chapter examines those changes, highlighting the circumstances under which they occurred and the kinds of influence the ICTU gained and lost, as a result of its fluctuating fortunes.
By the late 1950s, the Irish economy was in serious difficulty and a mood of despair pervaded society. Into this environment came Seán Lemass, the new Taoiseach and leader of the largest party, Fianna Fáil. Lemass introduced new ideas on how to manage the economy and how to reform the country’s relationship with the world. His ideas and influence transformed economic policy and had a profound influence on the role of trade unions in the formulation of public policy.
The growing economic openness of the 1960s produced incentives for new patterns of collective bargaining. Ireland had come to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI) to promote industrialisation and employment. In response, from the 1970s onwards, public policy was directed towards minimising strikes and restraining pay increases: ‘the then Fianna Fáil government of Jack Lynch brought the trade union movement into the policy-making process as a way of ensuring economic stability’.
However, by the early 1980s, the economy had deteriorated. Although centralised agreements between the employers, the government and the ICTU were the hallmark of industrial relations during the 1970s, they were not achieving the unions’ objectives. This led to reluctance on the part of the ICTU to continue participating in these agreements. Irrespective of the unions’ attitude, they were excluded from the policy-making environment by the Fine Gael and Labour coalition government (1982-1987) as economic decline gathered momentum.
By 1987, the economy reached a historic nadir. In response, a new Fianna Fáil minority administration sought a centralised pay agreement with the ICTU and the employers, bringing the unions’ influence directly back into the corridors of power. This was to be the first of a series of such agreements. The social partnership born of these agreements contributed to the transformation of society over the following decades.
The chapter is divided into four sections, each one of which deals with a particular period – the late 1950s–mid 1960s, mid 1960s–late 1970s, the early 1980s and the late 1980s – that saw the ICTU’s influence on public policy transformed. Each section begins with a discussion on the economy at that time and the impact that this had upon government thinking. Thereafter, the section moves on to examine how economic circumstances impacted upon the relations and interactions between the government and the trade union movement.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TRADE UNIONS’ ROLE IN SOCIETY (1950s – MID 1960s)
The trade union movement expanded with industrialisation in the 1930s. However, with industrialisation came inter-union rivalry. During the 1940s Seán Lemass, then Minister for Industry and Commerce, sought to encourage trade union rationalisation. However, efforts to rationalise the unions created tensions that fissured the movement. In April 1945, 15 Irish-based unions withdrew from the Irish Trades Union Congress (ITUC) and established the Congress of Irish Unions (CIU). The existence of two rival congresses weakened the movement’s efforts, dissipated resources and rendered a common front against employers impossible. However, in 1956, a Provisional United Trade Union Organisation was set up to co-ordinate the activities of both congresses, with a view to reunification.
The general election of 1957 resulted in a Fianna Fáil victory, and saw its 75-year-old leader, Éamon de Valera, form his final administration. The year ‘1957 is conventionally thought of as the end of an era, marking the final exhaustion of the ideas of the first generation of political leaders’. Two years later, de Valera was succeeded as Taoiseach by Seán Lemass. Lemass, although almost 60, and a lifelong follower of De Valera, was nevertheless to stand for a clean break with the policies of the past and was to oversee the opening of the country’s economy. The transformative impact of his innovative leadership, upon a then poor and insular Ireland, was to constitute the foundations upon which modern Ireland is built.
The Economic Stagnation of the 1950s
From the late 1940s onwards, the Irish economy stagnated. Ó Gráda and O’Rourke argue that ‘in the 1950s, Ireland’s relative [economic] performance was disastrous, poorer than the European average’. The benefits from protection had been reaped by the industrial expansion of the 1930s. The post-war economic boom petered out at the end of the 1940s. By the 1950s, Irish industry was supplying as much of the domestic market as it could.
OECD analysis showed agricultural production was abnormally low, while industrial output was faltering. Per capita GNP grew at 2.4 per cent throughout the 1950s, but only because of ‘the exceptional demographic experience during this period when net migration averaged forty-one thousand persons a year’. Yet, even this growth rate was among the lowest in the OECD. Although employment in the economy was falling, the cost of living was still high. The impact of these disastrous figures upon the populace at large cannot be underestimated.
In 1957, manufacturing output was no higher than in 1953, while building activity declined. Between 1951 and 1958, GDP rose by less than one per cent per annum, employment declined by 12 per cent, unemployment rose and half a million people emigrated. By the late 1950s, the outlook for the economy was depressing, while Europe was achieving strong and sustained growth.
The Government’s Response to the Economy
Upon his appointment as Minister for Industry and Commerce, in the new Fianna Fáil government of 1957, Lemass began implementing policies opening the state to foreign investment. Despite fears over the competitiveness of protected Irish industry, the pressure for change increased. By the end of the decade, both the government and opposition recognised the crisis facing the country. During the Dáil debate on Lemass’s nomination as Taoiseach, Daniel Desmond of the Labour Party argued that it was time for the political establishment to realise that solving the problems with the economy superseded their own struggles for power. On becoming Taoiseach in 1959, Lemass stated that the task was to consolidate the economic foundations of independence. He brought to government vigorous entrepreneurial leadership.
The crisis in the economy prompted a fundamental reappraisal of the policies pursued up to that time. Into this pessimistic environment came T.K. Whitaker’s report, Economic Development, in 1958. Whitaker, then Secretary of the Department of Finance, was committed to export-led growth. He advanced a strategy within the finance department of more planning, fewer tariff barriers and greater emphasis on productive investment: ‘It was in the atmosphere of a new government and a more active and interventionist Department of Finance, that Economic Development was born’.
This document was ‘a watershed in the modern economic history of the country’. It proposed the gradual transition to free trade, stimulation of private investment, the reorientation of government investment towards more productive uses, the introduction of grants and tax concessions to encourage export orientated manufacturing and the inducement of FDI oriented manufacturers. The document advocated abandoning the protectionism Fianna Fáil had pioneered since the 1930s. These measures were incorporated into the First Programme for Economic Expansion in November 1958. This White Paper, based on Whitaker’s document, ‘was drawn up by Charles Murray of the Department of Finance, supervised by a four-member Government subcommittee headed by Lemass’. The fact that Lemass was involved in the White Paper ensured that the essence of Economic Development’s recommendations remained intact:
While there were some significant differences between Economic Development and the [First] Programme for Economic Expansion, which arose out of their different parentage, such differences were for the most part cosmetic as the main thrust of both documents was the same.
The ICTU Brought in from the Cold
The ITUC and CIU eventually reunited after 15 years apart. The absence of ideological and organisational differences between the congresses made the process of reunification easier. …
Soon after Lemass became Taoiseach he sought a meeting with the ICTU to discuss the challenges facing the economy and how co-operation might be fostered between the various economic interests. The number of meetings between the new Taoiseach and the unions increased thereafter, whereas there had been little interaction with de Valera. These meetings covered a range of issues, from the economy to the prospects of Ireland joining the European Economic Community (EEC). This development was in line with the calls for consultation between state, unions and employers contained in the First Programme for Economic Expansion.
The Fianna Fáil government’s 1958 and 1959 budgets reflected a change in fiscal policy. Lemass’s speeches in 1959 often paralleled the positions adopted by the ICTU. These included the need for state involvement in development and the expansion of the state sector. The ICTU argued that the government should pump-prime the economy for growth and that capital investment should not be pursued to the detriment of social spending. Within a year of Lemass becoming Taoiseach, budgets began expanding, with increased investment in areas identified by Congress. By 1961, the reshaping of public capital expenditure, to give increased emphasis to directly productive investment, something the trade unions had argued for, stimulated economic growth. A policy of grants and tax exemptions attracted foreign capital and the government also pursued an increasingly liberal trade policy.
The Unions and Their Role in Policy Development
Until the 1950s, the unions’ influence was largely indirect. However, during the late 1950s, the government’s policies began to reflect those of the unions. Lemass’s perspective on economic development was close to that of Congress. In June 1959, Lemass remarked on the need for change in industrial development policy. The government began to regard the trade union movement in general, and the united Congress in particular, as both an ally and supporter of its programme for national development. The task of adjusting industries to competition led public policy into the realms of labour practices, industrial relations and pay bargaining. In return, Lemass was prepared to offer the unions an integral part in the development of economic and social programmes:
He [Lemass] clearly understood that the government would have to play a more active, even hegemonic, role in the Irish economy, but he also realised that the success of government strategy assumed a new partnership with different interest groups, which would (in time) become players in the policy game.
In 1961, the ICTU and the Federated Union of Employers (FUE) reached agreement on the formation of the Employer-Labour Conference (ELC), which the government subsequently facilitated. This body became central to corporatist control. The unions’ increasing influence was visible in all areas of government policy. For instance, the 1961 budget saw increases in social welfare payments at the behest of Congress.
Lemass argued that social progress would follow from economic development… With the move towards the liberalisation of trade and economic planning, Lemass was instrumental in creating consultative bodies involving the unions and employers…
Union membership, declining throughout the 1950s, increased after 1959 and would go on rising for the next 21 years. After 1959, the number of committees on which the ICTU was represented expanded. The Irish National Productivity Committee (INPC) was a joint consultative body charged with improving productivity. The Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO) was set up in 1961 to examine the ability of Irish industry to compete within the EEC. The National Industrial and Economic Council (NIEC) was established in 1963 as a consultative body in economic planning. These bodies, paralleling ‘the state’s commitment to economic planning as contained in the first two programmes for economic expansion’, permitted the unions to co-operate with the state on a range of problems posed by economic expansion. Thus, the period between 1959 and 1965 was to witness a new pattern of Congress participation in state institutions, such that ‘[t]he institutional setting soon became largely tripartite, with the representatives of business, of labour and of government discussing the issues of employment, output, prices and trade’.
THE MOVE TO CENTRALISED BARGAINING (MID 1960 – LATE 1970s)
In the 1960s, the economy performed well, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 4.4 per cent per annum, economic openness grew by 23 per cent, while unemployment averaged 5.05 per cent. Economists attribute this success to export-led growth based upon trade liberalisation and FDI.
The Institutionalisation of the ICTU/Government Relationship
Congress’s attitude to EEC entry was initially cautious, but by 1962 it was willing to support Lemass’s plans. Congress, recognising free trade as inevitable, decided to embrace it from a position of influence with the government through membership of the CIO and NIEC… the limitations of relying on a web of collaborative bodies to oversee economic adjustment, while collective bargaining remained unregulated, became clear.
The government’s attitude towards collective bargaining was influenced by its increasing economic significance. As more workers became unionised, bargaining exerted a major influence on macroeconomic policies. Industrial development’s pride of place in national policy influenced the government’s stance towards centralised collective bargaining.
Lemass had urged a corporatist strategy towards industrial relations following the Second World War. Corporatism (or as it is sometimes called neo-corporatism) is an inclusive bargaining approach involving the unions, employers and government. However, the employers’ and unions’ preference for the status quo – free collective bargaining – prevented corporatism’s introduction. …
The pay-rounds of the 1960s prompted attempts to again centralise collective bargaining. Growing trade union power, rising industrial conflict and wage pressures impelled governments to adopt a more interventionist stance. The dangers of economic crisis from industrial unrest and an unprecedented pay-round increase in 1969 were the catalysts for the move towards corporatism. This resulted in the unions’ influence over public policy increasing substantially. Throughout the following decade, pay determination became increasingly politicised and public policy was directed towards minimising strikes and restraining pay.
Economic Stagnation at the Beginning of the 1970s
Economic expansion and decentralised collective bargaining were viewed as incompatible in the NIEC’s Report on Incomes and Prices Policy. To compound matters, economic growth slowed. Statistics for output, employment, imports and sales all indicated a stagnating economy. Industrial production and construction activities were affected by strikes, while investment was depressed by a six-month bank strike. Inflation was running at 8.5 per cent, its highest level since 1952. The OECD argued that the high level of inflation was partly due to the labour disputes. The Central Bank warned that the penalty for high and prolonged inflation would be declining sales, followed by a fall in production and employment. The improvements in living standards in the 1960s were in danger of being lost to inflation. At this time, economic openness declined, while the total number of days lost through economic disputes peaked at over one million.
The Government’s Deepening Relations with the Unions
‘The chief lesson emerging from the operation of collective bargaining in the 1960s was that decentralised wage rounds were by their nature unstable and prone to inflation’. The government’s economic policy, traditionally geared to long-term growth and industrialisation targets, from 1969, became increasingly concerned with inflation. Demand and output were depressed by the government’s anti-inflationary policy and the recession in the United Kingdom. The combination of relatively slow growth, inflation and a large external deficit in 1970 presented a dilemma. As prices became a primary concern, budgetary strategy was aimed at moderating government spending so as not to contribute to inflation. In response, the government’s policies towards organised labour changed.
The NIEC viewed economic expansion and decentralised collective bargaining as incompatible. The 1970 budget argued ‘the principle need at present is for a more orderly development of incomes if we are to bring the present inflationary situation under control’. Another lesson from the 1960s was the need for a joint body to administer national pay agreements. It was against this background of industrial strife and economic difficulties that the NIEC prepared its Report on Incomes and Prices Policy. A consequence was the reconstitution of the ELC in May 1970 (which had become defunct during the early 1960s), a significant event in restructuring the adversarial approach to industrial relations. The government became a participant in the ELC with the intention of influencing wages. Then Minister for Finance, George Colley, stated that the economy could not afford wage increases unrelated to productivity increases. Following the collapse of talks at the ELC in the autumn of 1970, the government threatened statutory controls on wages and salaries with a Prices and Incomes Bill.
… it should be noted that the ICTU refused to ratify the agreement until the government withdrew its Prices and Incomes Bill. The 1970 agreement marked the beginning of a decade of engagement in centralised collective bargaining, a significant change in the politics of pay determination. Between 1972 and 1978, six National Wage Agreements (NWA) were reached through bipartite negotiations between the ICTU and employers. A further two agreements reached in 1979 and 1980, referred to as National Understandings (NU), were arrived at through tripartite negotiation with the involvement of the government.
By the mid-1970s, the new collective bargaining was marked by quid pro quo arrangements on taxation between the unions and the state and the integration of government budgetary policy into national pay determination. The linkage between the national pay agreements and government budgetary policy was ‘the most profound change in the nature, functions and prerogatives of democratic government in the history of the state’. With active state involvement in industrial relations came union involvement in policymaking. The relationship between the ICTU, the FUE and the government had changed significantly.
Trade Union Representation and Government Policies
… following the 1970 agreement, the boundary between politics and industrial relations was dismantled by the state and unions. ICTU representation on government committees, in the economic and social fields, expanded. All centralised pay agreements were drafted and concluded by employer and trade union representatives in the reconstituted ELC and thereafter adopted as state policy. …
The 1970s saw union membership expand. Throughout that decade the unions’ and employers’ federations became major actors in policy formulation. … there was a marked change in the level of ICTU policies incorporated into the government’s policies. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 largely followed the proposals of the ICTU, and the National Prices Commission was established by the then Minister for Industry and Commerce in line with Congress’s proposals. … By the end of the 1970s, formal tripartite agreements were concluded. The government went from using budgetary policy to underwrite national pay deals, to placing a range of policy issues on the negotiation table. The ICTU, through dialogue with the government, gained influence over the most important economic policy instruments in the state.
Industrial relations difficulties – attributed to the wage round system and free collective bargaining – along with inflation, the loss of competitiveness and industrial conflict, impelled the centralisation of collective bargaining. With the conclusion of the NU in 1979, the government acknowledged a new role for pressure groups in an important sector of economic policy-making and incurred commitments to them; they, in turn, incurred reciprocal obligations involving the conduct of their members. However, by 1978, the ICTU had grown strong due to the state’s willingness to grant it concessions. This became clear in 1980… This left the employers disgruntled and questioning their place in social partnership.
THE COLLAPSE OF CENTRALISED BARGAINING (EARLY 1980s)
By the close of the 1970s, centralised agreements had become policy agreements. However, by the time the second NU expired in 1981, the unions and employers were disillusioned. The sought after economic stability had not materialised. …
The Economy Crisis and Economic Policy
The centralised agreements, implemented as solutions to the economic and industrial relations problems of the 1960s, were increasingly relied upon to address the problems of the 1970s. The late 1970s saw the economy recover from the downturn following the 1973 oil crisis. Inflation and unemployment began to fall, while strong growth returned. Real GDP increased by 5.3 per cent annually from 1976 to 1979. However, the Fianna Fáil government of 1977 employed an expansionist fiscal policy when the economy was already growing unsustainably. Strong pro-cyclical policies led to deterioration in fiscal balances, with the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) rising from 13 per cent of GNP in 1976 to 17 per cent by 1979. The structural problems highlighted by the first oil crisis remained unresolved when the second crisis struck in 1979.
Adjustment to the European Monetary System (EMS), entered in 1979 after severing the link with Sterling to reduce inflation, proved problematic and inflation fell more slowly in Ireland than the UK. The average rate of consumer price increase in 1980 was 18.25 per cent. Although high levels of current expenditure produced a budgetary over-run in 1979, the government continued its expansionary policies due to the worsening international economic climate resulting from the second oil crisis, increasing unemployment and emigration.
Following rapid growth in the second half of the 1970s, demand fell in the early 1980s.‘The second oil shock, the protracted international recession and the failure to achieve the fiscal policy of retrenchment led to a worsening of [economic] imbalances’. With a slowdown in growth, unemployment rose to historic levels. The increase in fiscal deficit, intended to be temporary, became impossible to eliminate as the economy declined. By 1981, the national debt reached £10.195bn. The PSBR peaked at 20.1 per cent of GNP, while the current budget deficit stood at 7.3 per cent. Government spending was so high that the total amount budgeted for 1981 had been used by June.
The Unions and the Ending of the National Agreements
Taoiseach Haughey, who came to power after winning a divisive party leadership contest within Fianna Fáil in December 1979, needed to prove his authority to a divided party with an election victory. In this context, the government was reluctant to adopt measures that could prove unpopular. In September 1980, as talks on a second NU entered their final stages, they collapsed, resulting in government intervention. ‘The Taoiseach managed to press the FUE national executive into resuming negotiations by pledging guarantees on the content of the 1981 budget’. The second NU was subsequently ratified, but the FUE resented the pressure brought upon it.
Centralised bargaining was not meeting the FUE’s objectives. For employers, particularly in indigenous companies in exposed sectors, the agreements imposing similar wage norms across the economy undermined competitiveness. For the unions, the agreements were not transforming pay restraint into jobs at a sufficient level to meet the labour supply, nor were they reducing social inequality. The state looked to the agreements to restrain pay increases, preserve competitiveness and deliver economic growth. However, these objectives were compromised by extensive bargaining below national level. The result was a second tier of pay determination developed in the 1970s. Although the agreements had procedures for containing industrial conflict, this was historically high during the 1970s.
Irish governments have tended to appease interest groups through ad hoc policy concessions. This worked against enduring agreements between the state and interest groups found in continental neo-corporatism. Additionally, close ideological affinity between the unions and government, a feature of stable neo-corporatist arrangements, was absent in Ireland. The social partners’ failure to share comparable views on the policies needed for tackling economic problems compounded difficulties. Employers warned that spiralling wages fuelled inflation and contributed to rising unemployment. The unions argued unemployment was a consequence of deficient demand. Their solution was expansionary fiscal policy. Employers resisted the demands for public sector job creation on grounds that it would have a crowding out effect. …
Political and Economic Instability
The general election of 1981 saw a minority Fine Gael and Labour coalition government come to power. At a most inopportune time, Ireland was condemned to a period of unstable government.
Prior to the election, the Central Bank stated the ‘fundamental problem is that the community still does not realise that it must adjust its living standards and expectations downwards in the face of deteriorating terms of trade and the need to commit resources to servicing the increased external debt’. The new coalition government was determined to bring order to the public finances. According to the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), a spiralling current budget deficit, PSBR and national debt precipitated a new approach to economic management. Regaining control of the public finances would entail constraining public service pay. …
Government ministers saw little merit in tripartite agreements. When discussions on a new NU broke down, the government was unwilling to intervene to save the talks. … From late 1981 onwards, with worsening economic conditions, wage rounds became decentralised. By 1982, all political parties were committed to curbing public spending, which was incompatible with the terms of the NUs. Union influence on public policy was drastically reduced during the first half of the 1980s, as the ICTU was pushed out of the policy-making process. The Fine Gael wing of the coalition decided social partners had no right to influence policy.
Political and economic instability peaked in 1981-1982. With the national debt and budget deficit spiralling out of control, a coherent policy approach was essential. However, the governments of 1981/1982 lasted such a short time that no clear policies emerged. When the second Fine Gael-Labour coalition came to power in November 1982, the national debt was almost on par with GNP. By then, all the parties agreed on the need to stabilise the debt/GNP ratio.
The state’s strategy for much of the 1980s was to exclude the unions from the policymaking process. State policy changed from focusing on employment to balancing budgets, export growth and international competitiveness. Persistent turbulence over public service pay, and government disinclination to return to tripartism, meant meetings between the government and the ICTU were formal, tense and unproductive.
The Changed Influence of the Unions
After expanding for two decades, union membership peaked at 545,200 in 1980 and then declined thereafter. During the late 1970s, the unions’ polices had been finding their way into legislation. However, by January 1982, the ICTU was at loggerheads with the Fine Gael-Labour coalition over their budget. Determined to cut government expenditures, the subsequent Fianna Fáil government ignored ICTU proposals. From mid-1982, in the face of an unsustainable national debt, all political parties committed themselves to curbing public expenditure as a precondition for economic recovery. The Fine Gael-Labour coalition budget of February 1983 saw the tax burden on pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) workers increase and social welfare cut. Thereafter, it was clear that on taxes, wages and welfare, the government and ICTU were in disagreement. …
The coalition government of November 1982 to February 1987 experienced considerable difficulties in righting the economy. As McCarthy put it ‘an attempt to achieve fiscal correction and disinflation through increased taxation, rather than expenditure reduction, completed the economic picture’. However, the stabilisation of the debt required sharp cuts in borrowing and, consequently, in current spending. Control over current spending proved difficult to achieve with high unemployment and population growth. Government spending on social services jumped from 28.9 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 35.6 per cent in 1985. … With investment and productivity capacity depressed by high taxes and interest rates, the economy entered a downward spiral.
THE REINSTITUTION OF CENTRALISED BARGAINING (LATE 1980s)
The 1980s saw a stagnating economy, deteriorating public finances and unprecedented unemployment. By the mid-1980s, the level of unemployment was being offset by emigration. Between 1981 and 1986, 75,000 people left the country, and, for the first time in a quarter of a century, 1986 saw the population decrease. By 1987, the economy reached its lowest point ever.
The State of the Economy
By 1986, most economic indicators had reached historic lows, while national economic and political commentators, the media and domestic and international organisations, all regarded the economy as in crisis. The policies introduced to shelter the economy from the oil shocks of the 1970s led to unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances. Between 1982 and 1987, the national debt doubled to over 130 per cent of GNP. The government borrowed to spend on welfare services that could be sustained only by more borrowing. Economic commentators advocated debt repudiation. Although inflation had fallen, the borrowing requirement stood at 13 per cent of GNP in 1986. Unemployment reached 17.7 per cent in 1987, with 254,526 people out of work. The numbers in work had fallen from 1,145,000 in 1979 to 1,095,100 by 1986, shrinking the tax base.
The Central Bank viewed the situation with pessimism, as it would not permit for improvements in welfare benefits to the needy. The business community was extremely concerned and leading businessman and entrepreneur Tony O’Reilly warned of the dangers of International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention in the economy. If the IMF were to intervene in the operation of the Irish economy, it would signal to the international financial community the diminution of Irish economic sovereignty and be widely perceived as confirmation that the Irish government was incapable of righting the economy on its own.
The NESC Report: A Strategy for Development
In this context, the government became interested in building support among the economic and social interests for a national recovery strategy. Through the involvement of the major economic interests, the NESC acted as a forum for discussing the crisis. In the autumn of 1986, it produced a report A Strategy for Development, 1986-1990, in which it noted that ‘[t]he argument against a continuation of present policies is based on the consideration that discretion over economic and social policy would ultimately be removed from [Irish] control’.
The NESC report emphasised a plan, requiring an integrated medium term strategy that would command acceptance throughout society to tackle the crisis in public expenditure. The report was conceived as a means of supporting the coalition government’s recovery plans. While still in opposition, Fianna Fáil proposed building on the NESC’s report and its 1987 manifesto, The Programme for National Recovery, absorbed much of A Strategy for Development.
The 1987 General Election
By 1986, Fianna Fáil, in opposition, was aware that the unions were disillusioned with the government, especially the Labour Party. In the absence of political links, the union movement faced the prospect of continued marginalisation from policy debates. Spotting an opportunity, Fianna Fáil sought to woo the unions through its willingness to involve them in policy discussions if elected to government. It did not regard the arms length dealings with the unions, employed by the coalition government, as ideal for imposing fiscal discipline upon the troubled economy. Haughey also denounced the Thatcherite policies of the Fine Gael-Labour government, supporting the calls of union leaders for a return to social partnership.
Labour Party ministers struggled in cabinet to maintain social benefits, imposing considerable strains on the coalition. Yet, the Labour ministers’ stance had not made their relationship with the unions easier. The coalition government collapsed in 1987, when Labour resigned in disagreement over budget cuts.
The election of 1987 saw all party leaders proposing fiscal rectitude. Haughey, leader of Fianna Fáil, stressed that the election was about economic recovery. The Fine Gael election manifesto, Breaking out of the Vicious Circle, proposed reduced public spending and borrowing. Fianna Fáil campaigned on a platform of opposition to cuts in social spending and advocated a return to centralised pay agreements.
The election saw a shift of urban working-class support towards Fianna Fáil, in protest at the harshness of the measures proposed by the coalition. The new Fianna Fáil minority administration was considered likely to want to avoid the risks of implementing severe spending cuts. However, after Haughey visited the Department of Finance for a briefing on the national finances, Fianna Fáil recanted on its manifesto promises, making clear it proposed little modification to the outgoing government’s plans. The budget introduced in March 1987 sought greater fiscal adjustment than was achieved in preceding years. This was a marked shift in policy emphasis and a determination to reduce the deficit. Expenditure was reduced by £250m, while tax revenue increased by £117m.
The Unions and the Programme for National Recovery
The new government’s actions appeared unpromising from the ICTU’s perspective. However, Fianna Fáil wanted to avoid confrontation with the unions, especially in the public service. Within a few months of assuming office the government promoted talks on a national pay agreement – The Programme for National Recovery (PNR) – in accordance with the principles in the NESC report. The administration was interested in securing a three year tripartite agreement throughout the economy. ‘The Taoiseach invited the unions, along with the other social partners, to take part in an effort to spur recovery by means of consensus’. To facilitate agreement, the government was willing to modify its stance on public service pay and discuss tax concessions, job creation and welfare.
By supporting a centralised pay agreement for industrial peace and union commitment to spending cuts, Fianna Fáil revealed a preference for defusing, rather than inflaming, industrial conflict and for seeking union support, rather than excluding them from policy deliberations. By 1987, the unions favoured a return to centralised pay determination. The prospects of agreement on a moderate pay rise, combined with tight control over second-tier bargaining, also drew in the employers.
The union movement entered negotiations in a weaker position than in the 1970s. Although the unions had not been consulted on policy by the coalition government, they still possessed leverage in the Dáil with the Labour Party and Fianna Fáil. However, with Fine Gael now in opposition and operating under its Tallaght Strategy of not opposing the government’s measures to revive the economy, many of which had ironically been proposed by Fine Gael in the run up to the election, the unions had few options besides doing a deal.
Talks built on the NESC report. The ICTU executive argued that the PNR would prevent Ireland going down the Thatcherite road, where the UK Trades Union Congress (TUC) had been utterly marginalised. Thus, the PNR restored social partnership, as well as brining considerable benefits for capitalism. The PNR resembled the NUs in scope, but not content. The central issue was an agreement on wages in the public and private sectors for three years. However, the PNR, and its successor agreements, also encompassed a wide range of economic/social policy commitments on job creation and welfare benefits. Unlike the 1970s, these agreements were based on shared understanding of the problems facing the economy and the policies required to address them.
The Unions and Policy Developments
Following the recommendations of the NESC, the government’s objective was to reduce the debt/GNP ratio to a sustainable level. The change in government economic policy, first encapsulated in its March 1987 budget, as a determination to reduce the deficit, was elaborated in the PNR. In contrast with earlier attempts, the targets for 1987 were achieved. Subsequent budgets were designed in harmony with the PNR and the agreements thereafter and they provided for implementation of policies over which the unions had direct input.
Three joint government-ICTU working parties on Employment and Development Measures, Taxation and Social Policy were established and chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach. More committees were formed following subsequent national agreements. A Ministerial-ICTU group also met monthly to review progress. The unions had secured input into policy-making through their position as an essential constituency with rights of representation on state boards, committees and policy fora
From 1987 onwards, Congress policies on pay, tax and social welfare found their way into government policy. Ireland had embarked on a tripartite approach to income policy, marking ‘a fundamental change in [the] approach to social partnership between that practised up to the early 1980s and that practiced from 1987 onwards’. The agreements of the 1980s and 1990s were not confined to wages, but encompassed a range of socioeconomic policies. The focus of these agreements was economic stability, greater equity in the tax system and enhanced social justice, with the result that, ‘in the decade after 1987, interest group activity in Ireland attained centre stage, with the tripartite agreements of the 1990s cementing social partnership’. Ireland’s political economy shifted from a British, towards a European, mode of consensus between social partners. ‘These arrangements re-established a reciprocal relationship between Congress, the government, and employers on a much stronger institutional footing than heretofore’.
Social partnership arrangement continued to function up until the collapse of talks on a new national agreement in 2008, as a new economic crisis took hold. It remains to be seen whether Ireland will witness a return to the decentralised collective bargaining of the early 1980s, or if the social partnership arrangements can be revived. In this respect, the current situation in some ways mirrors conditions in 1981. The decision on this issue will have huge implications for the role of trade unions in Irish society, and for the performance of the economy, over the coming decade.
This chapter examined the four periods in which the trade union movement’s influence over Irish public policy changed dramatically during the latter half of the 20th century. In each of these cases, extant economic circumstances had a significant role to play. Thus, the unions’ changing influence was examined in the context of the broader Irish political economy.
The 1950s was a depressing decade. However, after Lemass came to power in 1959, the Fianna Fáil administration sought to open the economy to competition and FDI. Lemass regarded trade union involvement as critical in this attempt to revive the economy. As a result, ICTU access to the Taoiseach, representation on government committees, government economic policies and policies towards organised labour, changed in the unions’ favour.
Fear that industrial unrest might frighten off FDI led to centralised collective bargaining between the state, unions and employers throughout the 1970s. The NWAs and later NUs, provided the ICTU with unprecedented access to government, its policies, and their formulation. These centralised collective bargaining arrangements were linked to government budgets. Thus, the state came to play a role in industrial relations, in return for which the unions gained influence over economic policy. By the end of the 1970s, wage agreements were being concluded in a tripartite context.
The early 1980s were a time of economic turmoil and political instability. The national agreements of the 1970s, a solution to the industrial relations problems of the late 1960s, were no longer addressing the needs of the economy. The employers’ had become disillusioned with the agreements’ failure to control wage inflation, while the unions felt pay restraint was not resulting in job creation. In 1981, the government abandoned centralised bargaining, as it sought to bring public spending under control. As a consequence, the ICTU was excluded from directly influencing policy.
By 1987, with the country on the verge of bankruptcy and unemployment at almost 20 per cent, the political establishment recognised the need for a new consensual approach to the economy. A new Fianna Fáil administration, building on an NESC report and determined to impose fiscal discipline, sought to involve the unions in policy consultation to avoid the dangers of open confrontation. For the weakened ICTU, fearful of permanent marginalisation, the prospect of reinstituted centralised bargaining was a welcome lifeline. The unions saw this as an opportunity to regain influence over taxation, unemployment and social welfare policy. From 1987 onwards, a tripartite approach to managing the economy developed, wherein the social partnership agreements encompassed a range of economic and social issues. The ICTU, through involvement on numerous committees and working parties, secured an input into state policies that endured up to 2008.
However, with the collapse of social partnership in 2008, a large question mark hangs over the whole process. If the impact of current recession was sufficient to collapse the social partnership process, this raises questions as to the underlying strength of the agreements. Did Irish social partnership hold together from 1987 onwards because of an underlying societal commitment to what the agreements represented? Or, did partnership exist primarily due to a very favourable set of economic circumstance that, once ended, made it an unsustainable proposition? The answer to these questions will determine the future of Irish social partnership, and that of the wider economy and society, over the next decade.
Here is also a paper, FDI and Irish Economic Development over Four Stages of European Integration (PDF, January 2006) | Frank Barry, University College Dublin. Underlines, italicization, excerpts, et al. are on our own.
Ireland is the most FDI-intensive economy in Europe. Foreign-owned firms account for almost 50 percent of Irish manufacturing employment. This compares to an average figure of 23 for the Western European EU member states and a figure of 33 for the three largest Central and Eastern European economies. Of the 17 EU countries plus the US and Norway for which OECD (2005, E7) provides data, Ireland also records the highest share of services-sector employment in foreign-owned firms. These figures are reflected in the value of the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI). Per head of population, the Irish inward FDI stock is a multiple of the EU average.
The distinguishing feature of the country’s development strategy over the last four decades of outward orientation has been the emphasis placed on attracting FDI. The country had been remarkably successful in this regard even before the “Celtic Tiger era” of the 1990s and beyond. Having stumbled upon the strategy, it turned out with hindsight to accord well with Ireland’s advantages: its Atlantic location and English-speaking environment, relatively low labour costs by Western European standards, cultural connections with the US and Western European standards of governance.
The present paper analyses the co-evolution of institutional features of the Irish economic environment and the types of FDI available to European economies. We divide the period of Irish outward orientation into four distinct phases.
The first phase of Irish trade integration with Continental Europe began in the late 1950s when the country moved away from protectionism, dropped its restrictions on foreign ownership of industry and adopted a zero rate of corporation tax on manufactured exports. These moves drew in substantial numbers of US firms who exported into mainland Europe (as opposed to the UK, which remains to this day the dominant export destination of most Irish domestic firms) even though substantial tariff barriers remained against Irish-produced goods. Increased openness saw the country adopt the main proposals of an influential OECD report on primary and secondary education in 1965, which sparked a dramatic educational expansion at all levels.
The second phase began when Ireland joined the EU in 1973. This brought a substantial increase in FDI inflows which – in response to the upgrading of the Irish tertiary educational system – began to locate in higher-technology sectors. Macroeconomic instability over the period of the oil shocks however prevented Irish convergence on average Western European living standards over this period.
The third integration phase was driven by the Single European Market, the global high-tech boom and domestic policy adjustments in Ireland. The outlawing of restrictive public procurement practices on the part of EU governments allowed Ireland’s locational advantages come more strongly to the fore; the low-corporation tax environment proved especially beneficial to high-tech MNCs who are better able to exploit its benefits; Ireland’s continued educational upgrading remained an important magnet for such firms, while fiscal consolidation, EU regional aid and the institutions of social partnership brought further competitiveness gains. Furthermore, the EU-enforced inter-sectoral harmonisation of corporation tax rates in Ireland brought the Irish rate on services down dramatically just as global services-sector offshoring began in earnest.
The fourth phase arose as a consequence of Ireland’s convergence on average Western European living standards over the Celtic Tiger era and the accession of other low corporation-tax states to the EU. This required Ireland to focus more on developing its national system of innovation in order to target the increasingly technology-sourcing foreign direct investment flowing into and across Europe.
- Phase 1: from Protectionism to EU Accession (1958-1973)
Ireland remained protectionist for about a decade after most of the rest of Western Europe had moved towards freer trade. The post-war boom of the 1950s saw Western Europe achieving growth rates of almost 6 percent per annum while protectionist Ireland stagnated with a growth rate of less than 2 percent, and an employment growth rate of less than 1 percent. The need to import the more sophisticated capital and consumer goods that the country could not produce for itself led to balance of payments crises and macroeconomic instability, exactly as happened in protectionist Spain at around this time. The depressed economy of the 1950s saw more than 400,000 Irish people emigrate, out of a total population of less than 3 million.
By the end of the 1950s it was clear that economic policy would need to be completely overhauled. The First Programme for Economic Expansion, which removed protectionism, encouraged foreign direct investment and promoted exports, was introduced in 1958. The Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, which aimed to liberalise trade with the country’s major trading partner of the time, the United Kingdom, came into force in 1966, and both countries acceded to the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. The move towards openness was accompanied by the introduction of a zero tax rate on profits derived from manufactured exports and a liberalisation of the law on foreign ownership of companies. As the bulk of the country’s exports at that time were agricultural in nature, there was little diminution of the tax base when the concessionary tax rate was adopted.
O’Hearn (1987) has estimated employment levels in the new foreign firms that entered Ireland to avail of the zero tax rate on manufactured exports. By the time of EU entry these firms accounted for slightly more than half of all foreign-firm employment in manufacturing, with the remainder accounted for by the mainly UK firms that had entered Ireland to cater to the home market, whether under protectionism or in the outward-oriented era. …
…most of the growth prior to EU entry was in traditional or low-tech sectors such as Textiles and Clothing, Metals Industries (such as aluminium extrusions, shipbuilding, cranes, metal nuts), Pulp and Paper, and Rubber and Plastics.
The FDI inflows of this period led to Ireland developing a revealed comparative advantage (at the SITC-1 level) in Chemicals (whose share of exports grew from less than one half of 1 percent at the end of the 1950s to 6 percent at the time of EU entry) and in “manufactured goods classified by material” and “miscellaneous manufactured articles”.
The growth in foreign industry also contributed to a substantial diversification of Irish exports away from the UK market, with the then 6-country EU share of manufacturing exports rising by 10 percentage points between the late 1950s and the early 1970s.
It is of interest to note that though the numbers of new foreign firms establishing operations in Ireland accelerated as EU accession drew closer, the impact of EU membership on inbound FDI would have been unclear a priori, since accession entailed the loss of Ireland’s preferential position in the UK market.
The increased intellectual openness of the period saw Ireland (and later Austria) volunteer to allow the OECD conduct a survey of the entire national education system. An important feature of the subsequent report, issued in 1965, was that – almost for the first time – technocratic expertise was now to be heard alongside the party political and denominational interests which had previously dominated ministerial councils (Logan, 1999). The report was scathing in its assessment of the Irish system, noting that over half of Irish children left school at or before the age of thirteen. This finding generated newspaper headlines and presaged the introduction of ‘free’ second-level education and free access to special transport networks for all second-level school pupils in 1967. These measures sparked a dramatic educational expansion over the course of the 1970s and subsequently.
Notwithstanding Ireland’s early successes in attracting FDI, there was no convergence on average Western European living standards over this period, nor indeed until the late 1980s. This is arguably ascribable to Ireland’s “regional economy” character, where, because of the historic ease of emigration to the UK, Ireland can be thought to have little control over its net-of-tax labour costs (though there were substantial insider-outsider problems in the labour market also). This would have prevented Ireland from industrialising through the development of low-wage consumer goods exports as each of the other traditionally less developed Western European economies – Portugal, Spain and Greece – did in the 1960s…
- Phase 2: From EU Accession to the Single Market Era (1973-87)
Although Ireland was already relatively FDI-intensive at the time of EU entry, the number of jobs in foreign-owned manufacturing industry grew by 23 percent between 1973 and 1980, before declining subsequently as a consequence of macroeconomic mismanagement.
Although Ireland’s low corporation-tax environment is particularly attractive to high technology firms, the increasing technological intensity… would not have been possible without the educational advance touched upon in the last section.
The structure of the Irish education system that emerged in the wake of the OECD report is unusual in that while Ireland just matches the OECD mean in terms of those with university qualifications, it has far higher proportions than the average OECD country with specific post-secondary and sub-degree tertiary educational qualifications…
The post-secondary education system that emerged in Ireland was based on a realisation that, unlike in the UK – whose early industrialisation had ensured the evolution of a well-developed system to provide an intermediate layer of technicians – the education system in Ireland would need to provide this intermediate layer from scratch if human resources were to be available to sustain the industrial expansion… that followed on from Ireland’s relatively late trade-liberalisation-driven industrialisation.
The main components of the technical-education system developed in Ireland over the course of the 1970s were the Regional Technical Colleges (later rebranded as Institutes of Technology), for which there was no UK model. These offered subdegree programmes of shorter duration than those at universities and concentrated in the fields of engineering and business studies, and their curricula had a practical orientation designed to be responsive to the needs of local industry and business.
From having had a tiny short-cycle third-level sector before 1970, by 1981 Ireland had internationally, after the Netherlands, the highest proportion of third-level students taking sub-degree courses. Since the late 1970s, furthermore, the universities themselves – at the behest of the national development agency, the IDA – had begun to accept increased responsibility for ensuring that manpower needs were met. The Manpower Consultative Committee was established in 1978 to provide a forum for dialogue between the IDA and the education system. The state agency, concerned by the looming disparity between electronics graduate outflows and its own demand projections, convinced the government to fund a massive expansion in educational capacity in these areas. The output of engineering graduates, as a result, increased by 40 percent between 1978 and 1983, while the output from computer science increased tenfold over the same short period. The IDA in turn was able to use the rapidity of this response – exemplified by the immediate introduction of a range of one-year conversion courses to furnish science graduates with electronics qualifications – as a further selling point to foreign investors; MacSharry and White (2000).
…the major expansions were in computing equipment and electronic components, pharmaceuticals and medical and optical devices, and these expansions continued into the following “Celtic Tiger” era.
Once again over this period however, notwithstanding the continued success in upgrading the country’s sectoral FDI allocation, no convergence was recorded on average Western European living standards. Unlike in the previous era (1960-73) however, this lack of convergence was replicated across all the poorer Western European economies… Barry (2003) identifies deficient macroeconomic policymaking across all these four countries in the wake of the oil shocks as a common factor behind their weak performance, suggesting that poorer countries may be structurally less capable of adhering to appropriate monetary and fiscal policies in the event of a downturn in the world economy. Convergence is also known to be more difficult to achieve when the encompassing world economy is performing poorly.
- Phase 3: The Single Market, Services Offshoring and the Celtic Tiger
In this phase, running from 1987 to the present, all four cohesion economies converged substantially on average Western European living standards, with Ireland’s performance being particularly dramatic. The various factors behind the Irish performance are discussed in detail elsewhere, e.g. in Barry (2004). Here we focus solely on the contribution of FDI.
Manufacturing FDI into and within Europe expanded in the late 1980s. …with respect to US investments in Europe, with the US Department of Commerce Survey of Current Business (March 1991) attributing much of this to the lead up to the introduction of the Single European Market in 1992. The figure also shows that Ireland captured a growing share of US investments in Europe. MacSharry and White (2000) explain this latter effect by describing how several larger EU countries, in the pre-Single Market era, “had suggested to potential investors that publicly funded purchases of their products might be blacklisted if the new investment was located in Ireland” (rather than in the countries from which the threatening noises issued). With the outlawing of restrictive public procurement practices under the Single Market initiative, the attractiveness of Ireland as a destination for FDI increased. This effect would undoubtedly have been dampened without the concurrent restoration of macroeconomic stability.
The increasing share of high-tech sectors in European manufacturing over the 1990s also helped, as did the high profitability of the era, since both increase the attractiveness of a low corporation-tax environment. Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) argue, furthermore, that US foreign investment has become more sensitive to differences in host country taxes in recent years, and Ireland has had – until the recent enlargement – the lowest rate of corporation tax in the EU. The Single Market programme may also have allowed Ireland achieve a critical mass of US firms in certain sectors, allowing agglomeration and demonstration effects to come into play (Barry, Görg and Strobl, 2003).
Thus the number of jobs in foreign-owned manufacturing in Ireland expanded by almost 50 percent between 1987 and 2000.
Combined with this increase in manufacturing FDI, Ireland also began to attract increasing services-sector FDI inflows (Grimes and White, 2005). Starting from a base close to zero in the late 1980s, by the new millennium, foreign-firm employment in each of Ireland’s strong FDI-intensive manufacturing sectors is now matched by foreign-firm employment in several offshore services sectors located in Ireland. Thus computer software now matches hardware, international financial services matches pharmaceuticals and other business-process offshored (BPO) activities match employment levels in instrument engineering. Furthermore, as Barry and Van Egeraat (2005) show, as computer hardware firms have shifted their manufacturing facilities to Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, they have upgraded their operations in Ireland into services activities.
An indicator of Ireland recent successes in offshore services… Though Ireland has only around 1 percent of the EU15 population, it attracted 50 percent of new shared services projects in the EU15 and 8 percent of regional headquarters projects in the period to which the data refer.
It is well known that the share of services in international FDI flows has been increasing over recent decades (UNCTAD 2004). Ireland’s ability to attract an increased share of services was facilitated by substantial reductions in the rate of corporation tax on services over the course of the 1980s and 1990s… These changes were generally made of the behest of the European Commission. Export Profits Tax Relief, for example, began to be phased out in 1978, to be replaced by a special 10 percent rate for manufacturing industry. From 1987 this special rate was extended to qualifying activities carried out at the newly opened International Financial Services Centre in Dublin. Most other market services meanwhile continued to be subject to the standard 32 percent rate that prevailed at that time. The European Commission had been pushing for some time for tax harmonisation across sectors, implicitly hoping that Ireland’s rate would be pushed much closer to the EU average. The Irish government instead decided in 1998 on a harmonised rate of 12.5 percent –to be instituted from 2003 – which yielded substantial benefits to most services sectors in order to cushion the impact on manufacturing.
Table 7: Ireland’s corporation tax regime
- 1956: Finance Act introduces Export Profits Tax Relief (EPTR), primarily for manufacturing industry, with 50 percent tax remission on profits (increased to 100 percent two years later). The measure provided full relief for fifteen years and tapering relief for a further five years.
- 1969: EPTR extended to 1989-90.
- 1978: Government abolishes EPTR and replaces it with a special 10 percent rate of corporation profits tax for all manufacturing industry from 1981-2000. Those qualifying for export-tax relief before 1981 continue to benefit until 1990.
- 1987: Financial Services Act establishes International Financial Services Centre in Dublin. Profits of qualifying activities carried out from the Centre are taxed at 10 percent until 2005.
- 1990: Government extends the 10 percent corporation profits tax rate to 2010.
- 1998: Agreement with European Commission on universal 12.5 percent corporation tax for all trading companies from 2003. All existing commitments to the 10 percent tax rates for manufacturing industry to the year 2010 to be honoured. The current 28 percent standard rate applying to most Services to be reduced by 4 percent annually in 2000, 2001 and 2002, and by 3.5 percent in 2003, giving a 12.5 percent rate at that date.
The Finance Act 2004, furthermore, established a new headquarters regime aimed at attracting international corporations to establish their regional HQ in Dublin. This has further served to attract other activities such as shared services and treasury management (Finance Dublin Yearbook, 2004).
- Phase 4: Science, Technology and Innovation Policy and the Offshoring of R&D Functions
Offshoring of R&D facilities is a growing phenomenon. Kuemmerle (1999a) tracked 32 MNCs in the pharmaceutical and electronics industries and found that their overseas R&D staff increased from 6 percent in 1965 to more than 25 percent today, while the number of overseas R&D labs increased from 14 to 84. His study distinguishes between “home-base-exploiting” R&D sites (which are associated with traditional FDI, where firms set up overseas to exploit on a larger stage the advantages, such as brand names, that they had already accumulated) and “home-base-augmenting” or technology-sourcing cites. The former are found to be more likely to be located close to existing factories and important markets, while the latter are more likely to be located close to universities. The proportion of R&D labs that Kuemmerle categorises as home-base-augmenting rose from 7 percent to 40 percent over the period he studied.
The 2005 UNCTAD World Investment Report provides broader and more detailed evidence on the recent growth in global offshoring of R&D functions. This provides the context for recent developments in science, technology and innovation (STI) policy in Ireland.
Given the growth in offshoring of R&D, along with Ireland’s convergence on average Western European living standards by the early years of the new millennium – and perhaps also in response to the threat of increased corporation-tax competition from Central and Eastern Europe – science, technology and innovation policy has recently moved to the heart of the Irish policy agenda.
This was heralded by the release in 1996 of the first-ever Irish Government White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation. It is underlined by the five-fold increase in investment in these areas under the current National Development Plan (2000-06), by the launch in 1998 of the Programme for Research in Third-Level Institutions (which established 24 major research centres as well as major programmes in human genomics and computational physics), by the establishment of Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) in 2000, and by the introduction of a 20 percent tax credit for incremental R&D in the Finance Act of 2004.
The origins of Science Foundation Ireland lay in a Technology Foresight Exercise organised by the state body Forfás, which asked client company executives where they saw their companies headed over the next 10–15 years, and what the Irish government could do to respond to those changes. The response was that as Ireland was no longer a low-cost manufacturing location it would have to develop more highly trained engineers, research scientists etc. to become a center for innovation, research, design and development.
The exercise proposed the establishment of a Technology Foresight Fund to promote and finance new basic and applied scientific and technological research in Ireland, and SFI was set up to administer this fund. Besides providing awards to support scientists and engineers working in designated fields (along the lines of the US NSF), SFI has established a host of joint partnerships between third level research institutions and industry.
Within ICT alone, the last few years have registered a number of significant developments under this new strategy. Bell Labs has announced its intention to set up a major R&D centre at Lucent Technologies’ Dublin facility, linked with the establishment of a collaborative academic centre at one of the city’s universities. Similarly, Hewlett-Packard announced the establishment of a world-class Technology Development Centre at its manufacturing facility outside Dublin, while its European Software Centre entered into collaboration with NUI-Galway in establishing the Digital Enterprise Research Institute. Intel has established an innovation centre at its main site outside Dublin and increased its investment in its research centre near Limerick. It has also partnered three Irish universities in an academic Centre for Research on Adaptive Nanostructures and Nanodevices. IBM over the same period announced significant investments in its R&D software facility in Dublin – a decision influenced, according to one of the company’s directors, by the availability of the necessary skills, the strong support of the IDA and the increasing role of SFI. A number of similar investments have also appeared recently in the biotech and pharmachem areas.
Ireland’s success in attracting FDI can be ascribed to the following factors:
- EU membership, macroeconomic stability, Western European governance standards and an English-speaking environment
- a low corporation tax rate
- the skills and experience of the country’s Industrial Development Agency (IDA)
- the quality of the telecommunications infrastructure, and
- an educational system that is integrated to a large extent with the country’s FDI-oriented development strategy.
As one of the first countries in the world to adopt an FDI-focused development strategy (in the late 1950s), the country has had an extensive period of time to fine tune its policies and institutions in line with the requirements of international FDI. This has allowed it to continue to succeed as FDI flows into Europe have shifted progressively from traditional to higher-tech manufacturing sectors through services offshoring and more recently into the offshoring of R&D functions.
Though a late starter – by Western European standards – in increasing educational throughput, Ireland by 1981 had, after the Netherlands, the highest proportion of third-level students taking sub-degree courses. This was a relatively inexpensive option for the country for follow, a strategy arguably justified in the case of a relatively poor European country. By international standards tertiary enrolments were heavily biased towards science and engineering, which accorded with the requirements of the MNCs that the country was trying to attract. As convergence on Western European living standards was progressively achieved and as offshoring of R&D has grown, the emphasis has increasingly switched towards university and postgraduate education.
As shown in the appendix, the country’s IDA has also functioned effectively as a learning organisation through its transnational strategic networks. The strong focus on the importance of FDI in Ireland and the position of the IDA in the policymaking hierarchy ensure that the system is configured to respond rapidly to emerging market opportunities as well as changing factor-market conditions in Ireland.
One example, discussed earlier, concerns the pace of response to the looming disparity, once recognised, between electronics graduate outflows and the IDA’s demand projections for such graduates. Another example is provided by the response to an EU Directive in the 1980s which allowed financial services companies, once established and registered with the regulatory authorities of one EU member state, to operate in any other member state. The directive freed firms to locate in countries where they found the regulations to be most favourable. Ireland was the second country after Luxembourg to implement the directive, in 1989. In addition the authorities decided to forego VAT and inheritance taxes on certain investment fund activities and two further items of legislation were enacted in 1990 to facilitate the development of investment funds. The industry’s activities in Ireland expanded dramatically in response and by 2005 the country had become one of the world’s leading locations for the domicile and administration of investment funds (Barry, Thebault and Wojcik, 2006).
Here is a paper, IRELAND’S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: Industrial Policy, European Integration and Social Partnership (PDF) | Rory O’Donnell, Jean Monnet Associate Professor of European Business Studies at University College Dublin (University of Pittsburgh, CENTER FOR WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES, EUROPEAN UNION CENTER, Working Paper No.2, December 1998). Excerpts, underlines, italicization, et al. are on our own.
It is an interesting case of macroeconomic stabilisation and adjustment in a small and extremely open economy. It is a fascinating study in industrial strategy and modernisation, a transformation from a weak peripheral economy to a significant centre of high-technology manufacturing and advanced services. It is a story of European integration, and the threats and opportunities if offers to small member states. Finally, it is a remarkable story of social concertation, interest mediation and institutional innovation. While the paper attempts to weave these four stories together, it focuses particularly on the last of them. Since 1987, Ireland has conducted economic and social policy by means of social partnership between the state and economic and social interests. …
Section 2 [Background: Ireland’s Development Strategy: p4-5] outlines the background to the developments of the past decade, particularly the strengths and weaknesses of the outward-looking strategy adopted in the late 1950s. Section 3 [Domestic Crisis and European Integration: p5-9] describes the deep economic, social and political crisis of the 1980s, tracing it to both domestic pressures and the effect of European integration, and reports a variety of recent interpretations of Ireland’s economic ‘failure’. Section 4 [New Perspectives and Approaches: p9-12] outlines the new perspective on internationalisation and the social partnership approach developed in the late 1980s and pursued through the 1990s. Economic performance in the decade of social partnership is summarised in Section 5 [Economic Performance Under Social Partnership: p12-13]. Section 6 [Analytical Underpinnings and the Neo-Liberal Critique: p14-17] outlines the analytical underpinnings of the social partnership strategy and the objections to it advanced by some of the country’s more orthodox economists. Section 7 [Interpreting Irish Social Partnership: p17-22] discusses interpretation of Irish social partnership, suggesting that it is not adequately captured by the concept of neo-corporatism. Some conclusions are outlined in Section 8 [Conclusion: p22-23].
p4 Transnational Corporations (TNCs)… Indeed, during the 1970s, the weakness of linkages between foreign-owned enterprises and the indigenous economy became a major subject of research and policy concern4.
p5 CAP and Structural Funds
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)… The period 1980 to 1987 was one of prolonged recession, falling living standards, a dramatic increase in unemployment and, once again, the prospect of emigration as the best option for the young. Total employment declined by almost 6 percent and employment in manufacturing by 25 percent. The length and depth of this depression reflected Ireland’s sharp balance of payments and public finance adjustment and adherence to the ERM. In addition, this weak real performance coincided with increasing public sector deficits and debt; controls on capital spending were more than offset by high interest payments and weak revenues. By 1987, the debt/GNP ratio was approaching 130 percent and real fears of national insolvency emerged. Fifteen years after joining the EC, Ireland’s ability to manage in an increasingly global environment had been tested and found wanting.
Single European Act (SEA)… naturally prompted Irish reflection on its performance in the EC and prospects in the deepening European internal market. It was clear that Ireland’s adjustment to European market integration had yielded striking changes in both the level and composition of trade. There was a remarkable increase in the openness of the economy: exports increased from 38 percent of GDP in 1973 to 67 percent in 1989, while imports increased from 45 percent of GDP in 1973 to 56 percent in 1989. The share of Irish exports going to the UK fell from 61 percent in 1972 to 35 percent in 1988, while the share going to EC countries other than the UK rose from 17 percent to 39 percent over the same period.
The commodity composition of Irish exports showed equally dramatic changes. Although food, drink and tobacco accounted for over 45 percent of the value of exports in 1972, these were soon overtaken by the value of manufactured exports, and now stand at around 24 percent. The exports of the chemical and engineering industries grew from 15 percent of total exports in 1972, to over 46 percent (67 percent of manufactured exports) in 1992. This reflects the profound changes in the structure of the Irish economy which have occurred since Ireland switched to an outward looking economic strategy, and especially since membership of the EC.
NESC identified four possible effects of the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers: Inter-industry adjustment and trade; Cold shower effect of improved technical efficiency; Intra-industry and trade; Increased firm size and restructuring.
Detailed analysis of output, employment and trade developments in the industrial sector since 1973 identified which of the possible effects, outlined above, materialized in the Irish case…: Cold shower effect; Some intra-industry adjustment; Large inter-industry adjustment; Reduction in firm size.
Given that the Irish economic structure in 1973 was one that had developed behind high protective tariffs, it is likely that severe inefficiencies existed. Economic performance during the gradual reduction of protection suggests that efficiency was improved in a typical cold shower effect. There is clear evidence of an intra-industry adjustment in Ireland following the reduction of tariffs, as firms reacted to free trade by specializing in particular segments of their industry. However, the most significant feature of Ireland’s adjustment to European market integration was a substantial inter-industry adjustment. The nature of this adjustment is best illustrated by identifying three groups of industries, each of which had a different pattern of response: 1. Foreign-owned, grant-aided, export-orientated industries; 2. Industries in which the domestic market is naturally protected; 3. Internationally traded, relatively large-scale, industries.
The first group—chemical, pharmaceutical and electronic machinery—experienced continuous expansion, and rapid export growth, throughout the period of EC/EU membership. Because of their reliance on the domestic market, the industries in the second group (which include paper and printing, drink and tobacco, some food industries and small-scale metal and woodworking firms), fared well in the 1970’s—when domestic demand was buoyant—but suffered severe contraction in the 1980’s, when the Irish economy languished in prolonged recession. …
The third group is comprised of textiles, clothing, footwear, leather, or parts of the chemical industry, motor vehicles and parts, electrical engineering, shipbuilding, bread, biscuits, flour and confectionery and other food industries. Many of Ireland’s relatively large manufacturing firms were in these sectors. After the removal of tariff protection, import penetration was rapid and, in this highly competitive international environment, these industries suffered secular decline in which the larger Irish producers were eliminated. While some difficulties were experienced in the 1970s, the dramatic collapse occurred in the 1980s. …
The fourth possible effect of market integration listed earlier, industrial concentration, was not observed in industry in Ireland. There was, in fact, a fragmentation of indigenous manufacturing industry. The opening of trade induced a sharp reduction in average manufacturing firm size, thereby reversing a slow process of industry concentration that had operated since the 1930s. This seemed to further reduce the possibility of building a large-scale indigenous industrial sector.
This radical adjustment in the structure of the Irish economy was interpreted as the response of firms to European integration. The removal of inefficient practices (the cold shower effect) and an element of product specialisation (intra-industry specialisation) offered some breathing space to indigenous manufacturers. But it did not, as in other countries, complete the process of adjustment. Because Irish firms’ basic scale was too small relative to their new competitors, and because they suffered a range of other competitive disadvantages, that breathing space was only temporary. Competitive pressure for further adjustment built up, forcing contractions of output and employment. In industries where economies of scale exist, contraction of employment and output tends to raise costs rather than lower them. Consequently, such ‘adjustments’, rather than re-establishing Irish competitiveness on a new basis, were the start of the process of long-run decline, inherent in specialisation between industries. The experience of Irish manufacturing between 1973 and 1987 can be seen to be consistent with a modern and realistic understanding of how trade and integration work where there are initial differences in levels of development, technology and scale of production.
The appalling experience of the 1980s, and its analysis as a failure to handle economic integration, had a significant influence on the approach of policy-makers and social partners to the dramatic deepening of European integration initiated by President Delors in the mid-1980s. However, as shown in Section 4, it did not prompt a retreat from European integration or internationalization.
The severity of this experience in the 1980s altered perceptions of the Irish economy. Expectations of medium and long-term prosperity became extremely weak, which encouraged rent-seeking and profit-taking behavior. This was evident in the extent of capital flight in the 1980s and the tendency for various government incentives to produce rent-seeking financial manipulation rather than increased business initiative. The emergence of the so-called ‘black hole’ in the balance of payments and national accounts, and the coincidence of rapidly growing exports with falling living standards and employment, produced fears that the modern Irish economy was fundamentally fictitious. The failure, once again, of indigenous development gave rise to a number of major studies of Ireland’s ‘economic failure’.
Crotty argued that Ireland should be compared with third world countries, in which the social and
political structures established under colonialism are used by the state in ways which favor entrenched elites. O’Hearn traced Ireland’s long-run failure to its outward-looking free market strategy, which made Ireland a ‘classic case of “dependent” relations: slow growth and inequality caused by foreign penetration’. Although supportive of inward investment, O’Malley argued that Ireland, as a late-developing country, faced, and still faces, significant barriers to entry created by the scale, market power or technological lead of established firms in larger, more developed, economies.
In an important historical account, Lee traced Ireland’s twentieth century experience to the predominance of a ‘possessor ethic’, as opposed to a ‘performer ethic’, in the country’s institutions, intellect, character and identity. Political structures—the nature of party politics and the failure of politics to represent and mediate conflicting interests—were emphasized by Girvin. Others analyzed the relationship between national political mobilization and the development of Irish Catholicism, and suggested that those factors could have an influence on economic life. Kennedy et al identified a set of proximate causes of Ireland’s failure at the level of policy and administration: failure to grasp the implications of the small size of the economy, absence of a long-term perspective, and neglect of the human resource dimension. Finally, Mjoset’s work for NESC synthesized these studies, suggesting a dynamic interaction of economic and social structures, global political factors, and cultural and attitudinal patterns. In his view, Ireland’s ‘basic vicious circle starts from two facts: the weak national system of innovation and population decline via emigration. The mechanism whereby these two features reinforce each other must be sought in social structure. These mechanisms are highlighted by studying contrasts which emerge from the comparison with the other…countries’.
In retrospect, many of these perceptions of the Irish economy seem colored by the extreme difficulties of the 1980s. Some of them reflect the fact that—because of its openness and high share of inward investment—Ireland was, perhaps, the first country in which conventional national accounting categories became insufficient. Others reflect the fact that dead-weight, displacement and rent-seeking are particularly prevalent in a stagnant economy with weak expectations. What is remarkable is that within ten years of emergence of the so-called Celtic Tiger, large-scale studies by some of the country’s senior social scientists shared the premise that independent Ireland was an economic ‘failure’.
…Far from accepting the analysis of Crotty or O’Hearn, there emerged a view that internationalisation, and European governance, while they had exposed critical weaknesses in Ireland, were no longer the cause of those weaknesses. Indeed, even deeper European integration and internationalisation, when properly understood and managed, came to be seen as a route to success.
While Ireland’s membership of the EC allowed the country to achieve one of its agricultural policy aims—access to a large, high-priced market—attention turned to problems in agriculture which remained despite, or because of, the CAP. The disappointing development of the food industry, and other problems in agriculture, reflected a range of industrial, agricultural and structural constraints which had not been successfully removed by domestic policy. The loss of so many indigenous businesses was traced to failure of industrial policy and the uneven growth of domestic demand. The focus and delivery of industrial policy was quietly changed—shifting from grants to equity, to an emphasis on indigenous development, to providing business services rather than start-up capital, to strengthening linkages from the TNCs—without any overt shift in industrial strategy. The argument for a greater focus on building indigenous firms and sectors—including clusters of related and supporting industries—received a measure of official support.
… A feature of the NESC approach was its insistence on placing the issue of EMU within a wider set of questions concerning Ireland’s strategic approach to European integration (including political integration) and a new perspective on the regional effects of the overall integration process….
… Economic actors came to recognize what Irish officials had long understood: that small states generally benefit from the formal, legal, supranational elements of integration, whereas larger and more powerful states can work intergovernmental negotiations to much greater effect. From intense study and deliberation, there emerged a recognition that the ‘1992’ program must be seen in the context of other changes in the general economic environment affecting business, many of which are independently encouraging internationalization. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), which had opposed the SEA in the referendum of 1987, was, by 1989, promoting integration in a campaign entitled ‘Make Europe Work for Us’.
…NESC’s Strategy for Development (1986) formed the basis upon which a new government and the social partners quickly negotiated the Program for National Recovery to run from 1987 to 1990…
The three subsequent agreements—the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) 1990-1993, the Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW) 1994-1996, and Partnership 2000, 1997-2000—had a broadly similar form. Each has covered a three-year period, and has set out agreed pay increases for the public and private sector. They also contained agreements on a variety of policy areas, including commitments to social equality and tax reform. While the macroeconomic strategy has been adhered to consistently since 1987, subsequent agreements contained policy initiatives that are worthy of note. The PESP initiated an experiment in which local partnerships seek innovative approaches to long-term unemployment. A recent OECD evaluation of Ireland’s local economic development policies considered that the local partnership approach constituted an experiment in economic regeneration and participative democracy which is, potentially, of international significance. Commercialization, and limited privatization, of Ireland’s state-owned enterprises has proceeded in the decade of partnership. The most recent program, Partnership 2000, contains a measure of agreement on action to modernize the public service, enlisting the social partners in support of the Strategic Management Initiative. Partnership 2000 marks some progress in addressing the issue of enterprise-level partnership. In addition, a partnership approach has been adopted in several policy areas, and was reflected in a range of Task Forces and Forums examining issues concerning education, poverty, the travel community, and people with disabilities. An important feature of the recent Irish approach is the attempt to widen partnership beyond the traditional social partners (trade unions, business and agricultural interests). A new forum was established and the membership of NESC was gradually widened, to include representatives of the voluntary and community sector. Reflecting this, Partnership 2000 was negotiated in a new way, involving representatives of the unemployed, women’s groups and others addressing social exclusion.
…In the decade 1986 to 1996, real Irish GDP has grown by an average of 4.9 percent a year, compared to an OECD average of 2.4 percent. While total employment had fallen by an average of 1.1 percent per year between 1980 and 1986, since then it has grown by 1.8 percent per year, compared to an OECD average of 1.0 percent and an EU average of 0.3 percent. More recently, growth of output and employment has reached unprecedented levels. From 1993 to 1996, growth of real Irish national output has averaged 7.5 percent a year, and employment by a remarkable 4.0 percent per year. The rate of growth of employment in services during the 1990s has been higher than in any other EU country, and also higher than the US. Indeed, the outstanding feature of recent economic performance has been the strong growth of employment rather than earnings. Social partnership has also produced a transformation in Ireland’s public finances. The general government deficit as a percent of GDP
declined from 8.5 percent in 1987, to 2.3 percent in 1994. The debt/GDP ratio, which reached 117 percent in 1986, has fallen steadily, to 76 percent in 1996. Inflation has remained significantly below the EU average and, having reduced inflation in the 1980s, Ireland did not need a second bite of the cherry (and a second deep recession), as the UK did. However, the performance on unemployment has been less satisfactory. …
Social partnership would seem also to have aided Ireland’s successful participation in the ERM and transition to EMU. “After considerable initial difficulties, it was recognized that satisfactory participation in EMS and EMU requires not only conduct of monetary policy consistent with the exchange rate peg, nor the private sector’s acceptance of modest wage increases, but also consensus on the management of the public finances, including taxation”. Partnership provided the context in which Ireland maintained low inflation and reaped the benefits of lower interest rates and improving competitiveness. After the loosening of the ERM in 1993, the social partners remained committed to a credible, non-accommodating, exchange-rate policy, leading to membership of EMU. While technical arguments suggest that this is the best exchange rate regime for a country such as Ireland (compared with a crawling peg or free float), the Irish case shows that technical mechanisms can only be effective where the political economy of inflation, incomes and public expenditure is resolved.
The growth of the past decade reflects continued growth of exports and, more recently, strong domestic demand. In the economic conditions created after 1987, Ireland attracted a high proportion of US investment in Europe, particularly in electronics, pharmaceuticals, software, financial services and teleservices. Between 1987 and 1996, the number of foreign firms grew from 670 to 1050, an increase of 57 percent in a decade. In 1996, foreign firms accounted for 47 percent of employment in manufacturing and internationally traded services. There is no doubt that the exports and employment of these firms constitute a significant part of Ireland’s economic transformation. However, there is evidence of greater strength in indigenous enterprises. Irish banking and insurance firms, many of which consolidated prior to the international competition introduced by the ‘1992’ programme, have grown strongly. In manufacturing, it has been estimated that the exports of Irish-owned firms have grown at annual rate of 11 percent in the period 1986 to 1995, slightly ahead of the EU (10.2 percent) and the OECD (10.5 percent). Between 1987 and 1996, Irish-owned firms accounted for 28 percent of the increase in employment and in the period 1993-96 they accounted for 41 percent of the net growth in manufacturing employment. In recent years, a significant number of Irish enterprises—in food and financial services—have undertaken mergers, acquisitions and alliances abroad. Irish enterprises have become attractive acquisitions for foreign investors. Such acquisitions, and the launch of emerging Irish enterprises on the New York or London stock exchanges, have become a routine feature of business life. There is evidence that the new methods of decentralized and flexible organization are being adopted by both TNC and indigenous firms in Ireland.
In its second Strategy document, 1990, NESC set out a framework which has informed its subsequent work, and which underlies the commitment of government and the social partners to the process. It argued that there are three requirements for a consistent policy framework in a small, open, European democracy:
- The economy must have a macroeconomic policy approach that guarantees low inflation and steady growth of aggregate demand.
- There must be an evolution of incomes that ensures continued improvement in competitiveness, and which handles distributional conflict in a way that does not disrupt the functioning of the economy.
- There must be a set of complementary policies which facilitate and promote structural change, in order to maintain and improve competitiveness in an ever changing external environment.
It was argued that, in the Irish case, the first of these requirements is best met by adherence to the ERM, a non-accommodating exchange rate and, as soon as possible, transition to membership of EMU.
The second requirement is best met by a negotiated determination of incomes. To be really effective, such a negotiated approach must encompass not only the evolution of pay, but also taxation, the public finances, exchange rate and monetary policy, the main areas of public provision and social welfare.
In pursuit of the third requirement, the Council advocated a major programme of structural reform in taxation, social welfare, housing, industrial policy, manpower policy and the management of public enterprises. It argued that such reforms can only succeed with the active consent and participation of those who work in the agencies and institutions concerned. This participation is more likely in the positive industrial relations atmosphere which can be created by national policy which, on the one hand, minimizes the scope for conflict over pay and, on the other, lays down rights and duties which foster and encourage security and flexibility.
The conduct of policy along these lines since 1987 allows us to identify some of the core elements of the emerging Irish model of economic and social governance. The first element is an overall orientation, which begins with the belief that the widest participation in social life, economic activity and policy-making are inseparable and fundamental requirements for the well-being of Irish society. This is combined with an unambiguous recognition and acceptance of Ireland’s participation in the international economy and the European Union. This implies that the competitiveness of the Irish economy is a precondition for the pursuit of all other economic and social goals. The third element of the emerging Irish model is the fact that the achievement of a consistent approach to macroeconomic policy, incomes and structural adjustment has been strongly associated with
negotiated programs. …
The international orientation of Irish social partnership was further underlined in the study which underpins the current program, Partnership 2000. While globalization has undoubtedly undermined many elements of national economic policy, even in large countries, there remain several areas where national policy remains crucial, and may even have become more significant. National policies which influence corporate governance, innovation, the labor market and industrial relations still have a significant effect on national prosperity. In addition, study of current economic conditions clarifies the policy approaches which can be effective in a small, open, European democracy like Ireland:
- Most of the policies which affect national prosperity are supply-side policies;
- Given rapid economic change, national policies must produce flexibility;
- Successful national supply-side policies, directed towards innovation and competitiveness, depend on ‘the high level social cohesion and co-operation that the state can both call upon and development’.
NESC argued that this view on globalization has implications for the three elements of a consistent policy framework, outlined above. It underlines the importance of consensus, both the social partners and the political parties, on macroeconomic and monetary policy. It suggests that, once such a consensus is in place—and is reflected in government policy, wage bargaining and management—there is little value in active discussion of macroeconomic matters, or in agonizing over the transition to, or terms of, European monetary union. The main focus of policy analysis and development should be on the supply-side measures that influence competitive advantage and social inclusion, and the institutional arrangements which encourage discovery and implementation of such measures.
In assessing the merits and potential of the social partnership experiment, note should be made of the political context. It might once have been believed that the social partnership model was dependent on the dominant position of the center-left, catch-all, political party, Fianna Fail. However, since 1987, the party composition of Irish government has gone through rapid change, such that all political parties of any significance have been in government in various coalitions. The social partnership approach has not only survived this, but has gained the support of the Labour Party and the second largest party, Fine Gael. Indeed, the evolution of social partnership has seen a co-evolution in Irish party politics—towards a system of permanent, but frequently re-negotiated, coalition. This brings Ireland nearer to a European system of governance, which does not have the ‘winner takes all’ and ‘oppositional’ characteristics of the British system.
While the evolution of Irish economic policy in the past decade has been marked by a high level of consensus—between the social partners and across the political spectrum—the more liberal and orthodox economists have stood outside the consensus. Some have objected to the politicisation of industrial relations because it ‘adds to the bargaining power of trade unionism on an ongoing basis’.
Others have argued that the social partners are ‘insiders’, whose pay and conditions have been protected at the expense of ‘outsiders who would work for less’, and that social partnership has had the effect of ‘raising the level of unemployment and emigration’. An aspect of the strategy that has particularly provoked orthodox and neo-liberal economists is EMU. A preference for the British model of economic and social policy (of the 1980s) is combined with a preference for sterling rather than the euro. Having failed to shake the consensus on EMU, they argued that EMU requires abandonment of centralised wage bargaining. In its recent assessment of the achievements and limits of the social partnership approach, NESC argued that these criticisms require careful consideration. It suggests that a number of qualifications are warranted.
First, the proposition that centralised agreements have prevented the unemployed undercutting the wage of existing workers, and has thereby increased unemployment, is both conceptually and empirically questionable. As Solow has shown, one of the fundamental features of labour markets, observed almost everywhere, is the absence of wage under-cutting by unemployed workers. This reflects the fact that the ongoing relation between management and labor gives rise to complex patterns of co-operation in which ideas of fairness play an important role. Wage rates and employment are entwined with social status, and the performance of the worker depends on the price paid for her services. Consequently, it seems inaccurate, on the part of the opponents of Irish social partnership, to attribute the absence of wage under-cutting to the centralised agreements of the past decade.
Second, the argument that social partnership arrangements maintain a high level of unemployment, ignores the fact that, without national agreements, income determination will remain a noncompetitive, highly collectivized, process, with tendencies to monopoly power on both sides of industry. Ireland is unlikely to move to the atomistic bargaining which would seem to underpin the analytical argument, and the political preference, for decentralized bargaining. It remains to be explained how, in a world of decentralized, sectional and non-political bargaining, agents acting in their own self-interest will take greater account of the problems of the unemployed.
The argument that EMU requires abandonment of centralized wage bargaining—or wage contracts linked to the Irish punt/sterling exchange rate—confronts certain problems of a factual, conceptual and practical nature. It is based on the misapprehension that the partnership agreements are entirely inflexible arrangements. It ignores the evidence, from Ireland and other European countries, that coordinated wage bargaining, as part of a wider consensus, plays a role in maintaining low inflation by means of a hard currency peg. Linking Irish wages to the sterling exchange rate would involve less co-ordination of Irish wage settlements, introduce unsynchronized behavior, establish a most unusual (and implausible) wage-contract, and could allow a return to the type of inflation-based bargaining which proved so destructive in past decades.
Indeed, the poorly specified analytical argument against the experiment, can be contrasted with the analysis advanced by the social partners themselves. This is an analysis which begins by noting the small scale and open nature of the Irish economy, the structure of industrial relations, high levels of taxation and social provision and the significant outstanding national debt. In this context, a negotiated consensus—with a non-accommodating exchange rate as the sheet-anchor of macroeconomic policy—must include agreement on the evolution of pay, taxation, the public
finances, the exchange rate and monetary policy, and the level of publicly provided services and social welfare. Four arguments underlie this position.
First, the internationalization of financial markets renders active manipulation of the exchange rate impossible in a small and extremely open economy.
Second, this is underpinned by the new perspective on the regional effects of economic and monetary integration, noted above.
Third, the social partnership agreements underpin the credibility of a non-accommodating exchange rate policy, by enlisting support for it as a long-term policy and ensuring that the ‘fixed’ exchange rate gives the right signal. As Soskice notes, depending on the institutional arrangements, a fixed exchange rate can either encourage moderate wage growth (when unions and employers jointly favour a low real exchange rate), or high nominal wage growth (when unions seek higher real wages in the short-term) .
Fourth, if the social partnership agreements underpinned the exchange rate policy, the reverse is also true: adherence to the ERM narrow band (and transition to EMU) guaranteed low inflation to such a degree that unions were willing to enter three-year wage agreements.
Adopting this approach, Ireland has made major advances in economic management and economic performance. In particular, consensus on this long-run strategy has taken the exchange rate, and therefore inflation, outside day-to-day party political competition and industrial relations conflict. This can be contrasted with an approach in which short-termism rules in economic policy, business decisions and wage setting. It has led, in the UK, to short bursts of fast economic growth, followed by deep recessions imposed in order to reduce inflation. Ireland’s experiment since 1987 has, for the first time in its history, partly inoculated it against the strikingly unsuccessful combination of macro policy and income determination pursued in Britain for many years. Ireland has finally escaped the most negative effects of Britain’s political business cycle and, in the process, has also rejected the neo-liberal approach to social policy and regulation adopted in Britain between 1979 and 1997. As a result, it has preserved a higher level of social solidarity, which seems an essential pre-requisite to sustaining redistributive policies and addressing issues of structural change and reform in a nonconflictual way.
While Ireland’s remarkable economic performance in the past decade is an interesting case of macroeconomic adjustment, industrial strategy and European integration in a small member state, it is also an intriguing case of social and political concertation. How should we interpret the emergence, success and persistence of social partnership in Ireland since 1987? While it is clearly tempting to see it as a version of ‘neo-corporatism’, there are several difficulties with this view. Within Ireland, there is an interesting debate on the correct way to characterise and interpret the development of social partnership since 1987. Perhaps the most compelling interpretations are those which have emerged within the partnership process itself, in response to perceived difficulties and opportunities.
Industrial sociologists have raised important questions about the potential of corporatist governance in Ireland. Hardiman compared the Irish centralised pay bargains in the 1970s with the patterns of neo-corporatist ‘political exchange’ in Austria, Sweden and Norway. Important conditions which facilitated concertation in those countries—such as a dominant social democratic party, cohesive employers’ organisations and a trade union movement with a high degree of authoritative centralisation—were not met in Ireland. Thus, her study explained the limited success of national agreements from 1970 to 1981 and raised doubts about the potential for future development. Her doubts were shared by some other students of industrial relations, who dispute that the current Irish experiment can be viewed as social corporatism, arguing that the trade union elite agreed to a program of severe measures to adjust the Irish economy, first to fiscal crisis, and then to European integration. In addition, it was pointed out that social partnership at national level is weakly reflected in workplace industrial relations.
There can be no doubt that structures and procedures which sustain national tripartite arrangements were weak in Ireland when compared with the classical neo-corporatist models. However, developments since 1987 strongly suggest that this may not preclude the development of a significant form of social partnership. The trade union movement has entered four agreements covering a wide agenda—including pay, taxation, social policies, public finance management and the Maastricht criteria. The partnership approach has prompted important institutional developments—particularly the establishment of a central monitoring system—that have improved the effectiveness of tripartite concertation and that go some way to overcoming the indecisiveness and clientelism which can arise within the Irish party system. Unlike the 1970s, the agreements of the 1980s and 1990s have been based on a shared understanding of the problems facing the Irish economy and society and the main lines of policy required to address them. While the Irish case involves an unusual balance between national-level and enterprise-level partnership, Partnership 2000 has given rise to a potentially significant initiative on enterprise-level partnership.
In any case, comparison with the classical, Northern European, neo-corporatist cases may have lost some of its relevance. International developments suggest some revision of traditional ideas on both the conditions for and the nature of neo-corporatism. It seems more relevant to compare the Irish experiment with approaches to social concertation in other European countries in recent years, rather than the heyday of post war neo-corporatism. This suggests that we can compare alternative approaches to the policy problem of the late 1980s and 1990s—how to control inflation and maintain social cohesion in the context of deepening European integration and intensified international competition—rather than the policy problem of the post-war golden age. Despite the rhetoric of the 1980s, it does not seem useful to compare countries in traditional terms, such as ‘state versus market’ and ‘centralised versus decentralised’ bargaining. As (Colin?) Crouch suggests, the concepts of institutionalization/de-institutionalization, encompassingness, social partnership and co-ordination, are more useful than the contrast between ‘state-imposed incomes policy’ and ‘free collective bargaining’, and between ‘state control’ and laissez-faire.
The Irish approach has been encompassing in two senses: it encompassed a large enough proportion of the economic actors to produce low inflation and increased competitiveness; and it encompassed
enough of the things that concern these actors—prices, pay, taxation, welfare and social provision—to make the overall strategy coherent. The Irish approach bears some similarities with other cases: as in Germany, there is a de-politicisation of exchange rate policy, combined with a politicisation, or at least institutionalization, of other policy areas; it bears some similarities to the emergency packages undertaken in Belgium, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries; it may, also, involve some ‘social promotion’ of trade unions, in pursuit of wider social goals, such as occurs in Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and France. However, an emphasis on encompassing organisations does not fit well with the Irish attempt to widen social partnership beyond the traditional social partners.
A comparative approach has also been used to throw light on the unusual features—some say weaknesses—of the Irish experiment. Traditionally, the most successful approaches to coordination—in Germany, Austria and Switzerland—involve similar macroeconomic policies, but with less reliance on centralised, and particularly state-led, incomes policy. These countries are notable, less for national pacts than for a rich institutional framework that links company-level market sensitivity and flexibility with coherent national-level behaviour. A key challenge facing Irish social partnership is to address the weakness of indigenous Irish enterprises and the problems of long-term unemployment and social exclusion. It is now recognised that this requires institutional developments below the central level at which the social partners and the state have recently developed expertise in dialogue and negotiation. But it is no longer clear that the institutional arrangements in the once-successful continental countries provide a model which Ireland should follow. Indeed, considerable institutional innovations have been undertaken in Ireland—in policies addressing long-term unemployment, rural and urban re-generation and business development—and it is possible that these, however unorthodox, are more suited to current economic, organisational and technological circumstances.
In order to develop social partnership, and make it more inclusive, it has been necessary to analyze the nature, purpose and goals of the partnership approach itself. In its 1996 report, Strategy into the 21st Century, NESC offered the following characterisation of social partnership, as it has developed in the past decade:
- The partnership process involves a combination of consultation, negotiation and bargaining.
- The partnership process is heavily dependent on a shared understanding of the key mechanisms and relationships in any given policy area;
- The government has a unique role in the partnership process. It provides the arena within which the process operates. It shares some of its authority with social partners. In some parts of the wider policy process, it actively supports formation of interest organisations;
- The process reflects inter-dependence between the partners.
- Partnership is characterised by a problem-solving approach designed to produce consensus, in which various interest groups address joint problems;
- Partnership involves trade-offs both between and within interest groups;
- The partnership process involves different participants on various agenda items, ranging from national macroeconomic policy to local development.
A distinction can be made between two conceptions, or dimensions, of partnership: Functional interdependence, bargaining and deal making; Solidarity, inclusiveness and participation.
Effective partnership involves both of these, but cannot be based entirely on either. To fall entirely into the first could be to validate the claim that the process simply reflects the power of the traditional social partners, especially if claims for the unemployed and marginalised are not included in the functional inter-dependence, and are seen as purely moral. To adopt a naive inclusivist view would risk reducing the process to a purely consultative one, in which all interests and groups merely voiced their views and demands. While these two dimensions are both present, even together they are not adequate.
There is a third dimension of partnership, which transcends these two. Although the concepts of ‘negotiation’ and ‘bargaining’ distinguish social partnership from more liberal and pluralist approaches, in which consultation is more prominent, they are not entirely adequate to capture the partnership process. Bargaining describes a process in which each party comes with definite preferences and seeks to maximize its gains. While this is a definite part of Irish social partnership, the overall process (including various policy forums) would seem to involve something more. Partnership involves the players in a process of deliberation that has the potential to shape and reshape their understanding, identity and preferences. This idea, that identity can be shaped in interaction, is important. It is implicit in NESC’s description of the process as ‘dependent on a shared understanding’, and ‘characterised by a problem-solving approach designed to produce consensus’. This third dimension has to be added to the hard-headed notion of bargaining (and to the idea of solidarity) to adequately capture the process.
The final element in this argument is that there are limited pre-conditions for effective social partnership of that sort. The key to the process would seem to be the adoption of ‘a problem-solving approach’. As one experienced social partner put it, ‘The society expects us to be problem-solving’.
A notable feature of effective partnership experiments is that the partners do not debate their ultimate social visions. This problem-solving approach is a central aspect of the partnership process, and is critical to its effectiveness. This suggests that rather than being the pre-condition for partnership, consensus and shared understanding are more like an outcome. It is a remarkable, if not easily understood, fact that deliberation which is problem-solving and practical produces consensus, even where there are underlying conflicts of interest, and even where there was no shared understanding at the outset. It is also a fact that using that approach to produce a consensus in one area, facilitates use of the same approach in other areas. The key may lie in understanding what kind of consensus is produced when problem-solving deliberation is used. It is generally a provisional consensus to proceed with practical action, as if a certain analytical perspective was correct, while holding open the possibility of a review of goals, means and underlying analysis. This type of agreement certainly involves compromise. But the word compromise is inadequate to describe it. ‘Compromise’ so often fudges the issues that need to be addressed.
This view, that there are limited pre-conditions to social partnership, is then combined with observation of three trends which demand a further revision of conventional ideas of neocorporatism.
The nature and role of social partners is changing, in ways that require a new view of what a social partner is now. The traditional characteristics of partners in neo-corporatist systems—‘social closure’ (monopoly representation of a given social group), a functional role in the economy (preferably in production), centralised structures for representing and disciplining members —seem to be losing their relevance. Organizations cannot take for granted their role as representatives of a given group, with defined and stable roles. They must continually mobilize, co-ordinate and provide services. While success traditionally depended on power resources, information is the key resource that a modern social partner brings to the table. In the place of the old form of bargaining, there are new forms of public advocacy: analysis, dialogue and shared understanding. The role of representation has weakened. Mobilizing, organizing and solving problems (with others) are the feature of effective social partners.
We are also witnessing an historical shift in the role of the center and national government. The complexity, volatility and diversity of economic and social problems, and of social groups, is undermining the ability of central government to allocate resources, direct the operation of departments and agencies, and administer complex systems of delivery and scrutiny. These traditional center roles are being replaced by new ones: policy entrepreneurship, obliging and assisting monitoring, facilitating communication and joint action between social interests, protection of the non-statutory organizations that now have responsibility in many policy spheres, and supporting interest group formation. Traditional conceptions of neo-corporatism seem premised on an outdated view of the power, autonomy and effectiveness of central government.
The relationship between policy making, implementation and monitoring is changing, in ways which place monitoring, of a new sort, at the center of policy development. For a variety of reasons, national-level partnership, which focuses on national-level policy-making, is unlikely to solve the complex and diverse problems which citizens confront. What is required is examination of practical successes and failures, which is used to revise both the methods and goals of policy. This demands
a new fusion of policy-making, implementation and monitoring. If the institutional arrangements to achieve this can be found, it seems unlikely that the social partners will play their conventional neocorporatist role as representatives to the same extent.
This discussion of the nature and preconditions of social partnership, when combined with the three trends outlined above, provide a new view of social partnership as it is developing in Ireland. In particular, the categories and ideas found in earlier studies of classical North European neocorporatism seem inappropriate in understanding the Irish experiment. Indeed, it is possible that the Irish case might assist the formulation of a new concept of post-corporatist concertation, as it is emerging in several European countries.
Four strands of policy development have been reviewed: macroeconomic stabilisation, industrial policy, European integration and social partnership. None of these is entirely resolved, and none entirely understood. The nearest to resolution is the macroeconomic, the long transition to EMU being almost complete; though UK adoption of the euro is necessary for Ireland to make permanent its approach of the past decade: economic policy without macroeconomics. The least well understood is industrial policy, and the apparent transformation of Irish business. In seeking more effective policies for indigenous development over the past 20 years, Irish studies drew on various models: the Japanese firm, the industrialization of Korea and other late-developing economies, flexible specialization, the industrial districts of Italy and Germany, the National System of Innovation of successful, small, European countries, Porter’s clusters and the networks of resurgent Danish and other regions. Now that some competitive success is emerging, it turns out not to conform to any of these models. Consequently, we urgently need to know more about Ireland’s business transformation and how industrial policy works in its relations with enterprises and sectors.
The relevance and interaction of the four strands of policy is not in doubt. All four figure in any tentative explanation of Ireland’s success of the past decade.
First, after 1987, Ireland achieved consensus—across both the social partners and the political parties—on the requirements for successful participation in the European economy and on the view that there was no way of escaping these requirements.
Second, Ireland achieved a high degree of wage co-ordination; in Ireland’s case, this was done by means of centralized bargaining, which relied primarily on a cohesive trade union movement and strategy.
Third, Ireland achieved a sufficient degree of consensus on public finance. This was necessary not only because of the Maastricht criteria but, more fundamentally, because of the way in which taxation and public provision interact with both wage bargaining and the exchange rate.
Fourth, Ireland (in its European context) had a set of supply-side characteristics that ensured international competitiveness and encouraged fast economic growth. These included a young, well-educated, English-speaking workforce, improved infrastructure (funded by both the EC and the Irish state), an inflow of leading US enterprises (attracted by both Irish conditions and the deepening European market), a new population of Irish enterprises (free of the debilitating weaknesses of the past and open to new organizational patterns), and deregulation of the service sectors (driven by the ‘1992’ process).
The complex interaction of domestic and international factors is clear. The common thread, the underlying transformation, is a switch from a long history in which external factors were constraining, to a new situation in which the external environment provides valuable inputs and even its undoubted constraints can be used as opportunities. It seems that European integration has transformed Ireland’s relation to its international environment, and social partnership has transformed its internal ability to mediate interests and adhere to coherent strategies.
It is remarkable, but clearly no coincidence, that the opponents of one are also opponents of the other. Their opposition, negligible in policy terms but influential in academia and the media, is both to the substance of the prevailing consensus and to the idea and value of consensus itself—and, most of all, to the proposition that, in the circumstances of the past decade, these two interact. Yet those who achieved Ireland’s transformation have little doubt that closing-off macroeconomic alternatives freed management, trade union and government energies for discussion of real issues that impact on competitiveness and social cohesion—corporate strategy, technical change, training, working practices, the commercialization and/or privatization of state-owned enterprises, taxation, public sector reform, local re-generation, active labor market policy—and forced all to engage in realistic discussion of change. They sense, even if they cannot say, that this approach was particularly liberating in a country whose political system tended to clientelism, whose enterprises had grown used to direct and indirect protection and whose trade union movement had developed in the British adversarial tradition.
NT Department of Treasury and Finance
Northern Territory economic data | NT Department of Trade, Business and Innovation
NT Department of Primary Industry and Resources
Northern Territory Economy | NT Department of Treasury and Finance
Northern Territory Economy Quick Facts (PDF) | Northern Territory Government
Northern Territory Economic Outlook (PDF; 08/05/2017) | @BankSA
NORTHERN TERRITORY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (PDF; 2016) | @NthAust
Regional Development Australia (RDA) Northern Territory | id community
Blog | @Gas4NT,@APPEALtd
NORTHERN AUSTRALIA – EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES IN AN ADVANCED ECONOMY (PDF) | Austrade
Northern Territory | Britannica
Economic overview of northern Australia (w PDF; 12/2017) | @IndustryGovAu
Idea to merge South Australia and the Northern Territory gains support: It might sound crazy at first, but there’s growing support to merge South Australia and the Northern Territory into one mega-state. (01/03/2019) | Ben Graham @newscomauHQ
Migrate for business | The Territory
@CDUni @cdu_ni @RIELresearch
— Stockhead (@StockheadAU) April 22, 2018
— Island Conservation (@NoExtinctions) March 21, 2017
— JapingkaAboriginalAG (@JapingkaGallery) November 10, 2018
— NASA Earth (@NASAEarth) June 21, 2017
52 Places to Go in 2018: Australia’s remote Top End — the northernmost hunk of the Northern Territory — is experiencing an uptick of tourism to its aboriginal communities. https://t.co/rlKclhRjjE
— NY Times Travel (@nytimestravel) March 4, 2018
.@TerritoryLabor Treasurer @NicoleManison: $103M is going into tourism marketing and infrastructure. We want to see more people moving to the Northern Territory. We're targeting early career women, late career workers and migrants.
— Sky News Australia (@SkyNewsAust) May 1, 2018
The Federal Government should consider allowing international airlines to fly domestic routes in the Northern Territory in a bid to reduce astronomically high airfares in the region, Tourism Central Australia has suggested @ABCnews #NTpol #auspol https://t.co/CPZxhHak5e pic.twitter.com/JD6nF586GE
— ABC Darwin (@abcdarwin) April 4, 2018
The Northern Territory's tourism sector is in a nosedive, with recent data showing it was the worst-performing Australian jurisdiction in both the domestic and international tourism markets in the year to June 1 – https://t.co/WsJwolkr6P pic.twitter.com/b5cIMxHSxM
— ABC Darwin (@abcdarwin) November 2, 2018
— KARRYON (@karryontravel) July 27, 2015
— Aust Tourism Awards (@QATAINFO) June 9, 2016
Australia’s Northern Territory government is very upset at this risqué tourism campaign https://t.co/z8HOcBNJ05
— PinkNews (@PinkNews) November 10, 2016
— Intrepid Travel (@Intrepid_Travel) February 6, 2017
Great to see the Northern Territory benefiting from a $12 million funding announcement last week. In a huge show of support for Central Australia tourism, the money will be used to open up new adventure cycling tracks in the Red Centre. https://t.co/IhwXa68CNv
— Cycling Australia (@CyclingAus) March 16, 2018
— Leah (@OfficerTravels) February 24, 2019
'Are we going to be the moral police?' Northern Territory mayor slams council's decision to ban merchandise bearing the popular tourism slogan 'C U in the NT' https://t.co/y3UbetGpoU
— #aupol news (@AupolNews) March 13, 2019
— ABC Indigenous (@ABCIndigenous) April 7, 2019
For the benefit of armchair travellers, Google has launched its Street View of Kakadu National Park.The US tech giant collaborated with Tourism NT, Parks Australia, Traditional Owners & the Northern Territory government for the virtual-reality project. https://t.co/dJZqvSJ70D
— National Congress (@congressmob) April 8, 2019
NAIF loan of $150m will help add three solar farms and one battery storage system to airports in the Northern Territory, to help power tourism, local exports and jobs.. https://t.co/Dwt7M5DpyR
— RenewEconomy – Fair Dinkum Power News (@renew_economy) September 7, 2018
— Top End Tweets (@TopEndTweets) February 23, 2016
— SacriFish (@SacriFish1) April 18, 2016
Good news for crab fans. Northern Territory mud crab catches are on the rebound after a tough 2016, with one region more than tripling its catch on last year. Read more from @NTCountryHour: https://t.co/eQI4yYCV8G #crabbing #seafood pic.twitter.com/xiCNlSbCJE
— ABC Rural (@ABCRural) December 1, 2017
Nigel Scullion has used money earmarked for alleviating Indigenous disadvantage to fund a fishing industry lobby group he used to chair. The Northern Territory Seafood Council used the money to argue against land claaims. #ntpol #auspol https://t.co/s22NsbxE2u
— David Marler (@Qldaah) November 2, 2018
The Northern Territory's Coastal Line Fishery has welcomed a recent export approval from the Federal Government, effective for the next three years.https://t.co/5u4NQGwsz3
— Skills Impact (@Skills_Impact) February 18, 2019
Seasonal workers from Timor Leste say they have used the mango harvest to learn from Northern Territory growers to improve agriculture in their own country. https://t.co/kJY0FKxcty
— ABC Rural (@ABCRural) November 28, 2017
— Craig Elliott (@biosecurityrisk) February 1, 2019
The Northern Territory government lifts fracking ban – national parks and areas of 'high cultural, environmental and tourism value' remain protected, yet this comes with great risk for livelihoods in agriculture, pastoralism and fishing, activists argue: https://t.co/Z3X13fHcTx.
— Cassandra Söderström (@sodercassandra) April 17, 2018
Vanadium is all the rage for Hardey Resources (#ASX: $HDY), with the company finalising the strategic acquisition of six highly-prospective #vanadium projects in Queensland and the Northern Territory. https://t.co/a3kHrMRgmG
— Next Small Cap (@nextsmallcap) July 18, 2018
"Developing the Northern Territory's onshore shale oil and gas resources could release the equivalent of 34 billion tonnes of carbon emissions, equal to 60 times Australia's current annual carbon pollution, according to The Australia Institute." #ntpol # auspol https://t.co/B8lgip1lT2
— Lock the Gate (@LockTheGate) February 5, 2018
The Northern Territory Government has announced that it will support all 135 recommendations in the NT Fracking Inquiry Report and lift the moratorium on hydraulic fracturing of onshore unconventional shale gas resources in the Northern Territory. https://t.co/qPT6YDDMv2 pic.twitter.com/GNA96zlXw7
— HSFlegal (@HSFlegal) April 20, 2018
The Prime Minster is hoping to capitalise on dissatisfaction with the Northern Territory state Labor government as he campaigns in the Top End on Wednesday.https://t.co/9QFURx9zNX
— Sky News Australia (@SkyNewsAust) April 23, 2019
For the benefit of armchair travellers, Google has launched its Street View of Kakadu National Park.The US tech giant collaborated with Tourism NT, Parks Australia, Traditional Owners & the Northern Territory government for the virtual-reality project. https://t.co/dJZqvSJ70D
— National Congress (@congressmob) April 8, 2019
#YourADF assisted the Northern Territory Government to return evacuated residents home following Tropical #CycloneTrevor. Personnel from @AustralianArmy and @AusAirForce worked together to respond and support the evacuation effort. pic.twitter.com/dk9XiJcyTd
— Defence Australia (@DeptDefence) March 26, 2019
In November 2017, the Northern Territory government approved the clearing of 20,432 hectares of land on the Maryfield station property – an area more than three times the size of Manhattan.#ActOnClimate #ClimateChange https://t.co/DGC9WikP4q
— Paul Dawson on Climate Change (@PaulEDawson) March 9, 2018
— Indigenous Law UNSW (@ILC_UNSW) July 5, 2017
One-fifth of Darwin port to stay in Northern Territory government hands https://t.co/PBHIbANrkk
— The Sydney Morning Herald (@smh) July 4, 2017
Northern Territory government and role of racism to be investigated by royal commission. https://t.co/w4MAEOMZ1u
— The Sydney Morning Herald (@smh) July 28, 2016
— The Conversation (@ConversationEDU) July 3, 2017
— The Conversation (@ConversationEDU) August 17, 2016
— Move2Sydney (@movetosydney) May 2, 2019
Education is a key focus for @billshortenmp Labor team. We will rebuild the investment ripped out by the Coalition in our schools across Australia, in particular here in the Northern Territory.
Check the @AustralianLabor website on our education plan. pic.twitter.com/03T2HOueSS
— malarndirri mccarthy (@Malarndirri19) February 4, 2019
Northern Territory Labor government announces majority female cabinet https://t.co/90HoXsgXlv
— Guardian Australia (@GuardianAus) September 12, 2016
— World Solutions (@_WorldSolutions) July 18, 2015
— World Solutions (@_WorldSolutions) February 8, 2016
Here is New Zealand Labour Party Policy Platform (PDF) in November 2014. Excerpts are on our own.
Chapter 1: Labour’s values
~ Labour’s values are underpinned by our commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi – Te Tiriti o Waitangi
~ Labour’s values are enduring values
~ Labour’s values have shaped New Zealand
Chapter 2: Tāngata Whenua
Chapter 3: Strengthening the economy
3.1 Labour is committed to a strong economy. Labour believes a strong economy is one in which everyone enjoys the security of good incomes and jobs and the natural environment is enhanced and protected.
3.2 A strong economy is underpinned by export-led success and a government that plays an active role in creating that success. Labour will build an economy on social democratic values that will not tolerate economic settings based on existing, or growing, levels of inequality. We believe that New Zealand has great potential for robust and durable economic development that will improve people’s lives across the Māori and Pasifika economies, across regions and industries, and in all our communities.
3.3 Labour is committed to financial and economic development policies that will transform New Zealand into a sustainable, resilient, low-carbon economy that is high-performance, high-wage, high-employment, and export orientated. Labour recognises the inadequacy of GDP has a measure of the quality of life of a people and is committed to developing broad-based measures of economic, environmental and social wellbeing.
3.4 Since its ground-breaking first term in office, Labour has actively promoted a strong, diversified, successful New Zealand economy. Labour holds that government must play an essential role in managing and developing the economy. We reject the notion that free markets on their own will deliver either long-term prosperity or just distributional outcomes.
3.5 Labour remains committed to this vision and programme. The challenge now is to turn these positive structural changes into economic progress by working more closely in partnership arrangements to create the conditions for success in industries, sectors, and regions. The aim is to build a high-value, high-performance, export-oriented economy. We particularly recognise the potential for such outcomes in vibrant Māori and Pasifika economies.
~ Our approach
3.7 Labour is committed to a productive and innovative economy that has:
• high-value, high-wage jobs
• participative, safe workplaces
• employment relations legislation that promotes collective bargaining, protects minimum standards and guarantees working people and their unions a voice
• engaged, valued, and well-trained workforces assured of a living wage that allows working families to participate fully in community activities
• regular increases to the minimum wage
• A tripartite framework for collaboration with government, businesses and unions.
Labour also believes that key and essential infrastructure, services and public assets should be provided by and regulated by the state and/or by local communities.
3.8 Labour will undertake sustained diversification of the New Zealand economy to improve standards of living and export success. Manufacturing is vital in a modern, successful economy. We are committed to advanced manufacturing and services, supported by new partnerships, to expand investment in research and development.
3.9 Regional and sectoral development is vital. New Zealand’s regions must be encouraged and supported to play a full role in our economic development. Labour is committed to a strong rural economy in which existing high-performance sectors are complemented by support for other emerging sectors to reach similarly high standards. Agriculture’s traditional economic role, especially in exports, remains important for Labour. Responsible resource extraction or mining will also play a role in the economy. We believe there is considerable potential to grow the value of New Zealand’s seafood and marine industries while ensuring appropriate standards of sustainability and decent working conditions.
3.10 Labour recognises the potential for New Zealand as the producer and exporter of quality food to a growing international market. Our reputation for integrity, animal welfare and environmental protection must be protected and enhanced as we grow the volume and the value of our exports.
3.13 Under Labour, procurement policy will be based on whole of life costs, local industry participation plans, resilience, and sustainability, as part of value for money. This will enable New Zealand firms to be competitive in bidding for these contracts. Procurement policy will also be used to advance social, regional development and economic and environmental goals. Labour will deliver monetary policy that strikes a balance between the control of inflation and a competitive exchange rate, and which will support strong economic performance. We will promote policies that reduce the incentive for speculative financial behaviour.
3.14 Labour is committed to a fair and transparent tax system that promotes social equity, sustainability, and economic growth. Labour is committed to environmentally responsible outcomes in economic development, and clean and renewable technologies with an emphasis on reducing carbon emissions.
~ Portfolio priorities
Delivering financial stability and successful macroeconomic policy
3.20 Labour will act to reduce and then stabilise New Zealand’s exchange rate when it is overvalued by drawing on a range of monetary tools and the experience of successful export economies. Under Labour, the Reserve Bank will have a balanced focus on inflation along with other objectives, particularly a competitive exchange rate underpinning improved export performance and job creation.
3.21 We will promote a regulatory environment for financial institutions based on prudent, transparent, and professional behaviours. Labour believes in a universal Kiwisaver scheme to improve savings performance. Labour will promote R&D as an integral part of a strong economy, including through targeted tax benefits that encourage successful research and business collaborations.
3.23 Labour will support international trade and investment agreements that promote New Zealand’s economic wellbeing and support fairness, transparency, sovereignty, and sustainability. Labour takes seriously environment, labour, and human rights standards that are frequently raised by trade agreements, and is committed to improving such standards as part of trade agreements.
3.24 Labour is committed to a system of universal superannuation. Labour will ensure the future sustainability of the system and will consider options to achieve this, including raising the eligibility age. If this occurs, we will ensure that those who cannot work past 65 in their normal work and need the cover of superannuation will receive the equivalent of the superannuation payment from the age of 65.
Delivering sustainable economic development
3.29 Labour will implement an economic development approach that is ‘clean, green, and clever’. This approach will maintain high environmental standards, promote high-value production, and favour a lower-carbon, more renewable energy future.
3.30 Labour’s economic development strategy will be a bottom-up partnership model, rather than a top-down, state-to-client model. In this model, business, industry, regional, workplace, trade union, and community organisations will be first to identify opportunities for initiatives to drive improved economic performance and improved outcomes for people. These initiatives will be developed and taken to government for evaluation and support. Labour will respond to these initiatives actively, constructively, and in partnership with communities and industry while protecting and promoting the overall national interest.
3.31 Labour will implement a New Zealand manufacturing strategy. Labour believes that manufacturing has been the lost opportunity in New Zealand’s economy since the 1980s. We will focus on manufacturing because it will deliver high-performing jobs, high-performing workplaces, investment, innovation, exports, and opportunities for improved productivity.
3.32 Labour welcomes foreign direct investment when it:
• is integrated into advanced manufacturing and services that lead to jobs for New Zealanders
• maximises our competitive advantage
• expands the stock of New Zealand’s intellectual property.
3.33 Labour will, on a partnership basis, implement focused, evidence-based industry policies, designed to respond to market failures and opportunity analysis. Labour will work hard to ensure that these policies are strongly supported by:
• basic infrastructure and institutions
• New Zealand-based savings and investment
• skilled labour, public-good research, R&D tax credits, linked government procurement, and international market intelligence and assistance.
3.34 Labour will have an active regional policy that clearly identifies regional development priorities. Infrastructural capacity will be central to Labour’s regional policy, including a commitment to an efficient transport system that prioritises public transport and reduced emissions.
3.35 New Zealand’s information technology infrastructure is important in Labour’s vision for the economy. Information and Communications Technology (ICT) will drive economic development in New Zealand for decades to come. Labour will ensure that New Zealand takes the opportunity for economic development from ICT as a sector itself and uses it to enhance performance and innovation in other sectors.
Chapter 4: Protecting and preserving the environment
~ Our approach
4.12 Climate change
4.16 Resource Extraction
4.25 Transport and urban design — Labour is committed to all New Zealanders growing up in a country with a high-quality and pleasant built environment where:
• our homes are healthy and energy efficient
• our cities are well designed
• our transport systems are accessible, safe, and efficient
• people are able to walk and cycle without fear for their safety
• public transport is affordable and widely available for people, and
• Transport systems and urban design support the transition from carbon-dependence.
4.29 Oceans—Labour’s vision is for healthy oceans that are wisely managed to protect marine species and birdlife. In exercising economic opportunities, we must protect our marine environment and its intrinsic ecosystem values for generations to come including through a network of marine reserves and other protected areas. Labour supports legal requirements for environmental impact assessment of significant ocean and ocean-floor development. We support fishing rules and quotas that achieve long-term sustainable use. We believe in integrated oceans legislation to ensure the sustainable use and environmental protection of marine resources.
4.30 Agriculture/rural sector—Labour recognises the strides that many in the agricultural and rural sectors have been making in developing good environmental practices. We will work with farmers and agricultural scientists so that best practices become the industry norm. This approach recognises that, in the long term, our prosperity is bound up in retaining important eco-services and in the international perception of environmental stewardship. Labour will support those in the agricultural and rural sectors who protect and enhance the environment, and hold responsible those who do not meet their obligations and continue to pollute the environment.
Chapter 5: Opportunity and fairness for all
5.1 The goal of Labour’s social development policy has always been that New Zealand would be a place where everyone, no matter what their circumstances of birth or what unexpected troubles life throws at them, will be included and able to get ahead: to build their capabilities, make their own contribution, and have a stake in society.
5.2 Labour wants to see all New Zealanders able to reach their potential knowing that if real hardship and tragedy happens, there will be real social security and a pathway to opportunities for them. Labour wants New Zealand to be a country where disadvantage is not produced and reproduced across generations. To break this cycle, Labour wants:
• healthy, affordable housing
• access to healthcare
• support for disability
• access to childcare and adequate time to spend with children
• equal educational opportunities moving from education into work
• a living income
• security of income in old age.
5.10 Labour will always fight for a fairer New Zealand. Fairness and equality of opportunity are strong New Zealand traditions and a part of Labour’s soul. Widening gaps between better and worse off and between men and women, young and old, mean that the ‘social contract’, the strong shared sense of ‘us’, is under increasing pressure. So too is the sense of having a stake in society, that there are opportunities for everyone, and that responsibilities are mutual. We will always work to heal social divisions, reduce the experience of exclusion and alienation, and eliminate the need to put up walls to keep others out and down.
~ Our approach
5.12 Chance and misfortune mean that some people struggle even in ‘the good times’. Security, mutual responsibility, and fairness demand that those adversely affected should not depend on charity and the stigma that carries, or be subject to humiliation or meaningless ‘make work’ to survive.
~ Portfolio Priorities
Families, children, and young people
5.24 As a matter of principle and sound social and economic investment, Labour is committed to banishing child poverty in New Zealand. The solutions are not simple, and the goal cannot be achieved immediately. We will co-ordinate and monitor its approach across all of government and policy including:
• early intervention for vulnerable children
• labour market issues
• access to early childhood education
• adequacy of income
• appropriate and accessible healthcare and housing.
5.27 Labour will strengthen the legislative and policy framework to address the persistent gender pay gap and promote equal employment opportunity. Labour is committed to paid parental leave and flexible working conditions to allow women to participate fully and effectively in society. Labour recognises, with particular reference to women, that everyone has the right to be free from violence and harassment.
5.32 Overall, housing provision requires several actors working within an effective framework. Under Labour, the state sector will take a stronger lead in improving the quality of rental situations, starting with its own properties. We will work with others, including community housing providers and developers, to provide quality housing for less well-off families.
5.33 Labour will continue to improve the quality of the state housing stock, and work with local councils, state social housing providers, developers, and community social housing providers to deliver a mix of affordable rental and privately owned houses—houses people want to live in, and in many cases are able to own.
5.34 Labour will find ways to work with families through savings schemes, Kiwisaver and Kiwibuild, to enable them to own assets. We will make sure finance and bond markets are geared to provide long-term secure capital, not the usual cycles of boom, bust, capital destruction, and debt hangover.
5.35 Labour believes that a truly inclusive society is one in which disabled people have meaningful lives within their communities, based on respect and equality; have their diversity recognised; and their human rights protected. This is reflected in the motto ‘nothing about us without us’.
5.36 Labour recognises that impairment is a part of many New Zealanders’ daily lives. We believe each disabled person must be recognised as an individual person with their own set of needs and aspirations: no two disabled people are the same. We believe that a disabled person should be supported to follow their aspirations, to make choices, and lead a quality life. They must have choice over their housing needs, employment opportunities, sporting and recreational activities, political aspirations, and education opportunities—things most of society takes for granted.
5.41 Concerns about aged-care health services, elder abuse, and cost-of-living pressures are mounting for older New Zealanders. Future generations will not have the same levels of asset ownership that currently keep poverty low for older New Zealanders. Inequalities that developed earlier in life are likely to have greater significance in old age. Labour’s commitment to all senior citizens is that they will have access to a minimum level of social service provision.
Violence in families and communities
5.44 Family violence is a crime that affects many aspects of our lives from health and wellbeing to employment, rights, and justice. Family violence encompasses physical, sexual, financial, and psychological abuse and occurs regardless of educational background, income level, profession, or ethnicity. Certain groups, however, may be more vulnerable to violence and experience additional barriers to accessing support. These groups include people with disabilities, migrant and refugee women, and rural women.
5.48 Our ACC scheme is cost effective and relatively cheap. It manages injury proactively and preventively; it delivers active rehabilitation and realistic compensation. The scheme has efficiency of scale and power in the market. It negotiates nationally with treatment providers, hospitals, and ambulance services. Yet for all its strengths, ACC needs to be revitalised and protected from undermining, cost-cutting, and preparation for privatisation.
Community and voluntary sector
5.50 Labour recognises that a wide range of community and voluntary organisations, from churches to clubs and non-government service providers embody much of what is best about New Zealand. These organisations deliver essential services that support diversity and local do-it-yourself initiatives, deepen whānau and wider relationships, and train people in ways that help them make meaningful contributions. These organisations also contribute to the economy and provide a vital component of democratic engagement.
5.51 We must build on community capabilities and support communities to do what they do best. We recognise, however, that it is counterproductive to devolve responsibilities to communities when they will struggle to meet those responsibilities. Partnership and a clear and well-considered division of responsibility between central, local, and community agencies are needed before responsibilities and funding are devolved.
5.52 Labour has always regarded the voluntary contributions people make to their communities as sitting at the heart of social development. Where possible, and in whichever ways are best, we will support volunteer organisations to make their contribution by providing:
• services such as meals-on-wheels or youth mentoring programmes
• entry-level or post-employment work opportunities for a range of people
• community activities such as in early childhood centres, language nests, marae, or sports clubs.
Chapter 6: A world-class education for all
6.1 Labour is committed to a New Zealand in which all people can reach their full potential through education. High-quality, lifelong learning is vital for both social and economic development and for a successful democratic society of informed citizens.
~ Our approach
– Understanding the impact of social problems in education
– Rebuilding trust and recreating partnerships
– Communicating with parents and learners
– Making education accessible for all
– Supporting Māori and Pacific achievement
– Early Childhood Education
– The tertiary sector
– Adult education
– Māori and Pacific education
– Accessible education for all (Special Education)
Chapter 7: Health—wellbeing, access, and fairer outcomes
7.6 We can make New Zealand a healthier nation by:
• focusing on equality, access, and fairness in the health domain
• committing to the integrity of the public health system
• providing the tools, information, and incentives for people to make good health decisions.
~ Our approach
7.7 Labour recognises the importance of addressing the social determinants of health: housing, income, access to services, and other factors have a major impact on people’s health. We will work across policy areas to create the right underlying conditions for individuals and communities—that they have the right support, information, and services to lead healthier, more rewarding lives.
7.10 Labour will restore a strong emphasis on primary health care, focusing on prevention, health promotion, health education, and research into what works best here in New Zealand. Cost should never become a barrier for any New Zealander needing primary health care. We will support primary healthcare to be developed and delivered at local level to suit the particular circumstances of local communities rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.
7.12 Every child deserves the best start in life. Maternal and post-natal care is an essential first step to children getting everything they need for good health in the critical early weeks and months. A high-quality maternity service is necessary for a strong bond between mother and baby to develop. This bond creates social wellbeing for the mother, baby, whānau, and wider community. Labour promotes and supports breastfeeding in accordance with World Health Organisation Standards. Labour believes that all individuals should have control over their own sexual and reproductive lives. An individual’s choice to determine the number and timing of one’s children cannot be compromised. To ensure that all people can make free and informed choices about their future, Labour supports safe, affordable and universal access to contraception, sexual and reproductive services and information. Labour recognises all women have the right to make their own choices about their own bodies, and should have access to abortion services.
7.13 As a country we must meet the challenge and opportunities of an ageing population. New Zealand needs a long-term or sustainable strategy for dealing with this issue. Labour supports the aspirations of many senior citizens to live as independently as possible in the community for as long as possible, and we will put in place the support to allow this to happen. Equally, we will make sure that appropriate and safe aged care is available for those who need it. We recognise the workforce crisis in this sector and will work with providers and the workforce to ensure that aged-care workers are valued for the important work they do.
7.14 Oral health is a major focus for Labour. We know that many people cannot access appropriate and timely dental treatment because of cost. We also know that the long-term health and financial costs of delayed dental treatment are very high. Labour will develop and implement an oral-health strategy that improves access to dental services and builds awareness of the importance of good dental health.
7.19 Labour is committed to the democratically elected District Health Board model, and to the principle that DHBs and Primary Health Organisations must reflect the needs of the communities they serve. We will work to enhance community input into the delivery of local services, so that communities have a greater role in identifying health priorities in their areas. Labour will collaborate with local communities for the delivery of local services, so that communities have a greater role in identifying health priorities in their areas.
7.20 One in five New Zealanders has a disability. Labour is focused on the need to support people with disabilities as full and contributing members of the community. We are committed to developing independent living arrangements or the local area coordination model. Disabled New Zealanders continue to be over-represented in those not gaining appropriate access to primary health-care services and information. Labour recognises the need for appropriate provision of respite care and carer support for people with disabilities and their families. We will act to reduce the disparities in funding support services between ACC-funded and health-funded people with disabilities.
7.21 Under successive Labour governments, New Zealand developed a public health system that was the envy of the world. Our policies have a relentless focus on improving the health and wellbeing of all New Zealanders, and we will build on the foundations of the past to ensure that our public health system delivers care to all New Zealanders.
Chapter 8: Justice, civil rights, and equality for all
8.5 Labour understands that the rights of all people are founded on a basis of equality. When we seek to celebrate diversity, it is because the cultural and social differences of various New Zealand communities are intrinsic to their ways of life, their health, and their happiness. Equality means that we recognise the wide range of traditions and values as being of worth in themselves, besides the overarching liberal inheritance of all New Zealanders: equality before the law and the rights set out in the Bill of Rights and the Human Rights Acts.
8.8 Labour recognises that it is the state, and only the state, that should be involved in the administration of justice. The social contract between the citizen and the state is an exercise of public relationship. Therefore, we see no role for the private sector in corrections, policing, justice, or the administration courts. We believe that the state, in partnership with communities, should play an active role in rehabilitating offenders, protecting communities through policing and the courts, and addressing the causes of crime.
8.12 In a healthy democracy, communities need to be able to engage effectively with powerful public agencies. Under Labour, independent Parliamentary officers (such as the Ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, and the Auditor General) and other complaints bodies (such as the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Review Tribunal) will be adequately financed and empowered. Dispute resolution services, including those offered by courts and tribunals, should be accessible to all. We know that a society that promotes equal rights for all citizens is a fairer and more secure society. Labour will promote equality of access and equality before the law for everyone.
~ Our approach
Adopting an evidenced-based approach to crime prevention
Dealing with the causes of crime
Protecting and strengthening civil and human rights
A well-funded, effective, and efficient justice system
Taking an evidence-based approach to constitutional change and law reform
~ Portfolio priorities
Get smart about crime prevention and community safety
Provide all New Zealanders with equal access to justice
Address sexual violence
Public control of justice and corrections
Protect civil rights for all
Chapter 9: New Zealand’s identity and culture
9.1 In a world that has become increasingly connected and standardised, Labour believes it is important to retain a strong sense of what it is to be a New Zealander. Our culture is what makes us special and different from other people. Creative people across different cultural fields record and illuminate our shared history, values, and accomplishments from a New Zealand perspective. We believe that our culture is an important part of our shared national wealth.
9.3 Our national identity is built on the distinctive accomplishments of New Zealanders. Our sense of nationhood reflects the legacy of Labour and other governments in building our welfare state; being the first nation to give women the vote; our comprehensive accident compensation system; our nuclear-free policy; and our advocacy for international justice and peace. Our writers, artists, musicians, and film-makers inspire and entertain people throughout the world.
9.5 Labour understands that the cultural sector is not just at the heart of our national identity, but is an important part of a modern, creative, high-wage economy. A strong creative sector is vital to our future economic development. As a country, we can no longer take an ad-hoc approach to arts and culture, and Labour believes that the sector deserves certainty and sustainability from government.
~ Our approach
The Treaty relationship in our culture
Arts and culture
Our multi-cultural future
Information and communication technology
Sport and recreation
Chapter 10: New Zealand’s place in a changing world
10.8 Labour wants a rules-based, multilateral global trading system that is accessible, fair, and transparent. We will take an approach to trade negotiations that promotes an environment where innovative firms can develop capability to adjust to new international challenges and pursue opportunities that exist in a rapidly globalising market. We will only support trade agreements that protect New Zealand’s sovereign right to make laws and regulations as we see fit, and that commit parties to international labour and environmental standards.
~ Our approach
Peacebuilding and sustainable development
10.11 Under Labour, New Zealand will:
• be an active player in multilateral organisations and agreements at the United Nations and other agencies
• play a leading role in pushing sustainable economic and environmental policies at the international level, particularly in taking up the challenge to respond effectively to global warming
• be nuclear-free, in line with the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act (1987)
• be a leader in promoting disarmament by working with like-minded countries to outlaw nuclear weapons, including through a Nuclear Arms Convention
• play a strong role in conflict prevention and resolution, particularly in the Pacific region, in resolving disputes as it has previously on Bougainville, Timor-Leste, and the Solomons
• take specific initiatives in promoting openness and transparency in government, combatting corruption and working with countries to develop institutions that respect and promote human rights—these are areas in which New Zealand has a strong reputation, and these initiatives can be included in the work we do in international development assistance
• have a highly professional, capable, and committed Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to promote our values and our interests
• focus Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) on alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable development and other initiatives in line with our principles, such as the advancement of women
• manage ODA independently from foreign policy through an agency with a high degree of autonomy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
• increase New Zealand’s ODA contribution as a proportion of GDP as fiscal conditions permit.
Pacific Island relationships
10.24 Labour will not support provisions in trade agreements that limit the government’s right to provide, fund, or regulate public services, such as health or education. Trade agreements should not prohibit the government from restricting the sale of land and infrastructure or regulating the sale of state assets.
Chapter 11: Democratic and Effective government
11.5 Labour realises that we must harness the ideas, knowledge, wisdom and skills of the non-government sector. In order to help shape positive outcomes, we recognise that government needs to be more responsive in using its resources and partnering with others.
11.6 Labour is a mainstream progressive Party that believes that democracy is about more than just voting once every three years. We will put New Zealand people at the heart of government, so they feel that government is owned by them. We believe in local democracy and the right of communities to have a say on major decisions affecting them. This includes the form and activities of local government, the right of communities to shape and plan their own future development, and the right to be genuinely heard by central government when it exercises its powers.
11.7 Labour also believes that a strong democracy needs strong institutions that act as a check on those with power. We should be strengthening, not weakening, these checks and balances in our system.
~ Our approach
Strengthening our democracy
11.10 Labour stands proudly for a strengthened democracy in which communities have genuine decision-making rights, and in which empowered and independent institutions scrutinise those who exercise power. We affirm the rule of law in protecting democratic rights. We affirm the ability of central government to put in place policies and law that support the national interest.
11.11 Labour will give local communities the right to determine what form of local and/or regional government they have through a democratic process in which they have the final and binding say. It is a long-standing tradition of New Zealand democracy that local communities are best placed to determine their own future development. Labour will support local communities’ right to plan for the future without undue interference from central government. Labour understands that central government and local government do not exist in isolation, and that their interests should be balanced and supported. Other forms of participation, such as Town Hall meetings, feedback at community events, and expressing views on current decisions through new media will be encouraged.
11.12 Labour also signals its strong support for those civil society and parliamentary institutions (including the ombudsman system and OIA process) that act to keep government accountable. These institutions can be assured of Labour’s support and respect. We acknowledge the central role of voluntary and community sector organisations in a democracy, and will engage in an equal dialogue and genuine partnership with them. Our democracy needs strengthening, and Labour is the party with the traditions and values to work with the community on this important task.
Working with local government and local communities
11.15 Local government has a unique and vital role in our overall system of government, and we believe that role should be respected and enhanced. We believe that co-operation and collaboration hold more benefit for communities than a model based on competition and focused on short-term cost cutting. Community wellbeing, as determined by local communities, needs to be placed at the heart of local government purpose and decision-making. Community wellbeing should be the guiding principle of local government — whether it is in Council’s responsibility for a clean and safe environment, the enforcement of standards for food and water quality, or the oversight of building standards essential to safe and warm homes.
11.16 Local government will receive the support it needs to deliver on the transport needs of our cities, towns, and regions. In particular, Labour will work with local government to enhance affordable, sustainable, and energy-efficient public transport in all its forms—on roads, rail, waterways, cycleways, and walkways—in line with the aspirations of communities.
Leading the way—quality public services
11.20 Labour believes that part of this approach must be constant reflection on how the public service operates and the removal of barriers to innovation. We are committed to building a public service that puts the public first, and we won’t accept a public service that is simply a poor imitation of private enterprise. We will uphold the public service’s underlying principles of service, neutrality, co-operation and collegiality, and a focus on sound long-term planning for the national benefit. The State Services Commission will have an active role, and we will empower it to encourage innovative and adaptive improvements and efficiencies while acknowledging and overcoming any poor performance and management.
11.22 The Canterbury earthquakes have highlighted the challenges that disaster response and recovery efforts pose for the public services, both at the local level and nationally. We plan well for the response to a disaster, but we have not planned well for recovery. A centralised, top-down model of government was imposed on the city. Removing the democratically elected regional council raised serious questions about how a locality or region can protect itself against the heavy hand of central government. We know we can do better than that.
11.25 The experience of Auckland’s reforms highlights how important it is that local communities have the final say over amalgamations and the shape of their own local government. This includes the form of Māori engagement and participation, and making Council Controlled Organisations directly accountable to elected councils, not their own boards. Labour believes that local communities should have an important say in what services are provided by their Council, how those services are provided, and how those services are prioritised.
~ Portfolio priorities
cf. 2011 (PDF)