World Vol.4

Northern Europe Vol.1 (universities, etc.)

Ireland Vol.46 (Brexit: finance, IT, pharmaceuticals)

Brexit Centre | @AIBIreland
Breaking Down Brexit: What could it mean for Business in Britain? | @AIBIreland
AIB warns that a hard Brexit could cost the lender up to €163m (01/03/2019) | @rte
Brexit freeze: AIB warns firms are putting growth plans on ice (02/11/2019) | @siliconrepublic
Most Irish SMEs have yet to begin Brexit planning: AIB (02/11/2019) | @reuters
Irish lender AIB raises dividend despite ‘major concern’ on Brexit (03/01/2019) | @FT
Quarter of Irish bank lending is to UK borrowers, raising fears of Brexit shock (12/08/2018) | @IndoBusiness
AIB chairman says Republic risks ‘car crash’ Brexit if no deal reached (07/20/2017) | @BelTel
Majority of small business owners believe Brexit ‘will have negative impact’ (03/01/2019) | @News_Letter
Shares of AIB and Bank of Ireland hammered as Brexit storm clouds darken (07/29/2019) | @irishexaminer
Your Business and Brexit | @bankofireland
Bank of Ireland launches €2bn Brexit Fund | @bankofireland
Bank of Ireland warns on Brexit hazard to institution (08/08/2018) | @IrishTimes
BoI braces for no-deal as rhetoric hardens (07/30/2018) | @IndoBusiness
Brexit uncertainty hits Ulster Bank’s credit rating (07/03/2019) | @rte
Ulster Bank chief in Republic sees no crash-out Brexit house price slump (08/02/2019) | @irishexaminer
Online shopping rules may no longer apply post Brexit (20/03/2019) | @rte
An Post is planning to roll out Parcel Motel-style delivery lockers (02/19/2019) | @thejournal_ie
An Post Chief says company could suffer from hard Brexit (10/05/2018) | @rte
Profit increases at Aviva Ireland on Friends First inclusion (08/08/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Aviva gets OK to shift €10bn to Ireland (02/20/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Aviva to transfer policies to Irish unit to prepare for Brexit (09/25/2018) | @BusInsMagazine,@IrishTimes

Brexit | @MazarsIreland
Owner of Irish stock exchange wants move to Brussels after Brexit (11/09/2018) | @IrishTimes
Euronext Dublin, one year on. (04/04/2019) | @Medium
The departure of the UK from the EU: implications for the Irish economy and financial system – Deputy Governor Sharon Donnery (05/03/2019) | @centralbank_ie
Central Bank warns of 110,000 fewer jobs in event of no-deal Brexit (06/19/2019) | @irishexaminer
34,000 fewer jobs after no-deal Brexit, Central Bank warns (07/31/2019) | @irishexaminer
Hard Brexit a threat to house prices – Central Bank warns (07/12/2019) | @IndoBusiness
New study estimates the impact of various Brexit scenarios on the Irish economy (03/26/2019) | @EsriIreland
Quarterly Economic Observer – Summer, 2019 | @NERI_research

Spending on no-deal Brexit stockpiling hits £4bn, survey suggests (12/08/2019) | @breakingnewsie
In Brexit, Could Ireland Wear the Crown (02/21/2019) | @Fortune
Brexit: A cheat sheet (01/31/2019) | @TechRepublic
Will Dublin Become Europe’s Regulatory Technology Hub After Brexit? (08/26/2018) | @Forbes
It’s Cool, It’s Well Wired, and It’s Staying in the EU (02/06/2018) | @datacenter
Ireland, a Jurisdiction of Choice and Gateway to Europe for Financial Institutions (PDF; 2017) | @ALGoodbody
A closer look at BREXIT: The case for Ireland (PDF) | @ESgloballaw
Over Ireland? Bothered by Brexit? Find that new home for your cloud (13/06/2016) | @TheRegister

Irish Organisations receive €912,684 thanks to Intel Employees (10/04/2019) | @EnterInnov
Intel to expand Irish production to meet global chip demand (10/21/2018) | @IndoBusiness
Intel to develop AI incubator programme at Talent Garden Dublin (15/10/2018) | @rte
Farmer who won appeal against IDA launches latest bid to stop Intel’s €3.6bn plant (13/08/2019) | @thejournal_ie
Microsoft’s Irish arm paid $77bn dividend to tech giant last year (05/25/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Microsoft announces creation of 200 new jobs at its Dublin campus (17/09/2018) | @IDAIreland
Take a guided tour of… Microsoft’s new Dublin HQ complete with in-office bakery (02/22/2018) | @thejournal_ie
Oracle Launches EMEA Recruitment Drive To Add 1,400 New Cloud Sales Professionals (14/01/2016) | @IDAIreland

‘Major milestone’ as Uniphar begins trading on Euronext Dublin (07/17/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Irish company Uniphar raises €150m from IPO (07/12/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Irish pharma group Uniphar plans IPO (06/17/2019) | @reuters
Jazz Pharma could shift EU roles from Oxford to Ireland (08/01/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Pharmaceuticals unlikely to avoid a harsh Brexit (02/26/2018) | @irishexaminer
Irish M&A tally falls in wake of $62bn Shire deal (07/04/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Takeda UK boss retains role after Shire acquisition (22/01/2019) | @ThePharmaLetter
Speech by an Taoiseach, Mr. Enda Kenny, T.D., Official opening of Shire’s new offices, Baggot St. (27/04/2017) | Government of Ireland
Takeda forecasts operating loss as Shire integration costs mount (05/14/2019) | @FT

Ireland Vol.44 (Brexit)

IRELAND & THE IMPACTS OF BREXIT: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR IRELAND ARISING FROM CHANGING EU-UK TRADING RELATIONS (PDF; 02/2018; prepared for the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation) | Copenhagen Economics

– A European Economic Area (EEA) scenario, where we assume similar levels of trade costs between the EU and the UK as are currently observed between the EU and the EEA members (Norway and Iceland). The scenario includes duty free trade for most products, though with some tariffs on sensitive products within the agri-food sectors. Border inspections on EU-UK trade will add customs costs. The risk of regulatory divergence for both goods and services is lowest in this scenario.
– A Customs Union (CU) scenario, where we assume that the EU and the UK agree on a traditional customs union agreement. The scenario includes duty free trade for most products, though with some tariffs on sensitive products within the agri-food sectors. Border inspections on EU-UK trade will add customs costs. This scenario implies a higher risk of regulatory divergence for both goods and services relative to an EEA-like scenario, as a standard customs union does not cover regulatory issues for goods and does not address service trade.
– A Free trade agreement (FTA) scenario, where we assume that the EU and the UK agree on a free trade agreement (FTA). We use the effects of an average EU FTA as midpoint estimate, and the scenario includes duty free trade for most products, though with some tariffs on sensitive products within the agri-food sectors. Border inspections on EU-UK trade will add customs costs. As in the customs union scenario, there is a risk of emerging regulatory divergence between the EU and the UK in both goods and services.
– A WTO Scenario (WTO) scenario, where we assume that trade will be governed by WTO rules and other WTO agreements. In this case, the UK and the EU will impose MFN tariffs on each other’s goods where these are not bound by existing plurilateral agreements or arrangements. In addition, we assume that the EU and the UK will continue to use tariff rate quotas both between them and with third countries, which implies that the effective
– Agri-food, where processed foods, beef, sheep and other cattle meat and dairy are the sub-sectors in which the largest impacts occur, and where trade and production are predicted to fall significantly below the non-Brexit baseline level in 2030. Production in other primary agriculture sub-sectors such as grains, fruit and vegetables, forestry and fishing etc. will also be negatively affected – however, to a smaller extent. Impacts in the agri-food sector are driven by a combination of tariffs, customs costs and the risk of regulatory divergence.
– Pharma-Chemicals, which is the absolute largest export sector in Ireland. Our analysis shows that production in the sector could fall by 1-5 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline production level in 2030. Impacts in this sector are almost exclusively driven by the risk of regulatory divergence and increased border costs.
– Electrical machinery, which includes different types of electronic equipment such as computers, televisions and communication equipment, is another large export sector. Production in this sector is predicted to fall by 5-10 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline production level in 2030. Customs costs and the risk of regulatory divergence are the main factors driving the impacts in this sector.
– Wholesale and retail is an important sector in Ireland. The sector could face new costs in their supply chains as a result of diverging regulatory requirements. The sector will also be negatively affected by an overall drop in consumer demand resulting from Brexit.
– Air transport, which could face substantial challenges on routes to the UK as a result of Brexit.
… Measured relative to Irish GDP in 2015, the difference between the “best” (EEA) scenario and the “worst” (WTO) is €11 billion in 2030 (in 2015 levels). In a hypothetical situation, where regulatory divergence for goods and services could be avoided and where the Brexit impacts only relate to tariffs and border costs, the theoretical loss to Irish GDP would be further reduced to around 1 per cent of GDP or approximately €3 billion in 2015 terms.
With the objective of minimizing the overall economic loss to Irish GDP, the best possible trade negotiation outcome for Ireland would be an agreement that has an acceptable balance of rights and obligations for all parties and with the following main elements:
– No tariffs
– Large quotas for agricultural products
– Low border costs
– Landbridge transit
– Low regulatory divergence
– Low barriers for service trade

1. Trade promotion policies (e.g. helping existing exporters to access new markets, or new exporters to engage in exporting)
2. Enterprise policies (e.g. helping the transition from declining to growing sectors)
3. Skills policies (e.g. supporting skills required by the unavoidable adjustments)
p.11 Figure 1. Ireland-UK trade and investment relation

p.12 Figure 2. Irish trade with the UK and the rest of the world, 2015
p.13 Figure 3. Intensity of trade with the UK
… Besides both being EU members since 1973, there are many other underlying and historical reasons for why Ireland is uniquely exposed to Brexit:
– Common border and language: First of all, the UK is Ireland’s nearest neighbour and the only country with whom we share a land border. In addition, Ireland and the UK are both English speaking countries
– All Island economy: There is a wellfunctioning all island economy with fully integrated commuting patterns and shopping habits, and a closely knitted value chain across the Island
– Common Travel Area: A common travel area is in existence between Ireland and the UK since the 1920s
– Same consumer taste: In terms of consumer preferences, Ireland and the UK are in many aspects considered as one market with similar tastes and identical products being offered
– Common-law basis of legal systems: The UK and Ireland both have a common-law legal system, which places greater emphasis on previous court decisions, compared to a civillaw legal system, which is in place in other European countries.
– Joint commercial contracts: Commercially, there is a very close integration of business and enterprises across the Irish-UK market. The UK and Ireland are often treated as one market, e.g. in the organisation of many companies, and reflected in many commercial contracts
– UK-only exporters and importers: Like many countries, Irish SMEs are less active in international trade compared to larger enterprises. As a special feature, many of Ireland’s exporting and importing SME’s have the UK as the first and only export/import market and is hence extremely exposed to Brexit
– UK landbridge: Two-thirds of Irish goods exporters make use of the UK landbridge to access continental markets.
p.15 Box 1. UK landbridge is key for Irish trade with the rest of EU
…the agri-food sector where an average of around 40 per cent of exports are destined for the UK. For specific sub-sectors, the UK market accounts for an even greater share of exports, including beef (47 per cent), cheese (60 per cent) and mushrooms (90 per cent)…
…the impact is likely to be more pronounced amongst indigenous firms who account for between 80 and 100 per cent of enterprises in the agri-food sector …
p.16 Figure 4. Exposure to UK market at sector level

p.17 Figure 5. Loss of income due to drop in exchange rate
p.18 Figure 6. UK investment of around €40 bn in Ireland in 2015
p.19 Figure 7. Irish investment in the UK around €90 bn in 2015
…for the transition period immediately after Brexit in March 2019:
-“Soft Brexit”: This scenario represents a transition arrangement in which duty free trade is continued and no customs clearance procedures are implemented, which in essence means that the UK will remain in the Single Market during the transition period. While this will require a regulatory freeze in the UK and will require the UK to maintain all current regulation aligned to the EU Single Market rules, the scenario assumes a moderate increase in trade costs for both goods and services to reflect the uncertainty around the future trade relationship and the risk of future regulatory divergence.
-“Hard Brexit”: In this scenario, there is no transitional arrangement between the EU and the UK, and both the EU and the UK will implement MFN tariffs on goods, border procedures, and there will be some emerging deviations in regulation for both services and goods. Furthermore, the scenario assumes additional transit costs for Irish goods exported to the European continent across the UK landbridge due to the delays and infrastructural challenges that are expected to materialise in the scenario.
p.21 Figure 8. Future relationship (Barnier slide)

– EEA:…duty free trade for most products although with some tariffs on sensitive products within selected agri-food sectors. …regulatory alignment with the Single Market rules (e.g. including mutual recognition agreements, harmonisation of some standards, etc.). …will become necessary to impose border inspections on EU-UK trade by whatever means. …UK exporters will be facing higher costs of exporting related to border controls, tariffs and emerging regulatory differences. …
– CU:…the EU and the UK would continue to have a common external trade policy, and the UK will not be able to negotiate its own free trade agreements independently of the EU. Just as in the case of an EEA solution or an FTA solution, the UK exit from the Single Market implies that border checks on EU-UK trade will be needed, unless political agreement on their removal can be reached. …
– FTA:…duty free trade for most products although with some tariffs on sensitive products within selected agrifood sectors. …very limited ability to ensure regulatory alignment with the Single Market rules…
– WTO:…impose MFN tariffs on each other’s goods where these are not bound by other agreements or arrangements. …grant duty free trade on a range of listed products between the signatories… …tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on a range of products whereby imports from third countries can enter the EU with zero or low tariffs up to a certain quantity for a given time period, …
p.24 Figure 9. Overview of scenarios
…the complexity of the rules of origins…, the sensitivity of the good to delays… and the complexity of the value chain of the affected good
…In the EEA scenario, the average regulatory costs are estimated at 7 per cent corresponding to the average of the EU’s other EEA agreements (with Norway and Iceland).
In the Customs Union and FTA… on average 10 per cent… corresponding to the average of the EU’s other FTAs.
Finally, in the WTO… …increase up to 24 per cent…
If no regulatory divergence occurs between the EU and the UK, Irish goods exports will face additional trade costs related to tariffs and customs procedures corresponding to an average 4-5 per cent trade cost in the EEA, CU and FTA scenarios and around 7-8 per cent additional trade cost in the WTO-scenario. …
If regulatory divergence occurs in the long run… EEA…12 CU…14 FTA…14 WTO…32 …
p.32 Figure 11. Long-term impact of BREXIT on Ireland’s total exports

p.33 Figure 12. Long-term impact of BREXIT on Ireland’s total imports

p.34 Figure 13. Long-term impact of BREXIT on Ireland’s GDP

p.35 Figure 14. Development of Ireland’s GDP with and without Brexit

p.36 Figure 15. Impact on real wages for Irish high and low skilled workers
p.38 Figure 17. Ireland’s goods trade per sector with UK and the Rest of the World

p.39 Figure 18. Ireland’s trade per sector with UK and the Rest of the World
Figure 19. Ireland’s key goods export sectors to the UK

Figure 20. Ireland’s key service export sectors to the UK
p.41 Figure 21. Key goods import sectors from the UK

p.42 Figure 22. Key service import sectors from the UK
p.43 Figure 23. Output changes in two scenarios for Brexit in 2030

p.45 Figure 25. Key sectors explain over 90 per cent of GDP impact

p.46 Figure 26. Profile of key sectors
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [processed foods]
– Total exports in the processed food sector would be 15-31 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 16-17 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Exports to the UK would be 40-87 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 45-49 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from -10 per cent (EEA) to -21 per cent (WTO) compared to the 2030 baseline production level. The impact in the CU and FTA scenarios is -11 per cent to -12 per cent.
– Employment would be affected proportionately to production in the scenarios, i.e. a 10 per cent reduction in production would lead to a 10 per cent reduction in employment compared to the 2030 baseline.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [beef, sheep and other cattle meat]
– Total exports from the beef sector would be 18 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and CU scenario and 35 per cent below in the WTO scenario. In the FTA scenario, the impact would be 22 per cent below the baseline.
– Exports to the UK would be 29-53 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 28-35 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from -11 per cent (EEA) to -23 per cent (WTO) compared to the 2030 baseline production level. The impact in the CU and FTA scenarios would be -12 per cent and -14 per cent.
– Employment would be affected proportionately.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [dairy]
– Total exports from the dairy sector would be 18 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA scenario and 40 per cent below in the WTO scenario. In the FTA and CU scenarios the impact would be 19 and 20 per cent below baseline, respectively.
– Exports to the UK would be 35 to 76 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios, respectively and 37 to 38 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from -8 per cent (EEA) to -18 per cent (WTO) compared to the 2030 baseline production level. The impact in the CU and FTA scenarios would be -9 per cent to -10 per cent.
– Employment would be affected proportionately.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [pharmaceuticals and chemicals]
– Total exports from the pharma-chemicals sector would only be 1-5 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the scenarios analysed … A 5 per cent decline in exports from this sector is, however, still a large amount given the size of the sector (a 5 per cent drop in pharma-chemicals is for example more than the entirety of Irish beef exports).
– Exports to the UK would be 7-42 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 20 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from 1-5 per cent below the 2030 baseline production level.
– Employment would not be equally affected since the sector would still be one of the more productive sectors and can offer attractive wages, which would help to retain and attract labour from other sectors in Ireland.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [electrical machinery]
– Total exports to the world from the electrical machinery sector would be 5-9 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the scenarios analysed.
– Exports to the UK would be 34-40 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios, respectively and 20 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from 5-10 per cent below the 2030 baseline production level.
– Employment would be 2-5 per cent below the baseline employment since the sector would still be one of the more productive sectors and can offer attractive wages, which would help to retain and attract labour from other sectors in Ireland.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [wholesale and retail]
– Total exports from the retail and wholesale sector is in itself not the key parameter. Rather, the impact in the sector is seen more clearly from the increased costs of imports of various consumer goods from the UK, most notably processed foods.
– Production in the sector would be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from 2-4 per cent below the 2030 baseline production level depending on the scenario.
– Employment would be relatively less affected since a large number of retail outlets around the country would still be needed despite a drop in demand.
pp.51-55 4.8 Impacts in other service sectors
Air transport
Financial Services
ICT and Business Services
pp.56-59 CHAPTER 5 Policy Options for Ireland
5.1 Negotiating the best possible outcome
… The EEA-scenario will reduce Ireland’s GDP to a level 2.8 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline (or €7 billion in 2015-levels) compared to a WTO-scenario, which is foreseen to bring Irish GDP 7.0 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline in 2030 (corresponding to €18 billion in 2015-level). …
… In a hypothetical situation, where regulatory divergence for goods and services could also be avoided, and hence the Brexit impacts only related to tariffs and border costs, then the theoretical loss to Irish GDP would be further reduced to around 1 per cent impact on GDP or approximately €3 billion in 2015-level. …
…the best possible trade negotiation outcome for Ireland would be…
– No tariffs: Avoid imposition of any tariffs on future EU-UK trade – duty free for all products
– Large quotas: If some tariffs have to remain on agriculture products, sufficiently large tariff quotas should be pursued to cater for expected future trade levels
– Low border costs: EU-UK border costs on both sides should be minimised by using state-of-the art technology and procedures, including use of authorised economic operators as much as possible to minimize border costs
– Landbridge transit: Arrangements should be made to ensure undisturbed transit to/from Ireland via the UK landbridge
– Low regulatory divergence: Mechanisms should be put in place between the EU and the UK to avoid and minimize regulatory divergence and protect against emerging divergence as the EU or the UK develops their technical regulation further. Such mechanisms and the related dispute resolution mechanisms should apply to all areas currently covered by common EU regulation and rules (the harmonised area). For Ireland, this is important generally and would, in particular, be important for:
≫ Beef
≫ Dairy
≫ Processed food
≫ Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and chemicals
≫ Electrical machinery
– Low barriers for service trade: As for goods, similar mechanisms would be needed for services to avoid regulatory divergences and excessive trade costs. This would be important for all Irish service sectors, and notably for:
≫ Air transport
≫ Financial and insurance services (continued passporting, or strong equivalence)
5.3 Domestic enterprise policy responses to mitigate Brexit impacts (minimizing threats)
…three broad categories:
– Trade promotion policies (e.g. helping existing exporters to access new markets, or new exporters to engage in exporting)
– Enterprise policies (e.g. helping the transition from declining to growing sectors)
– Skills policies (e.g. supporting skills required by the unavoidable adjustments)
5.4 Domestic policies to pursue the opportunities from Brexit
Trade opportunities
Just as Irish exporters will face new barriers in the UK market, so will UK exporters in the EU market. This implies that UK products or services will be more expensive in the EU market, meaning that customers in other EU countries currently served by UK firms will be looking for alternative suppliers. This can present opportunities for Irish exporters, especially since there are many overlaps in the products export from the UK and from Ireland. One example could be cheese exports, where Irish cheese could replace British cheese in other EU markets. And similarly, for other products or services. These adjustments are already factored into to our analyses and quantifications, but the extent to which it takes place in reality depends on the actions taken by Irish exporters and how these opportunities are supported by Irish policy actions.
Talent opportunities
The general decline in economic activity in the UK following Brexit and in particular the uncertainty and sentiment of EU citizens in the UK presents another opportunity for Ireland. As the only English speaking country in the EU, aside from Malta, and with diverse job opportunities, Ireland can become a new home for talents deciding to leave the UK post-Brexit. This would particularly relevant in sectors and positions where there are already shortages in Ireland and where even the best re-schooling and job training (as per above) cannot meet the demand. This could include IT-specialists, researchers, financial service expert for example. Again, active and timely policies from the Irish government and local authorities can help maximise these opportunities.
Investment opportunities
The biggest opportunities in relation to Brexit is likely to be within the investment area. Ireland is already an attractive location in Europe for foreign direct investment (FDI), and with the right additional policies, Ireland should be wellplaced to attract entire companies or parts of multinational companies wanting to be located within the EU and in an English speaking common law country.

UK Vol.149 (think tanks)

UK Vol.148 (think tanks)

Australia Vol.18 (Australian National University, University of Melbourne)

Wyoming Vol.4 (University of Wyoming, corporations, Jackson Hole)

New Zealand Vol.16 (including University of Canterbury, University of Waikato, Lincoln University, Massey University)

U.S. universities and colleges Vol.4 (universities)

UK Vol.145 (universities)

West Virginia Vol.3 (West Virginia University)

Australia Vol.17 (2019 federal election)

House of Representatives – who is leading? | @AusElectoralCom
2019 federal election boundaries map (w PDFs) | @AusElectoralCom
Infosheet 8 – Elections for the House of Representatives | Parliament of Australia
Senate Results | @ABCNews
How the Senate result is determined | @AusElectoralCom
Senate elections | Parliament of Australia

PLAN FOR A STRONGER REGIONAL AUSTRALIA – The Nationals’ heart is in the country and the coast. | @The_Nationals
OUR PLAN | @CountryLibs
Liberal Party’s Scott Morrison re-elected as Australian Prime Minister (Video; 05/18/2019) | @globalnews
Scott Morrison goes from accidental Prime Minister to homespun hero in election 2019 (05/20/2019) | Andrew Probyn @ABCNews
cf. Australia Vol.4 (Coalition – Liberal Party of Australia, Liberal National Party of Queensland, National Party of Australia, Country Liberal Party (NT) – 2016 Election Policies)
Malcolm Turnbull Election Night Speech 2016 (YouTube)
Tony Abbott Speech – 2013 Campaign Launch (YouTube)

Excerpts are on our own.
Australia’s conservatives relish unexpected 3rd term win (05/18/2019) | @reuters,@CBC
… The White House said Trump and Morrison spoke by phone and “pledged to continue their close cooperation on shared priorities.” Morrison told raucously cheering supporters late on Saturday, who just hours earlier had seemed resigned to defeat, that he had always believed in miracles. …
… Morrison, however, cast himself as the candidate who would work for aspirational voters and the tactic seemed to strike a chord. A Pentecostal church-goer, Morrison took over as prime minister last year when he emerged as the unexpected winner of infighting within the Liberal party…
… The government campaigned on a platform of tax cuts and stability, while Labor promised to reduce inequality through tax reform, higher wages, better public infrastructure and faster action on climate change. Fitch Ratings said in a note the result would bring policy continuity, including the coalition’s pledge to start delivering budget surpluses next financial year. …
Here are the winning stocks in Australia as Morrison takes victory at the elections (05/20/2019) | @CNBC
… Bank, coal miners, property and healthcare stocks jumped, pushing the benchmark S&P/ASX 200 index to an 11-year high, after opening 1.7% higher and hitting its highest intraday level since 2007. …
… Yancoal Australia surged 5.7%, New Hope jumped about 4%, and Whitehaven Coal rose about 2%…
… Shares of Australia’s biggest lender Commonwealth Bank of Australia jumped about 6% and National Australia Bank surged 6.63%. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group also rose 6.46%, while Westpac soared 7.16%. …
… Property classified ads company REA Group was up 7% and shares of its rival, Domain Holdings Australia, rose 3% in early trade. Construction firm Lendlease Group bounced about 1%, while property developer Stockland jumped over 4.5%.
… Shares of the country’s biggest private health insurer Medibank Private were up 10%, while smaller NIB Holdings was up 9%…
What a Labor Victory Might Mean for Australian Foreign Policy (01/31/2019) | @elenacollinson @CFR_org
… In October 2016, Shorten declared Trump “entirely unsuitable to be leader of the free world,” having earlier that year described Trump’s policies as “barking mad.” In January 2017, Shorten called the new president’s policy barring visitors from several Muslim-majority from entering the United States “appalling.”…
… But any rift this may cause between the two countries is likely to be superficial. Shorten and the senior members of his shadow cabinet have articulated an “unshakeable” commitment to the U.S.-Australia alliance, terming it a “pillar” of the ALP’s foreign policy vision and “central to Australia’s strategic interests.”…
… With respect to China, there is no immediate indication that the ALP’s approach will differ significantly from that of the current government. Criticisms from Labor of the government’s handling of the Australia-China relationship have predominantly centred on rhetoric, variously characterizing it as “disjointed megaphone diplomacy,” “Chinaphobic” and “unwise and provocative,”…
…a ban on foreign political donations, and the decision to block Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from involvement in the rollout of Australia’s 5G network. Labor has also been supportive of strategies to balance China’s regional rise, actively engaging in the push to forge closer ties with Pacific nations, and articulating a strong commitment to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. There is also general consensus between the two major parties… the Australian government is handling the mass internment of an estimated one million Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang “the appropriate way” by enunciating Canberra’s concerns “very clear publicly and privately” but not immediately…
Shorten has also rejected the notion of “pre-emptively framing China as a strategic threat,” placing some distance between the Labor Party’s proposed China policy and the more adversarial posture toward China reflected in the U.S. National Security and National Defense Strategies and amplified in Vice President Mike Pence’s tough speech…
Two areas of potential difference in a Labor-led China policy may be on Australian strategy in the South China Sea and participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). …
One priority in Labor’s overall Asia strategy is to deepen economic ties with Indonesia, one of Australia’s most important, and often contentious, bilateral relationships. …
…in 2017, there is bipartisan support for the Australian foreign policy white paper released that year. The white paper, Australia’s first in fourteen years, examines the shifting power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, with a particular focus on the challenges presented by China’s rise…

Federal election 2019: What a Coalition win means for you, major policies explained: Scott Morrison’s stunning win saw the Coalition remain in government, but some changes are still coming soon. Here’s what you need to know. (w Video; 05/20/2019) | @9NewsAUS
Former Liberal Party leader: How Morrison won Australian elections (Video; 05/20/2019) | @CNBC
Working-Class Voters Deliver a Win for Conservatives in Australia (05/19/2019) | @NRO
Five Things To Know About Australia’s Election Results: As the country attempts to get its head around what happened last night, we are offering up a few bite-sized takeaways to get you through a day of political small talk. (19/05/2019) | @vice
What Scott Morrison’s win means for Australian investors (18/05/2019) | Katarina Taurian @NestEggAU
Why China is not celebrating the unexpected Australian election result (05/20/2019) | John Lee @CNN
Australia’s conservative party retains power in shocking election result (05/19/2019) | Rachel Withers @vox
How did they get it so wrong? Polling companies explain what happened after predicting a Labor win for THREE YEARS (20/05/2019) | DANIEL PIOTROWSKI and STEPHEN JOHNSON @dailymailuk
10 key lessons from Australia’s poll-defying election results (05/20/2019) | @washingtonpost
4 things to know about Australia’s contentious election: After years of dysfunction, will conservatives get the boot? (w Video; 05/17/2019) | Eric Kleefeld @vox
2019 Federal Election Preview (12/05/2019) | @OddscheckerAu
Morrison’s Allies Retain Power in Most-Populous Australian State (03/23/2019) | Jason Scott and Jackie Edwards @bpolitics
FactCheck: has Australia’s net debt doubled under the current government? (08/06/2018) | Mark Crosby @ConversationEDU

Labor’s Policies For A Fair Go For Australia | @AustralianLabor
LABOR’S FISCAL PLAN (PDF) | @AustralianLabor
How Australian Labor lost ‘the unlosable election’ (Audio) | Rebecca Huntley @abcconvos
How did the Liberal National Party win over voters in Queensland? (YouTube) | @ABCNews
Bill Shorten quits as Labor leader after loss (YouTube) | @9NewsAUS
What the left can learn from Australian Labor: By combining radical economics with patriotism, the party has made itself the favourite to win this May’s general election. (16/01/2019) | Adrian Pabst @NewStatesman
cf. Australia Vol.12 (Queensland)
We’re building a future for all of us | @Greens
Swing of 2.6% will give the Greens a dominant role on Senate crossbench: Adam Bandt comfortably re-elected in Melbourne but party fails to make gains in the lower house (19/05/2019) | @Paul_Karp @guardian
The rise of the Australian Greens (22/09/2008) | Scott Bennett @ Politics and Public Administration Section @ Parliament of Australia
cf. Australia Vol.3 (Australian Labor Party’s 10 Year Plan for Australia’s Economy; AUSTRALIAN GREENS ELECTION PLATFORM 2016)
Election 2016: Bill Shorten’s full campaign launch speech (YouTube)
Kevin Rudd’s Labor campaign launch speech (YouTube; 2013)
Julia Gillard Campaign Launch (YouTube; 2010)

Excerpts are on our own.
Australian election: Labor’s humiliating defeat – why it fell apart for Bill Shorten – ANALYSIS (19/05/2019) | Malcolm Farr @nzherald
… Bill Shorten’s attempt to parlay six years of Labor unity and preparation into a victory formula has failed, with Queensland bringing it undone. …
… Scott Morrison has established himself as a fierce political street brawler who surprised Labor with his energy, his aggression, and his read of the electorate. …
… As Liberal John Hewson found in 1993, Labor’s Bill Shorten has learned in 2019: Being a reformer exposes you to misrepresentation by an opponent unencumbered by fresh direction. …
… It should also be acknowledged his departure makes life easier for Morrison, who will not have to keep looking over his shoulder at creeping Abbott ambitions. … “It’s also clear that in at least some of what might be described as ‘wealthy seats’, we are doing it tough, and the Green left is doing better.”
…few political operative were able to pander to the desires for simplistic certainties, like Pauline Hanson and Clive Palmer. @OneNationAus and @UnitedAusParty were crucial in regional Queensland results. …
Tanya Plibersek’s disastrous comment that cost Labor Queensland: Tanya Plibersek has been slammed over a remark she made in the lead-up to the election, which may have cost her party the crucial state of Queensland. (05/20/2019) | @gavindfernando @newscomauHQ
…she was out there denigrating the coal industry and saying it will phase out,” he told Sky News. “To say that on the eve of the election, in which there are six marginal seats in North Queensland in the coal belt, was absolutely disastrous. …
… The seats Mr Katter refers to are Peter Dutton’s northern Brisbane seat of Dickson, George Christensen’s marginal seat of Dawson, the Townsville-based seat of Herbert, as well as Flynn, Capricornia and Leichhardt. …
… The Labor Party was dealt a crushing blow in Queensland, with its vote falling to just 27.4 per cent…
… Last month, she told the ABC that Australians “can’t rely on an Indian mining company to bring jobs to central and north Queensland”. Prime Minister Scott Morrison slammed her over the remarks, comparing her to former NSW Labor leader Michael Daley. Mr Daley infamously accused Asians of taking Australian jobs during the NSW state election in March, before he went on to lose the vote. …
… “We needed to make it clear that if it was able to do so, that of course Labor would welcome the investment and jobs,” Mr Fitzgibbon said. The Hunter MP, who suffered a big swing against him towards One Nation’s pro-coal candidate, also said the party had drifted too far to the left. …
… Liberal senator Eric Abetz said the impact of the debate around Adani went beyond Queensland, into his own state of Tasmania. “Adani was seen … as an indication that the Labor Party was deserting its grassroots and the workers in favour of the suburban city elite…

UK Vol.129 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.47: Bank of England)

EU withdrawal scenarios and monetary and financial stability: A response to the House of Commons Treasury Committee (w PDF; 28/11/2018) | Bank of England

The below excerpt is on our own.

Executive Summary
Analytical Foundations
… This analysis includes scenarios not forecasts. The scenarios illustrate what could happen, not necessarily what is most likely to happen under a range of key assumptions. …
… The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and Financial Policy Committee (FPC) have reviewed the relevant scenarios…
Key Economic Relationships
The impact of Brexit will depend on the direction, magnitude and speed of the effect of reduced openness on the UK economy.
Direction: The direction of the effects of a reduction in openness is clear: a weakening in both supply and demand, a lower exchange rate and higher inflation. …
Magnitude: The magnitude of the economic impact of the underlying assumptions is modelled using established empirical economic relationships. …
Speed of adjustment: Given the lack of precedents, there is uncertainty over the speed of adjustment to reduced openness. Empirical studies generally examine the effects of trade integration. …

  • …it is likely that the corporate sector is generally not yet well equipped to cope were the UK to leave the EU without a transition period.
  • The experience of New Zealand as it de-integrated from the UK following the loss of Commonwealth preferences in 1973.

… i) as the path the economy is currently on, represented by the MPC’s most recent, November 2018, forecast; or ii) as the path the economy was on prior to the EU referendum, represented by the MPC’s May 2016 forecast.
Economic Partnership under the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration
No Deal No Transition Scenarios
… To assess the ability of the banking system to continue lending to households and businesses in the most adverse outcomes, the FPC has compared the scenario that banks were tested against in this year’s annual stress test with a worst-case scenario that could be associated with a ‘no deal no transition’ Brexit. …
p7 Charts A, B and C
Maintaining Monetary Stability
Maintaining Financial Stability
… The severity of the UK economic stress in the 2018 stress test which the major UK banks have passed is significantly greater than the economic scenario for Brexit based on ‘worst case’ assumptions (see Chart D). …

1 EU Withdrawal and the Bank of England’s objectives
1.1 Monetary stability
… The MPC’s remit isto set monetary policy to achieve the Government’s target of keeping inflation at 2%. …
1.2 Financial stability
… The Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) … Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) …
2 Analytical foundations
2.1 Framework
2.2 Assumptions needed to characterise Brexit
2.2.1 Trade barriers
Chart 2.2.1: EU trade barriers over time show the rising importance of non-tariff barriers
2.2.2 Tariffs
… A simple unweighted average of EU MFN tariff rates was 5.7% in 2016. The trade-weighted-average MFN tariff rate, with weights given by the share of each good imported in overall imports, was lower ? at 3.2 per cent, as shown in Chart 2.2.1.
2.2.3 Non-tariff barriers
… NTBs include ‘at the border’ measures such as customs checks, including for compliance with rules of origin requirements. They also include ‘behind the border’ measures such as regulatory barriers and product standards. These include sanitary and phytosanitary rules (e.g. restrictions for substances, hygienic requirements, measures for preventing dissemination of disease and related to food safety), technical barriers to trade (e.g. labelling and certification), non-technical measures such as measures to protect intellectual property and rules on public procurement…
… ad-valorem tariff equivalent (AVE) of NTBs …
…find that the average AVE of NTBs can be as high as 48%, and find that existing NTBs almost double the level of trade restrictiveness imposed by tariffs…
2.2.4 Third country and new trade deals by virtue of EU membership
2.2.5 Preparedness for EU withdrawal
… The extent of disruption at the border and to transport and financial services will depend on the extent of preparations made in advance by firms and in critical infrastructure. HMRC estimates that between 145,000 and 250,000 trading firms who have not previously completed a customs declaration will need to do so in the event of no deal. …
… A Confederation of British Industry (CBI) survey found that 41% of companies had carried out some of their contingency plans…
… A CBI survey suggests that nearly 44% of businesses are planning to stockpile goods in the future, while 15% have already done so. Consistent with this, the Bank’s Agents report only limited stockbuilding so far, with many firms planning to do so through Q4 and in the New Year. A study by the Centre of Economics and Business Research (CEBR) estimated that three months’ worth of stockpiled raw material and semi-manufactures usually imported from the EU, plus one month’s worth of finished manufactures, would require £34bn in additional imports before 29 March.
Box 2A: UK companies’ preparedness for EU withdrawal: evidence from the Bank’s Agents
2.2.6 Impact of Brexit on financial conditions
2.2.7 Impact of Brexit on uncertainty and view of future prospects
2.2.8 Response of macroeconomic and macroprudential policy

…the UK Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB)…
2.2.9 Migration policy
2.3 Established empirical relationships
2.3.1 Estimating the impact on trade of alternative trade arrangements using a gravity model
… The models bear out two clear empirical regularities that trade between two countries depends positively on their size and negatively on the distance between them. To take an example from a recent OBR Discussion Paper, the UK’s trade with India is almost six times as large as the UK’s trade with Pakistan; while the two countries are both similar distances from the UK, Pakistan has a smaller economy than India. India’s economy is of roughly similar size to that of Italy, but because Italy is much closer, the UK’s trade with Italy is twice as large as that with India (trade between Italy and the UK will also have benefited from mutual membership of the EU).
…leaving the EU will decrease trade between the UK and EU members but, over time, it will also make the UK relatively less isolated from other countries, partially offsetting the reduction in trade from leaving the EU.
2.3.2 The economic relationship between trade openness and productivity
… That increases the incentive for firms to innovate (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1998), especially for more productive firms (Aghion et al., 2018). …
… Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016) show how increases in demand from key foreign markets led French exporters to focus their export sales towards their best performing products and expand the range of products sold. …
2.3.3 The economic relationship between foreign direct investment and productivity
… For instance, foreign ownership of a firm is associated with higher labour productivity. Recent work by the ONS (2017) shows that the productivity of the average UK firm involved in FDI activities was around three times higher than that of firms not involved in FDI in 2015. …
… Empirical evidence of such effects in the UK can be found in Haskel et al. (2007), who find that there are foreign investment ‘spillovers’ to domestically-owned firms in the same industry. …
2.3.4 Estimates of the impact of a reduction in trade openness and lower FDI on productivity
… For example, Barattieri, Cacciatore, and Ghironi (2018) show how tariffs reallocate production toward less efficient domestic producers, lowering aggregate productivity, as well as lowering investment in physical capital and the production of new varieties of products. …
… Feyrer (2009b)… Felbermayr and Groschl (2013) …the 0.16 to 0.74% range…
… Pain and Young (2004) estimate significantly larger long-run effects, with a 1% increase in the stock of FDI increasing productivity by 0.32% in the UK manufacturing and distribution sector, and 0.13% in the financial services sector. …
Taking the trade and FDI effects together…based on an estimate that a 1% fall in openness eventually reduces productivity by 0.3%.
2.3.5 The speed of impact from a reduction in openness
…the reduction in trade flows associated with leaving a trading arrangement, and their eventual impact on productivity, are similar in magnitude to the effects of lowering trade barriers. …
More uncertain is the timing of such effects. … Baier et al (2014) …
… As discussed in Box 2C, Commonwealth countries lost their preferential access to UK markets in 1973, when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC). …once new trade barriers came in, the level of exports fell very quickly, and this rapidly fed through to economic growth and investment.
Box 2B: The impact of EU withdrawal on sectors and supply capacity
Box 2C: New Zealand trade after 1973: a case study of trade disruption
2.3.6 Using empirical relationships to model the further economic impact of these changes in trading relationships
Openness and the exchange rate
Uncertainty and spending decisions
Economic and Financial conditions
… Cloyne et al. (2015). …the impact of changes in credit conditions and financial yields on the behaviour of households, firms and the financial sector. …
House prices
Relative economic performance and migration
The ONS’ latest principal population projection is based on an assumed path for net inward migration to the UK that declines from around +250k per year in 2016 to +165k per year from 2023. …
Box 2D: Tariff and exchange rate effects by sector of the CPI basket
3 Scenarios
… Sterling fell sharply immediately following the referendum, and remains 18% below its 2015 peak before the referendum was called. This has pushed inflation above target, and squeezed household incomes as a result. At the same time, Brexit-related uncertainty has depressed investment and held back productivity growth. …
3.1 Scenarios in which the UK and EU implement the Economic Partnership
..two variants of the Economic Partnership, labelled as ‘Close Economic Partnership’ and ‘Less Close Economic Partnership’, which form the top and bottom of a range of possible characteristics of the Economic Partnership. …
3.1.1 Assumptions underpinning the Economic Partnership scenarios
The two scenarios… share assumptions on migration and the way in which policy is set.
Table 3.1.1: Key assumptions
3.1.2 Modelling the effects of these assumptions on the economy
Table 3.1.2: Key economic relationships
3.1.3 Overall impact
… The level of GDP is between 1?% and 3?% lower than the May 2016 trend by end-2023. Relative to the November 2018 Inflation Report projection, by end-2023 it is 1?% higher in the Close scenario, and ?% lower in the Less Close scenario. …
Chart 3.1.1: Range of GDP outcomes in Economic Partnership scenarios
Chart 3.1.2: Range of unemployment outcomes in Economic Partnership scenarios
Chart 3.1.3: Range of inflation outcomes in Economic Partnership scenarios
3.2 Worst case macroeconomic scenarios for assessing UK financial system resilience
… A more testing scenario would be a Brexit scenario with a cliff-edge in March 2019 ? a “no deal with no transition” outcome. …
…the FPC has considered the particular risks that could arise if the UK’s relationship with the EU were to move abruptly to default World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules without an implementation period. …
3.2.1 Macroeconomic scenarios for a Brexit with no deal and no transition
Table 3.2.1: Summary of assumptions made in “No deal, no transition” scenario
3.2.2 Assumptions in no transition no deal scenarios
3.2.3 Additional assumptions for the disorderly Brexit scenario

Table 3.2.2: Key economic relationships which generate the economic outcomes
Table 3.2.3: Comparison of Brexit scenarios with no agreement and no implementation period with other stress episodes
Chart 3.2.1: Range of GDP outcomes in no deal, no transition scenarios
Chart 3.2.1: Range of unemployment outcomes in no transition no deal scenarios
Chart 3.2.2: Range of inflation outcomes in no transition no deal scenarios
4 Maintaining monetary stability
4.1 Demand
4.2 Supply
4.3 Exchange rate and tariffs
4.4 Implications for monetary policy
5 Managing the Ongoing Risks to Financial Stability
5.1 The UK is Home to the World’s Leading International Financial Centre
5.2 Managing risks of a No deal and No Implementation Period scenario
… The 2018 stress test (ACS) shows that the UK banking system is resilient to deep simultaneous recessions in the UK and global economies that are more severe overall than the global financial crisis, large falls in asset prices and a separate stress of misconduct costs. …
In the ACS, UK GDP falls by 4 3/4 %, the UK unemployment rate rises to 9 1/2 %, UK residential property prices fall by 33% and UK commercial real estate prices fall by 40%. The scenario also includes a sudden loss of overseas investor appetite for UK assets, a 27% fall in the sterling exchange rate index and Bank Rate rising to 4% (Table 3.2.3). …
Table 3.2.3: Outcomes in disorderly ‘no transition no deal’ scenario and 2018 ACS stress test
Chart 5.2.1: Comparison of the impact of the disorderly Brexit scenario and 2018 ACS on major UK banks’ capital ratios
5.3 Financial Stability Implications of an Implementation Period
… As regulator for the largest financial sector in the EU, the Bank of England has advised and supported the UK Government in the EU legislative processes and influenced the EU authorities in the development of binding technical standards. The Bank has played an active role in the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
During the Implementation Period, the UK will not be a member of, or have a regular voice in, the main supervisory cooperation structures – the European Supervisory Authorities…
5.4 Declaration on the Economic Partnership
5.4.1 Equivalence as the basis of the future partnership on financial services
… The Northern Ireland backstop incorporates no provision for the regulation of financial services. The position after the Implementation Period will therefore depend on whether any specific arrangements on financial services have been agreed. Absent such an agreement, WTO rules for financial services would apply. …
… The White Paper ‘The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union’ (“the White Paper”) …
…maintaining cross-border activity through equivalence provisions would require the UK and EU regulatory regimes to produce sufficiently similar outcomes on an ongoing basis. There could, over time, be pressure for the UK to maintain a closer alignment to the EU than it would otherwise choose in order to maintain equivalence. At one extreme this could result in the UK becoming a de facto rule-taker. …

Appendix A Impact on the UK economy of a transition to WTO
A.1 Assumptions underpinning the transition to WTO scenarios
A.2 Modelling the effects of these assumptions on the economy
A.3 Overall impact
Appendix B External studies of the impact of Brexit
B.1 The impact of Brexit on the UK economy to date
B.2 Estimates of the long-run impact of Brexit
Appendix C Scenario assumptions


UK should leave EU with no deal, says former Bank of England governor: Mervyn King says Britain could ease ‘dislocation costs’ with six months of planning (29/03/2019) | @RJPartington @guardian

Bank of England says no-deal Brexit would be worse than 2008 crisis: Bank warns of immediate economic crash, GDP to fall by 8%, unemployment to rise to 7.5% (28/11/2018) | @RJPartington @guardian

Bank of England leaves interest rates on hold as UK braces for no-deal Brexit – as it happened (22/03/2019) | @guardian

Bank of England governor warns no-deal Brexit could cause recession – as it happened (08/02/2019) | @guardian

Seafood Vol.3 (Mackerel, Spanish mackerel, Horse mackerel, Pacific saury, Sardine, Anchovy)

Australia Vol.16 / Meat Vol.2

Australia's food and nutrition 2012: in brief (full publication;Australia2 beef-exportsAustralia2' beef export 2017Australia2'' beef carcass Asia exportAustralia3 beef production states 2017Australia4 sheep-population 2011Australia4' lamb exports

Wine Vol.1

Wine1 export-countries 2017Wine2 Production_CountryWine3 countries_drink_mostWine4 trade_us_europeWine5 Import country 2013Wine6 produce US_states 2014

Meat Vol.1 (Beef Vol.1)

Beef1 meat importsBeef2 Exports Ranking CountriesBeef3 EU exportsBeef4 EU importsBeef5 Japan importsBeef6 Korea importsBeef7 southeast-asia importsBeef8 China imports

Germany Vol.11 (Conglomerate / Manufacturing – Siemens)