Southern Europe Vol.2 (Italy Vol.4 / Spain Vol.7 / Portugal Vol.2 / Greece Vol.2)

Italy
https://twitter.com/ItalyinCapeTown/status/1197797293140914176
https://twitter.com/italyinafg/status/1196400604547108864


https://twitter.com/cooperazione_it/status/1194162331024076800


https://twitter.com/VeraMantengoli/status/1194199662074507264


https://twitter.com/TravelerNomadic/status/1175232188758908928


https://twitter.com/Amy_Siskind/status/1169714066601971723


Spain
https://twitter.com/spain/status/1197091620505751553


https://twitter.com/ODDSbible/status/1174664710400225282


Portugal


https://twitter.com/FlFAWC2018/status/1175853022938836993


Greece


World Vol.6


https://twitter.com/newstephen/status/1189463110257664000


https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1189464046388547586


North Dakota Vol.4

@ndgov
@EnergyND
@EnergyofND
@NDagriculture
@NDGrainGrowers
@NDSoybean
@FarmRanchGuide
@agweekmagazine
@PFSeed
@NDResponse
@NDDPI
@NorthDakota
@NDLegendary
@ExperienceND
@PrairieBiz
@emergingprairie
@ndcounties
@cityoffargo
@DowntownFargo
@cityofmoorhead
@FargoMoorhead
@FMAmbassadors
@FargoUGND
@FMWFChamber
@westfargo
@inforum
@fargomonthly
@BismarckNDGov
@bismancedc
@DowntownBisND
@bismarckparks
@bistrib
@GrandForksCity
@GFREDC
@thechambergfegf
@DowntownForks
@visitgrandforks
@GrandForksParks
@gfherald
@EGrandForksMN
@VisitMinot
@MinotDailyNews
@dickinsonpress
@WillistonEcon
@willistonherald
@jamestownsun
@wahpeton
@SCHEELS
@stallionoil
@TitanAg
@Basin_Electric
@BorderStates
@MBIEnergy
@EideBaillyTech
@rdoequipment
@FisherSandG
@butlermachinery
@WanzekConst
@DakotaSupply
@BlackGoldFarms
@DiscoveryBen
@ESGWND
@BNCBank
@GateCityBank
@Ulteig


Canada Vol.26 (universities & think tanks – public policy & election 2019)


https://twitter.com/Pembina/status/1186775488221581329


https://twitter.com/Pembina/status/1186359568781193216


https://twitter.com/Pembina/status/1186300860650799106


Canada Vol.25 (economy)

The Economy of Canada | The Canada Guide
Canada: Economy | @globalEDGEmsu
Canada : Economy | @commonwealthsec
Departmental Plan 2019–20 | @FinanceCanada
Federal Support to Provinces and Territories | @FinanceCanada
Statistics | @bankofcanada
The Economy and Economic Policy | @bankofcanada
Canadian Bank Outlook 2019 (PDF) | S&P Global
@RBC
@TD_Canada
@scotiabank
@BMO
@cibc
@DesjardinsGroup
@banquenationale
@HSBC_CA
@BLaurentienne
@CWBcommunity
2019 Index of Economic Freedom – Canada | @heritage
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS | @nationalbank
Provincial Economic Indicators | @GAC_Corporate
Regional Economics in Canada | @CdnEncyclopedia
Gross domestic product by industry: Provinces and territories, 2018 | The Daily
Provincial Economic Forecast – External Backdrop Drives More Cautious 2020 View | @TD_Economics
Provincial Economic Forecasts | @RBC
Canadian Provinces and Territories | ThoughtCo.
GLOBAL ECONOMICS – ECONOMIC COMMENTARY: CANADA AND THE PROVINCES (PDF) | @scotiabank
RegData Canada: A Snapshot of Regulatory Restrictions in Canada’s Provinces | @mercatus
Labour force characteristics by province, territory and economic region, annual | @StatCan_eng
Choose Wisely: Immigration to Canada’s Provinces and their Main Industries | @FWCANADA
The Richest Provinces And Territories Of Canada | worldatlas
PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL RANKING – Economy | @ConfBoardofCda
CANADA | OEC
Canada’s State of Trade 2019 | @Canada
Trade Data Online-Generate Reports by product or industry | @Canada
Trade and investment agreements | @Canada
Canada’s exports over time: Resources and manufactured goods | @StatCan_eng
TRADE HEADLINES | @canadabeef
Foreign Trade | @cdnpork
Minerals and the economy | @NRCan
Industry Across Canada | Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
Agriculture and Agri-Food Economic Account, 2015 | The Daily
http://Unlocking the Potential of Canada’s Visitor Economy (PDF) | @DestinationCAN


2019 Nobel Economic Sciences Laureates (Professors Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer) Vol.2


https://twitter.com/francediplo_EN/status/1183741420269637633


https://twitter.com/MIT/status/1183790572198383617


https://twitter.com/Noahpinion/status/1183774244372537345


https://twitter.com/TheProgressives/status/1183755249292591104


2019 Nobel Economic Sciences Laureates (Professors Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer) Vol.1


https://twitter.com/TheDeshBhakt/status/1183807501545820161


https://twitter.com/iMac_too/status/1183685640916852736


https://twitter.com/TheDeshBhakt/status/1183700774284447744


https://twitter.com/ABHIJIT_LS/status/1183756207439265792


Canada Vol.23 (miscellaneous)

https://twitter.com/GlobalChamber/status/975134409991991296


https://twitter.com/manny_ottawa/status/1155070746814758912

https://twitter.com/Aldeplumber1/status/1034906585338990594


https://twitter.com/BCvanguards/status/1036302194809524224
https://twitter.com/BCvanguards/status/1035915373478961153


https://twitter.com/RD_Partners/status/1024999508382494724


https://twitter.com/ConfBoardofCda/status/1175068583296163841
https://twitter.com/ConfBoardofCda/status/1173955322358194176


https://twitter.com/IRPP/status/1177561041691168768


US Policy Changes Vol.103 (Economy Vol.16 – including domestic policy, finance, healthcare, safety, trade)

https://twitter.com/Trade__Talks/status/1176823240372760577


https://twitter.com/BlogsofWar/status/1012072763283001344


https://twitter.com/hmtennapel/status/1023194443468427265


World Vol.5


https://twitter.com/JavierBlas/status/1173115496226598913


https://twitter.com/ESS_Survey/status/1153698823019081728

https://twitter.com/TheWorldPost/status/1156965311096037377

https://twitter.com/France24_en/status/1157217245120122882


https://twitter.com/EUCouncilPress/status/1150303977709428736

https://twitter.com/FAO/status/1162828514497875969
https://twitter.com/FAOKnowledge/status/1163317079518265346
https://twitter.com/TERN_Aus/status/1162165781209051136


Massachusetts Vol.6 (Harvard University)


California Vol.22 (cities, companies, etc.)

16 mind-blowing facts about California’s economy (04/26/2019) | @MktsInsider
How Globalized Is California’s Economy? (PDF; 06/2003) | @PPICNotes
THE NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CALIFORNIA’S OCEAN ECONOMY (PDF) | @MarineCadastre
Defense Spending, Aerospace, and the California Economy (w PDF; 1993) | @RANDCorporation
California’s Innovation-Based Economy: Policies to Maintain and Enhance It (PDF; 12/2015) | @MilkenInstitute
FUTURE CALIFORNIA ECONOMY | @BayAreaCouncil
@CalChamber
@CSAC_Counties
@CaCities
@SteinbergDS
@MoveCAFWD
@CalBudgetCenter
@LAO_CA
@CAPolitiFact
@Capitol_Weekly
@center4jobs
@CaAlliance4Jobs
@CalRoundtable
@CAeconomy
@CalMatters
@SacBeeEditBoard
@selectsac
@Metro_Chamber
@TheCityofSac

Eureka! California-Grown Coffee Is Becoming The State’s Next Gold Mine (02/16/2018) | @NPR
@BreakingNews_RS
The 45 Best Companies to Work For in the Bay Area (03/01/2018) | @fortune
Salesforce; Cooley; Kimpton Hotels & Restaurants; Workday; Accenture; SAP America; Zillow Group; GoDaddy; Stryker; Protiviti; Nvidia; Intuit; Acxiom; Perkins Coie; Adobe Systems; Nugget Market; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe; Genentech; VMware; Cisco; Dropbox; Fidelity National Financial; Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer; Nordstrom; Cadence
Asana; Thumbtack; Engeo; Snowflake Computing; xMatters; Quora; Sage Intacct; Leanplum; Atlassian; GoFundMe; Xactly; National MI; Prometheus Real Estate Group; SurveyMonkey; Study.com; ShareThis; Reflektive; Accounting Principals; RiseSmart; Eventbrite
The Bay Area: A REGIONAL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (PDF; 10/2012) | @BayAreaCouncil,@BayAreaEconomy
In California’s economy, North trumps South for now (08/13/2017) | @sfchronicle
@CountyofNapa
@NapaChamber
@NapaRegister
@AlamedaCounty
@Oakland
@OakTribNews
@sfgov
@sfchronicle
@sfexaminer
@SCCgov
@SantaClaraCity
@CityofSanJose
Key Industries | Central California
@MontereyHerald
@FresnoBee
@Bakersfieldcali
@countyofsb
@SBCity
Industries – Trade & Logistics | @LAEDC
Los Angeles County’s Seven Targeted Industries | @lacecondev
Health Care Services, Manufacturing, Trade & Logistics, Leisure & Hospitality, Film & Digital Media, Bioscience, Construction
PRESS COVERAGE | @LAANE
Los Angeles Is Having a Loud Economic Boom (04/05/2019) | @bopinion
Los Angeles posts 23 companies in Fortune 500 (04/15/2010) | @LABizJournal
3. Chevron, $163.5 billion; 57. The Walt Disney Co., $36.1; 61. Northrop Grumman Corp., $35.3; 80. Ingram Micro, $29.5; 116. DirecTV, $21.6; 146. Health Net Inc., $15.7; 150. Occidental Petroleum Corp., $15.5; 159. Amgen Inc., $14.6; 187. Edison International, $12.4; 203. Jacobs Engineering Group Inc., $11.5; 304. Western Digital Corp., $7.5; 331. Dole Food Co., $6.8; 352. AECOM Technology, $6.2; 355. DaVita Inc., $6.1; 362. Avery Dennison Corp., $6; 387. Mattel Inc., $5.4; 394. Reliance Steel & Aluminum, $5.3; 401. Pacific Life, $5.2; 407. Tutor Perini, $5.2; 459. Allergan Inc., $4.5; 460. Broadcom Corp., $4.5; 480. Spectrum Group International, $4.3; 490. Live Nation, $4.2; 499. CB Richard Ellis Group Inc., $4.2
@ladailynews
@LAmag
@metrolosangeles
@LABJnews
@LAAreaChamber
@PalmSpringsCA
Our Economy | @SDRegionalEDC
What’s In Store For San Diego’s Economy In 2019? (12/26/2018) | @KPBS
@sdut
@SDCityBeat
@voiceofsandiego
@SanDiegoMag
@sdreader
@GaslampQuarter


US Policy Changes Vol.101 (Trade Vol.9: USMCA) / Canada Vol.22


https://twitter.com/VOANews/status/1165695071016169472


https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse/status/1165665696250040320


https://twitter.com/mike_pence/status/1164358419899281408


https://twitter.com/GOPLeader/status/1157637477332656128


https://twitter.com/RepGregPence/status/1163829979102269440
https://twitter.com/RepLaHood/status/1162460932288765952


https://twitter.com/WaysandMeansGOP/status/1164605656411889670


https://twitter.com/WaysandMeansGOP/status/1163503394272632835


https://twitter.com/IowaSoybeans/status/1164974470949249024


https://twitter.com/charliekirk11/status/1165655870962720768


https://twitter.com/usconsvancouver/status/1030224888899010561


World Vol.4

https://twitter.com/IEA/status/1145629456830291970
https://twitter.com/IEA/status/1145682234621534209


https://twitter.com/ENERGY/status/1148991305885708290


https://twitter.com/OPECSecretariat/status/1135595402194014209


https://twitter.com/Arroussiak/status/1133460725379280897

https://twitter.com/CarnegieRussia/status/1137104727542521857


https://twitter.com/IEA/status/1136991465714933760


https://twitter.com/MartensCentre/status/1129346581847826432


https://twitter.com/IFRI_/status/1131817106649968641
https://twitter.com/IRSEM1/status/1138722467265089536


https://twitter.com/EBRD/status/1147074387478269952


Northern Europe Vol.1 (universities, etc.)


https://twitter.com/CBIO15/status/1148550697895567361


https://twitter.com/Cobelab/status/1073216440319262721


https://twitter.com/DenmarkinUSA/status/941662416768774144


https://twitter.com/SITEStockholm/status/1144621574563217409


https://twitter.com/interspectral/status/1085523719005585410


https://twitter.com/UiB_HF/status/1145659478999732224
https://twitter.com/ERC_Research/status/1144266640386867200


https://twitter.com/NorwayEU/status/1004268242351935488


https://twitter.com/NATO_MARCOM/status/966947928924393473


https://twitter.com/ERC_Research/status/1144266640386867200


Ireland Vol.46 (Brexit: finance, IT, pharmaceuticals)

Brexit Centre | @AIBIreland
Breaking Down Brexit: What could it mean for Business in Britain? | @AIBIreland
AIB warns that a hard Brexit could cost the lender up to €163m (01/03/2019) | @rte
Brexit freeze: AIB warns firms are putting growth plans on ice (02/11/2019) | @siliconrepublic
Most Irish SMEs have yet to begin Brexit planning: AIB (02/11/2019) | @reuters
Irish lender AIB raises dividend despite ‘major concern’ on Brexit (03/01/2019) | @FT
Quarter of Irish bank lending is to UK borrowers, raising fears of Brexit shock (12/08/2018) | @IndoBusiness
AIB chairman says Republic risks ‘car crash’ Brexit if no deal reached (07/20/2017) | @BelTel
Majority of small business owners believe Brexit ‘will have negative impact’ (03/01/2019) | @News_Letter
Shares of AIB and Bank of Ireland hammered as Brexit storm clouds darken (07/29/2019) | @irishexaminer
Your Business and Brexit | @bankofireland
Bank of Ireland launches €2bn Brexit Fund | @bankofireland
Bank of Ireland warns on Brexit hazard to institution (08/08/2018) | @IrishTimes
BoI braces for no-deal as rhetoric hardens (07/30/2018) | @IndoBusiness
Brexit uncertainty hits Ulster Bank’s credit rating (07/03/2019) | @rte
Ulster Bank chief in Republic sees no crash-out Brexit house price slump (08/02/2019) | @irishexaminer
Online shopping rules may no longer apply post Brexit (20/03/2019) | @rte
An Post is planning to roll out Parcel Motel-style delivery lockers (02/19/2019) | @thejournal_ie
An Post Chief says company could suffer from hard Brexit (10/05/2018) | @rte
Profit increases at Aviva Ireland on Friends First inclusion (08/08/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Aviva gets OK to shift €10bn to Ireland (02/20/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Aviva to transfer policies to Irish unit to prepare for Brexit (09/25/2018) | @BusInsMagazine,@IrishTimes

Brexit | @MazarsIreland
Owner of Irish stock exchange wants move to Brussels after Brexit (11/09/2018) | @IrishTimes
Euronext Dublin, one year on. (04/04/2019) | @Medium
The departure of the UK from the EU: implications for the Irish economy and financial system – Deputy Governor Sharon Donnery (05/03/2019) | @centralbank_ie
Central Bank warns of 110,000 fewer jobs in event of no-deal Brexit (06/19/2019) | @irishexaminer
34,000 fewer jobs after no-deal Brexit, Central Bank warns (07/31/2019) | @irishexaminer
Hard Brexit a threat to house prices – Central Bank warns (07/12/2019) | @IndoBusiness
New study estimates the impact of various Brexit scenarios on the Irish economy (03/26/2019) | @EsriIreland
Quarterly Economic Observer – Summer, 2019 | @NERI_research

Spending on no-deal Brexit stockpiling hits £4bn, survey suggests (12/08/2019) | @breakingnewsie
In Brexit, Could Ireland Wear the Crown (02/21/2019) | @Fortune
Brexit: A cheat sheet (01/31/2019) | @TechRepublic
Will Dublin Become Europe’s Regulatory Technology Hub After Brexit? (08/26/2018) | @Forbes
It’s Cool, It’s Well Wired, and It’s Staying in the EU (02/06/2018) | @datacenter
Ireland, a Jurisdiction of Choice and Gateway to Europe for Financial Institutions (PDF; 2017) | @ALGoodbody
A closer look at BREXIT: The case for Ireland (PDF) | @ESgloballaw
Over Ireland? Bothered by Brexit? Find that new home for your cloud (13/06/2016) | @TheRegister

Irish Organisations receive €912,684 thanks to Intel Employees (10/04/2019) | @EnterInnov
Intel to expand Irish production to meet global chip demand (10/21/2018) | @IndoBusiness
Intel to develop AI incubator programme at Talent Garden Dublin (15/10/2018) | @rte
Farmer who won appeal against IDA launches latest bid to stop Intel’s €3.6bn plant (13/08/2019) | @thejournal_ie
Microsoft’s Irish arm paid $77bn dividend to tech giant last year (05/25/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Microsoft announces creation of 200 new jobs at its Dublin campus (17/09/2018) | @IDAIreland
Take a guided tour of… Microsoft’s new Dublin HQ complete with in-office bakery (02/22/2018) | @thejournal_ie
Oracle Launches EMEA Recruitment Drive To Add 1,400 New Cloud Sales Professionals (14/01/2016) | @IDAIreland

‘Major milestone’ as Uniphar begins trading on Euronext Dublin (07/17/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Irish company Uniphar raises €150m from IPO (07/12/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Irish pharma group Uniphar plans IPO (06/17/2019) | @reuters
Jazz Pharma could shift EU roles from Oxford to Ireland (08/01/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Pharmaceuticals unlikely to avoid a harsh Brexit (02/26/2018) | @irishexaminer
Irish M&A tally falls in wake of $62bn Shire deal (07/04/2019) | @IndoBusiness
Takeda UK boss retains role after Shire acquisition (22/01/2019) | @ThePharmaLetter
Speech by an Taoiseach, Mr. Enda Kenny, T.D., Official opening of Shire’s new offices, Baggot St. (27/04/2017) | Government of Ireland
Takeda forecasts operating loss as Shire integration costs mount (05/14/2019) | @FT


Ireland Vol.44 (Brexit)

IRELAND & THE IMPACTS OF BREXIT: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR IRELAND ARISING FROM CHANGING EU-UK TRADING RELATIONS (PDF; 02/2018; prepared for the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation) | Copenhagen Economics

pp.5-6
– A European Economic Area (EEA) scenario, where we assume similar levels of trade costs between the EU and the UK as are currently observed between the EU and the EEA members (Norway and Iceland). The scenario includes duty free trade for most products, though with some tariffs on sensitive products within the agri-food sectors. Border inspections on EU-UK trade will add customs costs. The risk of regulatory divergence for both goods and services is lowest in this scenario.
– A Customs Union (CU) scenario, where we assume that the EU and the UK agree on a traditional customs union agreement. The scenario includes duty free trade for most products, though with some tariffs on sensitive products within the agri-food sectors. Border inspections on EU-UK trade will add customs costs. This scenario implies a higher risk of regulatory divergence for both goods and services relative to an EEA-like scenario, as a standard customs union does not cover regulatory issues for goods and does not address service trade.
– A Free trade agreement (FTA) scenario, where we assume that the EU and the UK agree on a free trade agreement (FTA). We use the effects of an average EU FTA as midpoint estimate, and the scenario includes duty free trade for most products, though with some tariffs on sensitive products within the agri-food sectors. Border inspections on EU-UK trade will add customs costs. As in the customs union scenario, there is a risk of emerging regulatory divergence between the EU and the UK in both goods and services.
– A WTO Scenario (WTO) scenario, where we assume that trade will be governed by WTO rules and other WTO agreements. In this case, the UK and the EU will impose MFN tariffs on each other’s goods where these are not bound by existing plurilateral agreements or arrangements. In addition, we assume that the EU and the UK will continue to use tariff rate quotas both between them and with third countries, which implies that the effective
p.7
– Agri-food, where processed foods, beef, sheep and other cattle meat and dairy are the sub-sectors in which the largest impacts occur, and where trade and production are predicted to fall significantly below the non-Brexit baseline level in 2030. Production in other primary agriculture sub-sectors such as grains, fruit and vegetables, forestry and fishing etc. will also be negatively affected – however, to a smaller extent. Impacts in the agri-food sector are driven by a combination of tariffs, customs costs and the risk of regulatory divergence.
– Pharma-Chemicals, which is the absolute largest export sector in Ireland. Our analysis shows that production in the sector could fall by 1-5 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline production level in 2030. Impacts in this sector are almost exclusively driven by the risk of regulatory divergence and increased border costs.
– Electrical machinery, which includes different types of electronic equipment such as computers, televisions and communication equipment, is another large export sector. Production in this sector is predicted to fall by 5-10 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline production level in 2030. Customs costs and the risk of regulatory divergence are the main factors driving the impacts in this sector.
– Wholesale and retail is an important sector in Ireland. The sector could face new costs in their supply chains as a result of diverging regulatory requirements. The sector will also be negatively affected by an overall drop in consumer demand resulting from Brexit.
– Air transport, which could face substantial challenges on routes to the UK as a result of Brexit.
p.8
… Measured relative to Irish GDP in 2015, the difference between the “best” (EEA) scenario and the “worst” (WTO) is €11 billion in 2030 (in 2015 levels). In a hypothetical situation, where regulatory divergence for goods and services could be avoided and where the Brexit impacts only relate to tariffs and border costs, the theoretical loss to Irish GDP would be further reduced to around 1 per cent of GDP or approximately €3 billion in 2015 terms.
With the objective of minimizing the overall economic loss to Irish GDP, the best possible trade negotiation outcome for Ireland would be an agreement that has an acceptable balance of rights and obligations for all parties and with the following main elements:
– No tariffs
– Large quotas for agricultural products
– Low border costs
– Landbridge transit
– Low regulatory divergence
– Low barriers for service trade

1. Trade promotion policies (e.g. helping existing exporters to access new markets, or new exporters to engage in exporting)
2. Enterprise policies (e.g. helping the transition from declining to growing sectors)
3. Skills policies (e.g. supporting skills required by the unavoidable adjustments)
p.11 Figure 1. Ireland-UK trade and investment relation

p.12 Figure 2. Irish trade with the UK and the rest of the world, 2015
p.13 Figure 3. Intensity of trade with the UK
p.14
… Besides both being EU members since 1973, there are many other underlying and historical reasons for why Ireland is uniquely exposed to Brexit:
– Common border and language: First of all, the UK is Ireland’s nearest neighbour and the only country with whom we share a land border. In addition, Ireland and the UK are both English speaking countries
– All Island economy: There is a wellfunctioning all island economy with fully integrated commuting patterns and shopping habits, and a closely knitted value chain across the Island
– Common Travel Area: A common travel area is in existence between Ireland and the UK since the 1920s
– Same consumer taste: In terms of consumer preferences, Ireland and the UK are in many aspects considered as one market with similar tastes and identical products being offered
– Common-law basis of legal systems: The UK and Ireland both have a common-law legal system, which places greater emphasis on previous court decisions, compared to a civillaw legal system, which is in place in other European countries.
– Joint commercial contracts: Commercially, there is a very close integration of business and enterprises across the Irish-UK market. The UK and Ireland are often treated as one market, e.g. in the organisation of many companies, and reflected in many commercial contracts
– UK-only exporters and importers: Like many countries, Irish SMEs are less active in international trade compared to larger enterprises. As a special feature, many of Ireland’s exporting and importing SME’s have the UK as the first and only export/import market and is hence extremely exposed to Brexit
– UK landbridge: Two-thirds of Irish goods exporters make use of the UK landbridge to access continental markets.
p.15 Box 1. UK landbridge is key for Irish trade with the rest of EU
…the agri-food sector where an average of around 40 per cent of exports are destined for the UK. For specific sub-sectors, the UK market accounts for an even greater share of exports, including beef (47 per cent), cheese (60 per cent) and mushrooms (90 per cent)…
…the impact is likely to be more pronounced amongst indigenous firms who account for between 80 and 100 per cent of enterprises in the agri-food sector …
p.16 Figure 4. Exposure to UK market at sector level

p.17 Figure 5. Loss of income due to drop in exchange rate
p.18 Figure 6. UK investment of around €40 bn in Ireland in 2015
p.19 Figure 7. Irish investment in the UK around €90 bn in 2015
p.20
…for the transition period immediately after Brexit in March 2019:
-“Soft Brexit”: This scenario represents a transition arrangement in which duty free trade is continued and no customs clearance procedures are implemented, which in essence means that the UK will remain in the Single Market during the transition period. While this will require a regulatory freeze in the UK and will require the UK to maintain all current regulation aligned to the EU Single Market rules, the scenario assumes a moderate increase in trade costs for both goods and services to reflect the uncertainty around the future trade relationship and the risk of future regulatory divergence.
-“Hard Brexit”: In this scenario, there is no transitional arrangement between the EU and the UK, and both the EU and the UK will implement MFN tariffs on goods, border procedures, and there will be some emerging deviations in regulation for both services and goods. Furthermore, the scenario assumes additional transit costs for Irish goods exported to the European continent across the UK landbridge due to the delays and infrastructural challenges that are expected to materialise in the scenario.
p.21 Figure 8. Future relationship (Barnier slide)

pp.22-23
– EEA:…duty free trade for most products although with some tariffs on sensitive products within selected agri-food sectors. …regulatory alignment with the Single Market rules (e.g. including mutual recognition agreements, harmonisation of some standards, etc.). …will become necessary to impose border inspections on EU-UK trade by whatever means. …UK exporters will be facing higher costs of exporting related to border controls, tariffs and emerging regulatory differences. …
– CU:…the EU and the UK would continue to have a common external trade policy, and the UK will not be able to negotiate its own free trade agreements independently of the EU. Just as in the case of an EEA solution or an FTA solution, the UK exit from the Single Market implies that border checks on EU-UK trade will be needed, unless political agreement on their removal can be reached. …
– FTA:…duty free trade for most products although with some tariffs on sensitive products within selected agrifood sectors. …very limited ability to ensure regulatory alignment with the Single Market rules…
– WTO:…impose MFN tariffs on each other’s goods where these are not bound by other agreements or arrangements. …grant duty free trade on a range of listed products between the signatories… …tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on a range of products whereby imports from third countries can enter the EU with zero or low tariffs up to a certain quantity for a given time period, …
p.24 Figure 9. Overview of scenarios
p.25
…the complexity of the rules of origins…, the sensitivity of the good to delays… and the complexity of the value chain of the affected good
…In the EEA scenario, the average regulatory costs are estimated at 7 per cent corresponding to the average of the EU’s other EEA agreements (with Norway and Iceland).
In the Customs Union and FTA… on average 10 per cent… corresponding to the average of the EU’s other FTAs.
Finally, in the WTO… …increase up to 24 per cent…
p.27
If no regulatory divergence occurs between the EU and the UK, Irish goods exports will face additional trade costs related to tariffs and customs procedures corresponding to an average 4-5 per cent trade cost in the EEA, CU and FTA scenarios and around 7-8 per cent additional trade cost in the WTO-scenario. …
If regulatory divergence occurs in the long run… EEA…12 CU…14 FTA…14 WTO…32 …
p.32 Figure 11. Long-term impact of BREXIT on Ireland’s total exports

p.33 Figure 12. Long-term impact of BREXIT on Ireland’s total imports

p.34 Figure 13. Long-term impact of BREXIT on Ireland’s GDP

p.35 Figure 14. Development of Ireland’s GDP with and without Brexit

p.36 Figure 15. Impact on real wages for Irish high and low skilled workers
p.38 Figure 17. Ireland’s goods trade per sector with UK and the Rest of the World

p.39 Figure 18. Ireland’s trade per sector with UK and the Rest of the World
p.40
Figure 19. Ireland’s key goods export sectors to the UK

Figure 20. Ireland’s key service export sectors to the UK
p.41 Figure 21. Key goods import sectors from the UK

p.42 Figure 22. Key service import sectors from the UK
p.43 Figure 23. Output changes in two scenarios for Brexit in 2030

p.45 Figure 25. Key sectors explain over 90 per cent of GDP impact

p.46 Figure 26. Profile of key sectors
pp.46-51
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [processed foods]
– Total exports in the processed food sector would be 15-31 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 16-17 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Exports to the UK would be 40-87 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 45-49 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from -10 per cent (EEA) to -21 per cent (WTO) compared to the 2030 baseline production level. The impact in the CU and FTA scenarios is -11 per cent to -12 per cent.
– Employment would be affected proportionately to production in the scenarios, i.e. a 10 per cent reduction in production would lead to a 10 per cent reduction in employment compared to the 2030 baseline.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [beef, sheep and other cattle meat]
– Total exports from the beef sector would be 18 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and CU scenario and 35 per cent below in the WTO scenario. In the FTA scenario, the impact would be 22 per cent below the baseline.
– Exports to the UK would be 29-53 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 28-35 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from -11 per cent (EEA) to -23 per cent (WTO) compared to the 2030 baseline production level. The impact in the CU and FTA scenarios would be -12 per cent and -14 per cent.
– Employment would be affected proportionately.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [dairy]
– Total exports from the dairy sector would be 18 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA scenario and 40 per cent below in the WTO scenario. In the FTA and CU scenarios the impact would be 19 and 20 per cent below baseline, respectively.
– Exports to the UK would be 35 to 76 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios, respectively and 37 to 38 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from -8 per cent (EEA) to -18 per cent (WTO) compared to the 2030 baseline production level. The impact in the CU and FTA scenarios would be -9 per cent to -10 per cent.
– Employment would be affected proportionately.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [pharmaceuticals and chemicals]
– Total exports from the pharma-chemicals sector would only be 1-5 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the scenarios analysed … A 5 per cent decline in exports from this sector is, however, still a large amount given the size of the sector (a 5 per cent drop in pharma-chemicals is for example more than the entirety of Irish beef exports).
– Exports to the UK would be 7-42 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios respectively, and 20 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from 1-5 per cent below the 2030 baseline production level.
– Employment would not be equally affected since the sector would still be one of the more productive sectors and can offer attractive wages, which would help to retain and attract labour from other sectors in Ireland.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [electrical machinery]
– Total exports to the world from the electrical machinery sector would be 5-9 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the scenarios analysed.
– Exports to the UK would be 34-40 per cent below the 2030 non-Brexit baseline level in the EEA and WTO scenarios, respectively and 20 per cent below in the FTA and CU scenarios.
– Production in the sector would also be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from 5-10 per cent below the 2030 baseline production level.
– Employment would be 2-5 per cent below the baseline employment since the sector would still be one of the more productive sectors and can offer attractive wages, which would help to retain and attract labour from other sectors in Ireland.
Impacts on production and exports in the sector [wholesale and retail]
– Total exports from the retail and wholesale sector is in itself not the key parameter. Rather, the impact in the sector is seen more clearly from the increased costs of imports of various consumer goods from the UK, most notably processed foods.
– Production in the sector would be negatively affected in all scenarios ranging from 2-4 per cent below the 2030 baseline production level depending on the scenario.
– Employment would be relatively less affected since a large number of retail outlets around the country would still be needed despite a drop in demand.
pp.51-55 4.8 Impacts in other service sectors
Air transport
Financial Services
Insurance
ICT and Business Services
Tourism
pp.56-59 CHAPTER 5 Policy Options for Ireland
5.1 Negotiating the best possible outcome
… The EEA-scenario will reduce Ireland’s GDP to a level 2.8 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline (or €7 billion in 2015-levels) compared to a WTO-scenario, which is foreseen to bring Irish GDP 7.0 per cent below the non-Brexit baseline in 2030 (corresponding to €18 billion in 2015-level). …
… In a hypothetical situation, where regulatory divergence for goods and services could also be avoided, and hence the Brexit impacts only related to tariffs and border costs, then the theoretical loss to Irish GDP would be further reduced to around 1 per cent impact on GDP or approximately €3 billion in 2015-level. …
…the best possible trade negotiation outcome for Ireland would be…
– No tariffs: Avoid imposition of any tariffs on future EU-UK trade – duty free for all products
– Large quotas: If some tariffs have to remain on agriculture products, sufficiently large tariff quotas should be pursued to cater for expected future trade levels
– Low border costs: EU-UK border costs on both sides should be minimised by using state-of-the art technology and procedures, including use of authorised economic operators as much as possible to minimize border costs
– Landbridge transit: Arrangements should be made to ensure undisturbed transit to/from Ireland via the UK landbridge
– Low regulatory divergence: Mechanisms should be put in place between the EU and the UK to avoid and minimize regulatory divergence and protect against emerging divergence as the EU or the UK develops their technical regulation further. Such mechanisms and the related dispute resolution mechanisms should apply to all areas currently covered by common EU regulation and rules (the harmonised area). For Ireland, this is important generally and would, in particular, be important for:
≫ Beef
≫ Dairy
≫ Processed food
≫ Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and chemicals
≫ Electrical machinery
– Low barriers for service trade: As for goods, similar mechanisms would be needed for services to avoid regulatory divergences and excessive trade costs. This would be important for all Irish service sectors, and notably for:
≫ Air transport
≫ Financial and insurance services (continued passporting, or strong equivalence)
5.3 Domestic enterprise policy responses to mitigate Brexit impacts (minimizing threats)
…three broad categories:
– Trade promotion policies (e.g. helping existing exporters to access new markets, or new exporters to engage in exporting)
– Enterprise policies (e.g. helping the transition from declining to growing sectors)
– Skills policies (e.g. supporting skills required by the unavoidable adjustments)
5.4 Domestic policies to pursue the opportunities from Brexit
Trade opportunities
Just as Irish exporters will face new barriers in the UK market, so will UK exporters in the EU market. This implies that UK products or services will be more expensive in the EU market, meaning that customers in other EU countries currently served by UK firms will be looking for alternative suppliers. This can present opportunities for Irish exporters, especially since there are many overlaps in the products export from the UK and from Ireland. One example could be cheese exports, where Irish cheese could replace British cheese in other EU markets. And similarly, for other products or services. These adjustments are already factored into to our analyses and quantifications, but the extent to which it takes place in reality depends on the actions taken by Irish exporters and how these opportunities are supported by Irish policy actions.
Talent opportunities
The general decline in economic activity in the UK following Brexit and in particular the uncertainty and sentiment of EU citizens in the UK presents another opportunity for Ireland. As the only English speaking country in the EU, aside from Malta, and with diverse job opportunities, Ireland can become a new home for talents deciding to leave the UK post-Brexit. This would particularly relevant in sectors and positions where there are already shortages in Ireland and where even the best re-schooling and job training (as per above) cannot meet the demand. This could include IT-specialists, researchers, financial service expert for example. Again, active and timely policies from the Irish government and local authorities can help maximise these opportunities.
Investment opportunities
The biggest opportunities in relation to Brexit is likely to be within the investment area. Ireland is already an attractive location in Europe for foreign direct investment (FDI), and with the right additional policies, Ireland should be wellplaced to attract entire companies or parts of multinational companies wanting to be located within the EU and in an English speaking common law country.


UK Vol.149 (think tanks)


https://twitter.com/ChathamHouse/status/1155816608893427721


https://twitter.com/ChathamHouse/status/1151124897315377154


https://twitter.com/ChathamHouse/status/1146062175439425538


https://twitter.com/CHAsiaPacific/status/1149302911157055494


https://twitter.com/CHAsiaPacific/status/1148145838499225600


https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1157280798309064704
https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1157275278781145088
https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1156871991166676992


https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1156134385411923968
https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1154776967792779265
https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1154776965808820224
https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1154776963745292288
https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1154398073981984768
https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1153998068615974913


https://twitter.com/thefabians/status/1151865066695876610


https://twitter.com/EnvironmentYF/status/1157268499103985664


https://twitter.com/ChangingWorkC/status/1156547451463065605
https://twitter.com/ChangingWorkC/status/1156173980228902915
https://twitter.com/ChangingWorkC/status/1147183913980375040


https://twitter.com/BenCooper1995/status/1156864232501239808


https://twitter.com/BenCooper1995/status/1148538093923983361


UK Vol.148 (think tanks)

https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1156899125197099008
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1156565179670253571
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1156499064927789056
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1156149938746793984
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1156134839197634560
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1155810199959195650
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1155786749441990656
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1155784079100563461
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1155502673627471873
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1155098007081062400
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1155096497198968834
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1154377615723180032
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1154376902179741696
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1154374326575149057
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1154347555934953473
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1154317088200306688
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1154028461402525698
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1153982817044488192
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1153962791981727749
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1153681172758708232
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1152239169453748224
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1152209025372688384


https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1151804052713459713


https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1151472568936914946
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1151432875721580546
https://twitter.com/NEF/status/1151