Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.27

Here are tweets of great stuff retweeted by @_WorldSolutions.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.26

Here are tweets of great stuff retweeted by @_WorldSolutions.


Germany Vol.4 (Coalition talks)


US Policy Changes Vol.73 (US business school professors Vol.6)

Here is a part of U.S. business schools’ tweets on economic/social/technological issues in which their professors/alumni are featured, quoted, et al. (mainly those from September to November 2017). Great stuff!
[We don’t have affiliations with these schools or people.]


https://twitter.com/wvucobe/status/930549103196454912


https://twitter.com/wvucobe/status/861953297082613762


https://twitter.com/HaslamUT/status/909776894148608001


US Policy Changes Vol.70 (US business school professors Vol.3)

Here is a part of U.S. business schools’ tweets on economic/social/technological issues in which their professors/alumni are featured, quoted, et al. (mainly those from September to November 2017). Great stuff!
[We don’t have affiliations with these schools or people.]


https://twitter.com/Wharton/status/925441495561396226


https://twitter.com/CornellMBA/status/902259608323948545


US Policy Changes Vol.69 (US business school professors Vol.2)

Here is a part of U.S. business schools’ tweets on economic/social/technological issues in which their professors are featured, quoted, et al. (mainly those from September to November 2017). Great stuff!
[We don’t have affiliations with these schools or professors.]


https://twitter.com/NYUStern/status/909084805895213056


US Policy Changes Vol.68 (US business school professors Vol.1)

Here is a part of U.S. business schools’ tweets on economic/social/technological issues in which their professors are featured, quoted, et al. (mainly those from September to November 2017). Great stuff!
[We don’t have affiliations with these schools or professors.]


New Zealand Vol.13 (Coalition)

Here are articles & tweets on the coalition, et al. Excerpts are on our own.

How the Labour-NZ First-Greens deal compares to previous coalitions (10/21/2017) | Andy Fyers @NZStuff

Who’s in, who’s out? Labour announces Cabinet, ministerial line up (20/10/2017) | @nzherald

Jacinda Ardern: ‘Capitalism has failed New Zealanders’ (10/22/2017) | @australian

Jacinda Ardern is New Zealand’s Next Prime Minister – Winston Peters swings to the Left, saying the country voted for change. (10/19/2017) | Tess McClure @VICE

Winston’s Choice: Jacinda Ardern poised to become prime minister (10/19/2017) | @robhosking @TheNBR

– Greens 8 MPs will support the Labour-NZF coalition on confidence and supply

– Mr Peters says finance minister is off the table


… Peter Thiel became a citizen of New Zealand, indulging in equal parts his Lord Of The Rings fantasies and bunker style apocalypticism… “New Zealand will grow in size…will quickly become the glory land, and ultimately become one of the safest areas in the entire world.”
The centre-left coalition government, led by Jacinda Ardern’s Labour Party, is torn between the past glories of social democracy and a geographical exceptionalism that indulges equal parts ahistoric romantic notions of New Zealand and dread. …
… John Key crafted a unique brand of Third Way Toryism that was relaxed on social issues and augmented its old money and farming base with the so-called “aspirational” middle class drunk on a mid-oughts style property boom. …
… yet it lacks a natural coalition partner. …
Labour’s approach was far more Trudeau than Corbyn, running a likeable personality, Gen Xer and talented candidate with talk of, “values,” and, “positivity,” with a mantra of “Let’s Do This!” There are certainly some policies that would make an American leftist ecstatic…
… Our largest city, Auckland, combines the low density housing of San Francisco, the sprawl of Los Angeles, and a lack of infrastructure and public transport. …
… The party insists this is not racist while also circulating real estate documents highlighting the “Chinese sounding names” of buyers and using Australia’s moral abomination of a migration model as a means to attack the National party government from the right. …
… In the shadow of Trump and the rising fascist right across Europe, Labour is spurning internationalism for a “left” politics that sees its job as portioning out a dwindling social surplus. Labour thinks they are clever here but their modest left politics cannot beat back the demons of nationalism or the darker vision of Thiel and the global super-rich…
… Peters is a skillful politician, economic nationalist, and populist capable of destabilizing the political calculus between National and Labour. … Like a lot of far-right wing political figures in the West, he is obsessed with central bank policy, having railed against monetarism and Chicago economics for as long as I can remember.
Labour’s failure to go even half-Corbyn may create political space for New Zealand First should Peters upstage Labour on the economy, effectively locking in Labour’s anti-immigrant gambit into a new consensus. …


WINNERS
Anyone with a car
Farmers
First Home Buyers
Humanity
The Greens
LOSERS
Existing Home Owners
Economy
All of us
ACT
Everybody who’s freaking out

Jacinda Ardern commits to 100-day plan, with one exception (20/10/2017) | Anna Bracewell-Worrall @NewshubNZ
… Ms Ardern wouldn’t confirm which of Labour’s priorities had changed during negotiations with NZ First and the Greens, but said the 100-day plan remains broadly the same. …
Labour’s first 100-days plan

– Pass the Healthy Homes Guarantee Bill, requiring all rentals to be warm and dry
– Ban overseas speculators from buying existing houses
– Issue an instruction to Housing New Zealand to stop the state house sell-off
– Begin work to establish the Affordable Housing Authority and begin the KiwiBuild programme
– Legislate to pass the Families Package, including the Winter Fuel Payment, Best Start and increases to Paid Parental Leave, to take effect from July 1, 2018

– Resume contributions to the New Zealand Superannuation Fund to help safeguard the provision of universal superannuation at age 65
– Introduce legislation to set a child poverty reduction target and to change the Public Finance Act, so the Budget reports progress on reducing child poverty
– Increase the minimum wage to $16.50 an hour, to take effect from April 1, 2018, and introduce legislation to improve fairness in the workplace

– Set the zero carbon emissions goal and begin setting up the independent Climate Commission

NZ First gets four posts in Cabinet and one undersecretary as Jacinda Ardern leads new coalition government (19/10/2017) | @1NewsNZ

New Zealand PM-elect Jacinda Ardern focuses on final touches of coalition deal (19/10/2017) | CHARLOTTE GREENFIELD @globeandmail

@jacindaardern

Jacinda Ardern | @guardian

#JacindaArdern | @GlblCtzn

https://twitter.com/waikato/status/921113337940779009

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern: The world reacts (20/10/2017) | Matt Burrows @NewshubNZ

Jacinda Ardern, New Zealand’s Sudden Star, Gets Set to Govern (10/20/2017) | CHARLOTTE GRAHAM @nytimes

New Zealand Labour’s Jacinda Ardern To Be Next Prime Minister (19/10/2017) | Luke Cooper @HuffPostAU

Jacinda Ardern picks Labour, Greens, NZ First cabinet (10/20/2017) | @australian

Jacinda Ardern to become NZ prime minister following coalition announcement (10/19/2017) | Richard Shaw (@MasseyUni) @ConversationEDU

Meet Jacinda Ardern, 37, New Zealand’s Next Prime Minister (10/19/2017) | @laurelwamsley @npr

Meet NZ’s new Prime Minister: Jacinda Ardern clinches victory giving hope to progressives everywhere (10/18/2017) | smelly pirate @dailykos

New Zealand’s most powerful young woman is now Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern (10/19/2017) | @reuters @theheraldsun
… Those plans contrast with French President Macron’s announcement that he would look into opening migrant processing centres in Libya, to avoid a dangerous trip for asylum seekers across the Mediterranean Sea.
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, meanwhile, has positioned himself as an alternative figure to U.S. President Donald Trump by touting Canadian immigration as a success story. …
New Zealand’s annual net migration of 72,300 is at record levels in a country of just 4.7 million people, ahead of both Britain and the United States on a per capita basis. …
… “Our concern is that our immigration settings haven’t been dynamic enough to differentiate between the skills gap that might exist in regional New Zealand that doesn’t exist in Auckland,” …
Her conservative rival dismissed Ardern’s appeal as “stardust”, claiming she would squander the economic gains achieved under National. …

New Zealand just elected its youngest prime minister in 150 years (20/10/2017) | Ashitha Nagesh @MetroUK

New Zealand prime minister Jacinda Ardern left Mormon church to support LGBT rights (22/10/2017) | Lydia Smith @independent


… Peters is 72 and not expected to contest the next election as leader, but he clearly wants the party he created in 1993 to outlast him. By hitching his team to a new government with a young leader, Peters clearly believes there will be a greater long-term electoral dividend than simply backing a fourth and likely final term for National. …


… New Zealand First leader Winston Peters split from the National party in 1993 to form his party in opposition to National’s neoliberal economics. …


https://twitter.com/NewsroomNZ/status/921262253428690945

New Zealand election: Jacinda Ardern’s campaign rollercoaster ride (24/09/2017) | Josh Bavas @radioaustralia
… Associate Professor Grant Duncan from Auckland’s Massey University said it was a well-seized opportunity. “She assured the New Zealand public that our relationship with Australia is a solid one and it’s never going to be questioned,” …
“I’m not willing to do politics as usual ? I do bring a different approach, I favour being able to collaborate where I can.” …

Have Recruiter Salaries Stagnated? (08/31/2017) | JONATHAN RICE @NZRice

Taking stock of Jacinda Ardern’s stocktake (08/02/2017) | Sam Sachdeva @NewsroomNZ

“I have no intention to be a career politician” – Jacinda Ardern (Voice; 02/08/2017) | @RadioNZLIVE


UK Vol.95 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.24)

Here are articles on Brexit.

Statement by the European Council (Art. 50) on the UK notification (w Video & PDFs; 29/03/2017)

Now that Article 50 has been triggered, reality will start to bite (31/03/2017) | @ConUnit_UCL

The white paper on Brexit: a wish list disguised as a strategy (02/02/2017) | Dan Roberts @guardian

What the Brexit white paper says (and doesn’t say) about trade (02/03/2017) | Maria Garcia @ConversationEDU

Article 50 triggered – but is a Brexit deal really possible in two years? (29/03/2017) | @RGWhitman @ConversationUK

The Great Repeal Bill could prove costly | Professor Robert Lee, Head of @bhamlaw

How rupture with mainland Europe caused Britain to falter for hundreds of years (28/03/2017) | Stephen Church @ConversationUK

Brexit – The UK’s greatest transformation project (04/10/2016) | Ross Dawson

Carmakers eye more UK suppliers to handle hard Brexit (10/03/2017) | @CPitas @ReutersUK

Despite Brexit fears more companies have been set up in Cornwall in 2016 than in previous years (06/02/2017) | @Oli_Vergnault @CornwallLive

Theresa May’s meeting with Angela Merkel at EU summit is cancelled (03/02/2017) | Peter Walker & Daniel Boffey @guardian

Pound plunges amid fears over Brexit delays (09/06/2017) | @jilltreanor @guardian

Brexit with Dr Serena Kelly (w Voice; 18/01/2017) – Summer Days with Jesse Mulligan @radionz

Brexit and the People of Wales: What Do We Know? What Could We Know? (29/03/3017) | Professor Roger Scully @cardiffuni

SNP offers to abandon independence referendum if Theresa May lets Scotland stay in the European single market (14/03/2017) | Charlotte England

Scotland heads towards a second independence referendum (14/03/2017) | @craigmcangus @ConversationUK

NORTHERN IRELAND: POST-BREXIT (29/03/2017) | @QueensUBelfast

Brexit may hinder local Government co-operation – UCC centre director says Northern Ireland could move away from various EU directives (08/03/2017) | Barry Roche @IrishTimes

Brexit Insights: Lords INTERVIEW with Lord Jonathan Hill and Minister Eoghan Murphy | @matheson


UK Vol.94 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.23)

Here are tweets on Brexit.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.20

Here are tweets which include free papers, reports/articles (citing others), et al.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.19

Here are tweets which include free papers, reports/articles (citing others), and videos.

https://twitter.com/Wolgadeutscher/status/841658527814975490


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.17

Here are tweets which include free papers, reports/articles (citing others), and a video.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.12

Here are @_WorldSolutions’ RTs which include free papers, reports/articles (citing others), and a video.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.6

Here are @_WorldSolutions’ RTs which include free papers, reports (citing others), voices, videos, et al.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.5

Here are @_WorldSolutions’ RTs which include free papers, reports, podcasts, video, et al.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.4

Here are @_WorldSolutions’ RTs from late December to mid November 2016 which include free papers, reports, podcasts, video, et al.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.3

Here are @_WorldSolutions’ RTs from late January 2017 to late December 2016 which include free papers, reports, podcast, et al.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.2

Here are @_WorldSolutions’ RTs from February to late January 2017 which include free papers, reports, podcast, et al.


Free papers, reports, et al. Vol.1

Here are @_WorldSolutions’ recent RTs which include free PDFs of papers, reports, et al.


Africa Vol.6 (South Africa)

cf. An economy for the 99% | @Nina_Kirsten @KPMG_SA   UK and South Africa Relations post Brexit (w Video; 3/13/2017) | @MatterConcern (@SABCNewsOnline interview with the outgoing British High Commissioner to South Africa)

SouthAfrica_WorldSolutions


US Policy Changes Vol.63 (Deregulation/Reform/Inequality Vol.7)

Here are articles on inequality, financial reform, tax, et al. Excerpts are on our own.

America on the Brink of Oligarchy (8/23/2012) | Paul Starr (@WilsonSchool) @NewRepublic
The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy
By Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady (Princeton University Press, 693 pp.)
Oligarchy
By Jeffrey A. Winters (Cambridge University Press, 323 pp.)
The MoveOn Effect: The Unexpected Transformation of American Political Advocacy
By David Karpf (Oxford University Press, 237 pp.)
… Americans in the top fifth in socioeconomic status (a combined measure of income and education) are “roughly twice as likely to go to the polls as those in the bottom quintile” but about eight times more likely to make a political donation. …
… In research cited by Schlozman and her co-authors, Martin Gilens of Princeton University analyzed nearly two thousand questions in public-opinion surveys about proposed national policies from 1981 to 2002. On issues where opinion varied by income, he found that the policies finally adopted were strongly related to the preferences of upper-income people, and not at all to what the poor or even middle-income Americans wanted.
…twelve thousand organizations listed in the Washington Representatives directory. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, only a small proportion of groups represented in Washington (12 percent) are associations made up of individuals. The majority are corporations, governmental bodies, and associations of institutions. By sheer numbers, “representation of business is dominant.” In contrast, most workers who are neither professionals nor managers have no group in Washington representing their occupational interests, unless they are unionized—and only 7 percent of private-sector workers are now unionized.
The Unheavenly Chorus estimates that union members accounted for 25 percent of political activity in 1967 but for only 18 percent in 1990, and for just 11 percent in 2006. Meanwhile, corporations and the wealthy have been busily converting “market resources into political advocacy.”
… When C. Wright Mills wrote about “the power elite” in the 1950s, he was specifically referring to decision-makers at the pinnacle of corporate, military, and civilian bureaucracies. Winters rejects elite theory as a “detour,” and reaches back to an older tradition of thought stressing the distinctive role of wealth as a foundation of power. He traces his theory of oligarchy to Aristotle (“whenever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy”) and to Machiavelli, who was concerned with the means by which a republic could limit the power of wealth. …
… If a Michael Bloomberg decides to run for office, Winters points out, it is not because he is trying to keep his wealth safe from rivals or necessarily to advance his material interests. In a civil oligarchy, rather than seeking out the spotlight, the superrich can use their money to exert political influence, and they can hire the busy “worker bees” of what Winters calls the “Income Defense Industry,” including banks, investment advisors, and law and accounting firms. …particularly to the creation of tax shelters so costly that they are available only to the ultra-rich. …oligarchs have an interest in pushing tax obligations down to the mass affluent through a lower threshold for the highest tax bracket, which deflects some of the burden and may win the super-rich more allies in opposing higher marginal rates.
…the “lion’s share” of recent gains in income and wealth have gone “to a sliver of the population,” the top “1/10th and even 1/100th of the top 1 percent of households.” If political participation were the key, economic gains should at least have been diffused more widely among the mass affluent. …market-generated returns have also diverged because of changes in technology and the global economy, and although aggressively egalitarian policies might have limited the breakaway gains at the top, those policies were blocked by a conservative ideological resurgence that cannot be reduced to the influence of big money.
… Adelson’s Las Vegas Sands Corporation pays a tax rate of only 9.8 percent (compared with the statutory rate of 35 percent), because 90 percent of its earnings come from hotels and casinos in Singapore and Macao. Obama has proposed ending the deductions and credits that enable Sands to shelter billions in revenue from taxes. Adelson is also facing a Justice Department investigation of potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in his Macao dealings. Another big GOP donor, the Texas financier Harold Simmons, has used political contributions to win favorable legislation in his own and other states advancing his nuclear-waste business…
…David Karpf’s The MoveOn Effect… …@dailykos @DFAaction @BoldProgressive…
… In recent decades, while conservatives developed into a strong and cohesive political force, the rise of specialized, issue-based progressive advocacy led to a proliferation of separate agendas. So the rise of politically oriented “issue generalists” on the liberal side is a welcome development. In addition, the new groups are cheap to run, and they easily scale up to large dimensions.
…to suggest that the Internet is a “weapon of the strong” is to miss a crucial point: online organization does not depend on patronage by the wealthy. The new low-cost methods of organizing are especially important at a time when one of the central threats to American democracy is the entrenchment of oligarchic power. …

A Wasted Crisis?: Why the Democrats did so little to change Wall Street (7/12/2013) | Paul Starr (@WilsonSchool) @NewRepublic
…political changes have undermined whatever dignity and respect members of Congress once had. …
… But financial reform posed a difficult test for several reasons—the political power of the industry, the complexity of the issues, and the complicity of leading Democrats in the policies that helped to bring about the crisis.
…@OpenSecretsDC, which tracks political donations, “the financial sector is far and away the largest source of campaign contributions to federal candidates and parties.” Thanks in part to federal policy, finance has become the dominant sector of the economy, increasing its share of total domestic profits from 15 percent in the early 1980s to 41 percent in the early 2000s. The financialization of the economy promotes the financialization of politics, as money finds its way to power. …
… The ultimate basis of finance’s power is structural: if governments adopt policies that genuinely threaten financial markets, capital will migrate elsewhere, credit will tighten, and economic growth will suffer. But the more complicated the markets become, the more difficult it is to know where the danger point lies. Complexity amplifies the industry’s influence in discussions about alternatives, because its CEOs and lobbyists can make inflated claims of perilous repercussions from change that legislators do not know enough to discount. …
… Removing those barriers did exactly the opposite. …Senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut…
… Robert Kaiser’s Act of Congress is a step-by-step, journalistic narrative of the legislative process from the eruption of the financial crisis in September 2008 through the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July 2010. In Kaiser’s telling, Congress overcame special-interest pressures and partisan obstruction, worked through complex issues, and enacted substantial and intelligent legislation. In stark contrast, Jeff Connaughton’s The Payoff is a burn-all-bridges memoir of a longtime lobbyist who became a top aide to a liberal Democratic senator and says that Dodd-Frank was shot through with holes as a result of special-interest pressures and the connivance of both Dodd and the administration. And in the most weighty and analytical of the books, Political Bubbles, the political scientists Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal argue that 2008 was a “wasted crisis” because American democracy failed not only in the run-up to the bailouts, but also in the aftermath. Dodd-Frank, they say, exemplifies a long historical pattern (except for the New Deal) of weak and often counterproductive governmental responses to breakdowns in the financial system.
… Frank and Dodd shared…the practical wisdom required to get things done. …
“Dodd’s personal attributes were even more important,” Kaiser writes. Not as brilliant as Frank but “bright enough,” Dodd was popular with other senators and shrewd in dealing with them, always looking for ways to address the “substantive concerns of his colleagues, especially Republicans.” In a memorable episode…
… Frank agreed to two concessions: a limit on the supervisory authority of the new agency that the law would establish to protect consumers, and a change in the formula for assessments paid to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which would shift more than $1 billion in annual fees from the community banks to the big banks. Wall Street would not like it, but by peeling off the hometown banks, Frank reduced local pressure on the Blue Dogs and other representatives to oppose the bill.
… Social scientists distinguish among three dimensions of power. Who wins and who loses in overt conflict is only the first dimension. The second dimension is control, often implicit, over what gets on the agenda and the issues and alternatives that never even come up for discussion. The third dimension involves the terms of debate, the ways of thinking about problems. …
… The industry opposed the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created under the law as well as other provisions, such as a watered-down version of the Volcker Rule…
…Jeff Connaughton…
… Dodd, whom Connaughton describes as “Machiavellian,” readily made concessions to Republicans who were not going to vote for the bill, while ignoring his own Democratic colleagues. …
In Political Bubbles, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal… “We favor a strong set of simple rules rather than regulatory discretion,” they write. “The thirty-seven pages of Glass-Steagall are much to be preferred to the nearly three thousand pages of Dodd-Frank.”…
… “Washington rushed to bail out the commercial and investment banks and American International Group (AIG), but did little to relieve small debtors” and Congress passed Dodd-Frank, which “leaves ample opportunities for future bubbles.”
… Institutionally, the key development has been the increased use of the filibuster in the Senate. Together, the growth in ideological polarization in Congress and the exploitation of institutional choke points have led to gridlock, blocking legislative adjustment of policies as conditions change. And in the case of finance, that failure to update policy has effectively meant deregulation, because of the creation in recent decades of new financial products not envisioned under the New Deal regulatory regime. …
…a consumer coalition in 2009 announced it would raise $5 million to support financial reform; in comparison, the lobbying expenditures by the finance industry in 2009 and 2010 totaled around $750 million.
… Dodd-Frank’s establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the ACA’s insurance reforms and expansion of coverage. As a result of those provisions, I wouldn’t say that Dodd-Frank was a “waste” of a crisis or that the ACA was a mistake—but both laws leave key interests undisturbed and therefore do not deal with critical problems in either finance or health care. …
Yet the battles over financial reform and health care differed in at least one way. Financial reform never had the public’s attention the way health care did. According to McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, “it was not because the public was divided, even along partisan lines, over the causes of the crisis or the need to reregulate the financial services industry.” In their view, skepticism about government’s ability to restrain Wall Street and confusion about what ought to be done dampened public engagement.
… During the debate over Dodd-Frank, neither Obama nor congressional leaders even tried to arouse public concern about Wall Street and build support for a stronger bill. Ironically, anger over Wall Street and the bailouts found its expression in the Tea Party in 2010. …
… Connaughton’s memoir is a reminder about such deceptions as Goldman Sachs’s sale of derivatives to customers who didn’t know that those derivatives had been designed to go bust, and Lehman’s shift of liabilities off its balance sheets before it went broke, and the tower of speculation built on liar loans and other subprime mortgages. Millions of people have lost their homes, whole communities have been devastated, but somehow the government does not have the ability or the will to prosecute the executives…
The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig… …the debts of the five biggest banks in the United States as of March 2012 totaled $8 trillion, a figure that they say would have been higher under European accounting standards. …

What Is Hillary Clinton’s Agenda?: She’s had so much to say on so many issues that voters may not know what she wants to accomplish. (6/20/2016) | Paul Starr (@WilsonSchool) @theprospect
… In 2010, congressional Democrats and the president prevented the extension of the tax cuts for the rich enacted under George W. Bush, increasing the top marginal income tax rate back to its level during the Clinton administration (39.6 percent) and reducing tax cuts on investment income and estates. When these changes went into effect in 2013, the top 0.1 percent paid $50 billion in taxes more than they would have paid under the previous rules. Partly as a result of a provision in the ACA, the tax rate on capital gains has gone from 15 percent to 23.8 percent. …


US Policy Changes Vol.45 (Foreign Policy Vol.7 – globalization)

Here is an article on globalization: WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?: Four Possible Answers (PDF; Dec 1998) | Simon Reich @KelloggInst @NotreDame. Excerpts are on our own.

Introduction
… Structuralism, with its rationalist underpinnings, came under attack in political science from constructivists, and within a short period no professional conference or symposium was complete without a genuflection towards the attributes of ‘globalization. …
…finance, technology transfer, transnationalism, multilateralism, and regionalism…
…globalization signaled the reduced importance of (at least traditional forms of) security studies in international relations and a corresponding elevation of international political economy questions—as well as suggesting new linkages between OECD and non-OECD states, the private and public sectors, capital and labor, work and leisure, state and society. …globalization explains the Clinton Administration’s preference for focusing on economic issues in foreign affairs, the causal linkage between this apparently global phenomenon and current policy remains elusive. …

Definition
James Rosenau… Globalization is not the same as globalism, which points to aspirations for an end state of affairs wherein values are shared by or pertinent to all the world’s five billion people, their environment, their roles as citizens, consumers or producers with an interest in collective action designed to solve common problems. Nor is it universalism—values which embrace all humanity, hypothetically or actually.
Anthony McGrew… …multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation states (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can come to have a significant consequence for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe.
Philip Cerny… Globalization is defined here as a set of economic and political structures and processes deriving from the changing character of the goods and assets that comprise the base of the international political economy—in particular, the increasing structural differentiation of those goods and assets.

1. Globalization as a Historical Epoch
… The demise of the Cold War coincided with the onset of globalization, raising the question of whether there is a causal relationship between the two. Certainly, the comments of scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein (echoing Trotsky), who registered concern that Communist states could not sustain themselves in the context of a capitalist system, may be interpreted to imply as such. Whether causally related or not, globalization as a period might be said to ‘succeed’ the Cold War historically. …
… The first was the introduction of détente between the United States and Soviet Union. The second was the breakdown of the ‘Social Contract,’ initially in Britain but eventually throughout the advanced industrial countries. …

2. Globalization as Confluence of Economic Phenomena
… Linking globalization to processes of economic integration, Robert Z. Lawrence, for example, makes the broad statement that “economic integration generally leads to convergence, with poorer economies growing more rapidly than richer economies.” Jeffrey G. Williamson, noted Harvard economist and then President of the of the Economic History Association, also argued in his presidential address that globalization leads to convergence—and has done in prior historical periods. …
… R.J. Barry Jones who suggests that globalization may simply be an intensification of the process
of international interdependence…
… Wilfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder are specific in their characterization of globalization, associating it with increased international capital mobility and a growing incidence of mergers and acquisitions and of strategic alliances. …

3. Globalization as the hegemony of American values
… Edward Banfield’s The Moral Basis of A Backward Society or David Apter’s comment, in describing the theme of the Politics of Modernization, that “Despite an emphasis on methods of comparing governments and studying
their political growth and adaptation, analysis begins with moral content. …
Francis Fukuyama suggests that convergence is inevitable:… All countries undergoing economic modernization must increasing resemble one another: they must unify nationally on the basis of a centralized state, urbanize, replace traditional forms of social organization like tribe, sect, and family with economically rational ones based on function and efficiency, and provide for the universal education of their citizens… Moreover, the logic of modern natural science would seem to dictate a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism…
… Protestant values that purportedly epitomize the Enlightenment. Even Samuel Huntington, noted critic of the initial formulations of modernization theory (and explicit opponent of the concept of convergence), appears to have accepted a central proposition of modernization; the stimulant of economic growth on the propensity towards democratization. …
… But it is a specific form of liberal democracy—it is John Locke’s and not Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s variant. And it is, comparably, a particular form of economic development—it is the Anglo-Saxon classicism of Adam Smith rather than the ‘Continentalism’ of Friedrich List. …
… The effort to co-op elites, at least initially from across the Triad of Japan, North America, and Europe, has effectively defended the stability of a liberal international order and warded off any movement towards mercantilism, averting an imperialist crisis of capitalism anticipated by a Leninist approach. Here, Gramsci’s stress on hegemony’s reliance on consensuality rather than domination is critical in explaining the emergence of a transnational class structure which is buttressed by a substructure predicated on the free movement of capital. While American power in a realist sense may have therefore declined, the capacity of organic intellectuals like those found in organizations such as the Trilateral Commission has proven indispensable in exporting a universalist ideology (of neoliberalism), thus constructing a historic bloc and thereby sustaining America hegemony.
… For liberals it often disintegrates as part of this change in ‘zeitgeist.’ …
… Ann Marie Slaughter concurs: A new world order is emerging, with less fanfare but more substance than either the liberal internationalist or new medievalist visions. The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts—courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order… Transgovernmentalism offers its own world order ideal, less dramatic but more compelling than either liberal internationalism or the new medievalism. It harnesses the state’s power to find and implement solutions to global problems.

4. Globalization as Technological and Social Revolution
…of globally integrated production; of specialized but interdependent labor markets; of the rapid privatization of state assets; and of the inextricable linkage of technology across conventional national borders. …
The notion that glocalization is the localization of economic and political relations, shifting authority from the national level downward in a manner that enhances responses to globalization, conflicts with alternatives views that suggests the two are dialectically opposed. …
… Winfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder … globalizing firms pursue a strategy that strives for a worldwide intrafirm division of labor while glocalizing firms pursue an alternative strategy in which they seek to replicate production within a number of regions, thereby avoiding the risk associated with the formation of trade blocs. Glocalizing firms therefore seek to generate a geographically concentrated interfirm division of labor.
… Consistent with this distinction, the two behave in very different ways. Multinational firms may decentralize production and sales but their decision-making remains firmly centralized in a hierarchical structure. This, in behavioral terms, is reflected in their propensity to retain the overwhelming majority of R&D facilities at home, with very few exceptions.
…Ohmae… As private sector managers and government policymakers are discovering, it makes no sense in so borderless a world to think, say, of countries like ‘Italy’ or ‘China’ as discrete economic entities. …
…that of a paradigmatic shift in the sociological relations that are the foundation for relations among state, economy, and civil society. …
… Peter Schwartz and Peter Leyden who offer the prospect of four decades of sustained growth and ‘remarkable transformation,’ stimulated by the ‘big bang’ of technological development (computers, telecom, biotech, nanotech, and alternative energy) and deregulation. … An unprecedented alignment of an ascendant Asia, a revitalized America, and a reintegrated greater Europe—including a recovered Russia—together will create an economic juggernaut that pulls along most other regions of the planet. These two metatrends—fundamental technological change and a new ethos of openness—will transform our world into the beginnings of a global civilization. …

Conclusion
…four distinct approaches; the first being historical, the second economic, the third sociological, and the fourth technological. …

cf. Review “Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System (2014) by Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow” | G. John Ikenberry
Reich and Lebow have joined a long list of writers who have announced the end of U.S. hegemony and the coming of the next world order. In fact, they argue that hegemony has been dead for many decades. “Hegemony is a fiction propagated to support a large defense establishment, justify American claims to world leadership, and buttress the self-esteem of voters,” they proclaim. But they have an odd notion of what constitutes hegemony, which they equate with “the blunt exercise of force.” Reich and Lebow note that influence is far more important than raw power and identify three functions that leading states must perform to sustain order in today’s allegedly post-hegemonic international system: agenda setting (advocating policies and principles of order), custodianship (stabilizing the world economy), and sponsorship (initiating rules and institutions). These are perfectly good points, but the main critique relies on a straw man: political scientists and policymakers are well aware of the distinction between raw power and influence. Indeed, the field of international relations even has a term for the strategy of influence that Reich and Lebow advocate. That term is “hegemony.”


US Policy Changes Vol.37 (Trade Vol.5 – Metro areas, Currency exchanges, Globalization)

Here are @BrookingsInst’s articles on trade, metro areas, currency and globalization. Excerpts are on our own.

Americans most affected by trade voted for Trump (12/14/2016) | @joeparilla and @MarkMuro1 @BrookingsMetro
… Economic theory acknowledges that global trade offers benefits that should be celebrated and exacts costs that cannot be ignored. As the Council on Foreign Relation’s Edward Alden details in a new book, this reality led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in 1962. …
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The program’s Consolidated Petitions Database, which has been geocoded and provided online by Public Citizen, offers an estimate of the number of workers at trade-affected companies, including both layoffs and employment reductions through attrition. …
… Since 1994, the top 10 metro areas in terms of total TAA-certified workers include the largest metros in the country — New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Philadelphia, and Boston. Also in the top 10 are export-intensive midsized metros like Detroit, Charlotte, and Portland. El Paso — on the U.S.–Mexico border — rounds out the top 10. Small metro areas—those with populations between 50,000 and 500,000—house 21 percent of TAA-certified workers while micropolitan areas (those with populations under 50,000 residents with a core city of at least 10,000) and rural areas account for a combined 29 percent of TAA-certified workers.
… the most intense effect of trade displacement is in smaller communities in the Midwest and South… …the Carolinas, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and parts of Ohio and Michigan that depend on manufacturing industries that are subject to global competition and technological automation (Map 1). …
Yet business as usual will not suffice. The TAA program, as it is currently deployed, has not been particularly effective in helping displaced workers. Its scale is insufficient relative to the scale of displacement. Indeed, MIT’s David Autor and colleagues find that most displaced workers rely on Social Security and disability benefits rather than the retraining resources provided by TAA. …

Rise in dollar shows short-term support of Trump’s pro-business platform (12/7/2016) | Barry P. Bosworth @thehill @BrookingsEcon
… However, it is also important to view these changes from a longer-term perspective where the value of the dollar has been steadily appreciating for the past five years – 30 percent since early 2011. During that period the United States has been a lone bright spot in the global economy.
With unemployment below the historic norm, record levels of corporate profits, and the Federal Reserve now poised to raise interest rates, financial capital is being redirected to dollar-denominated assets. It is the judgment of global investors that the United States has completed its long recovery from the financial crisis and is on the verge of a return to normality. …
… On the other hand, for those who are employed in export-based jobs, the high cost of American-made goods will tend to drive down exports and increase the pressures to produce abroad.
Second, for comparisons with trade, it is important to focus on real, or inflation-adjusted, values since, for many countries, the change in the nominal exchange rate is simply an offset to relatively high rates of domestic inflation. …
… Most recent studies of U.S. trade suggest a lag response stretching over 2-3 years.
Those studies also typically conclude that a 10 percent appreciation of the dollar would lead to a long-run increase in the U.S. trade deficit by about 1 percent of GDP. Thus, we should anticipate that a continued strong dollar should exert a drag on the U.S. economy as a widening of the trade deficit from the current 3 percent of GDP to about 4 percent in the next 1-2 years.
… At present, the strong dollar reflects investors’ relative optimism about their prospective returns on dollar-denominated assets, and not a precursor of a deteriorating trade performance. …

Donald Trump and the future of globalization (11/18/2016) | @BrinaSeidel and @laurencechandy @BrookingsInst
Figure 1: Globalization trends, 1870-2015
Figure 2: Global shares of trade, capital markets, and migration
We may see countries retaliate against U.S. protectionist policies. … The threat has already been made explicit by the state-sponsored Chinese tabloid, Global Times, which proposed that China respond to aggressive trade policies by cancelling contracts with U.S. suppliers…and by…Nicolas Sarkozy who has suggested that the Europe Union impose a tax on U.S. products and limit the participation of foreign companies in EU public contracts if Trump withdraws from the Paris climate accord.
… In the past week, politicians from Italy, Hungary, Greece, and elsewhere have invoked Trump’s victory as justification for policies that reverse the pattern of globalization.
Alternatively, countries may repudiate global norms and institutions that underpin the globalized economy, if they feel that the U.S. is no longer committed to upholding the liberal economic order. …

Is globalization’s second wave about to break? (w PDF; 10/4/2016) | @BrinaSeidel and @laurencechandy @BrookingsInst
… Globalization’s first wave, which lasted from 1870 to 1914, is viewed today as the embodiment of the liberal open economic paradigm. … For instance, around half of all British savings were channeled abroad over this period, while half of Argentina’s entire capital stock was foreign owned by 1914. …
… The passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff act in the U.S. against the backdrop of the Great Depression set off a retaliatory backlash among the world’s major economies that crippled global trade. …
The essence of globalization is the movement of goods, money, and people across international borders. …Figure 1
We find that, while the process of economic integration has slowed, there is only limited evidence so far of an absolute decline. In addition, today’s level of integration matches or exceeds the heights of globalization’s first wave. This could equally imply that globalization has reached unsustainable levels or that no such levels exist.
… First, one of our three series (goods) is a measure of flows, whereas the other two (money and people) are measures of stocks. … Second, our series for goods and money are expressed in terms that differ from contemporary measures cited in economic reports and the media. …
GOODS
… At the end of the first wave of globalization in 1913, merchandise exports peaked at 7.9 percent of global GDP. That peak was surpassed as early as 1970, when tariff reductions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were still at an early stage, the standardization of shipping containers was being established, and the rise of export manufactures from the developing world had yet to occur. Goods exports have since been propelled to far greater heights, reaching 19.7 percent of global income in 2008.
That share stood at 15.1 percent in 2015, having declined continuously for the previous four years. …
The recent slump in trade growth… Both cyclical and structural factors are at work. The latter include the exhaustion of gains from both the incorporation of previously-closed economies into global markets and the fragmentation of value chains across borders—commonly referred to as the second unbundling. …
… While trade in services is considerably smaller than trade in goods, its value as a share of global GDP has doubled in the past 30 years and has proved more resilient during the recent trade slowdown… Figure 2
…the trend towards creeping protectionism using non-tariff barriers. … This risk is real, but for now remains speculative. …
MONEY
… Contemporary annual estimates from 1990 onward are built at the country level from independent estimates of external debt, foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio equity stocks. …
Four caveats are immediately worth noting. …
During the first wave of globalization, the developing world’s foreign capital stock peaked at 32.4 percent of GDP in 1914. … Despite falling precipitously during the Great Recession…30.1 percent, is at its highest level in a century. …
FDI’s rise is a defining component of globalization’s second wave and is synonymous with the growing role of international finance beyond traditional areas such as railways and extractive industries into new sectors including commerce and industry.
…the foreign-held portfolio stock as a share of low-income country GDP remains negligible at only 0.4 percent in 2014. …
…debt relief, and the nurturing of domestic debt markets through the issuance of debt denominated in domestic currency and the encouragement of purchases by local financial institutions. …
Concerns about the de-globalization of foreign capital since the Great Recession have centered on a different phenomenon: the reduction in inter-bank lending. …
Figure 3
MIGRATION
… Flows—as opposed to stocks—of long-distance migration along certain routes are well documented from ports and customs statistics. Other routes, especially those overland, are not formally recorded. Accounts of short-distance migration are missing altogether for most of the world. …
… Our benchmark for age at migration is the median age at entry of migrants to the U.S. each year, drawn from official U.S. records. Our benchmark for migrant’s life expectancy is U.S. life expectancy for the respective age, gender, and year of U.S. migrants, obtained again from U.S. records, and discounted by the ratio of U.S. life expectancy at birth to global life expectancy at birth. …
… At the end of globalization’s first wave in 2015, the global migrant stock is estimated to have peaked at 2.5 percent of the global population, although it stayed close to this level into the 1930s before beginning its descent. The share began to climb again in the 1970s and surpassed its previous peak for the first time in 1988. It rose further in the 2000s and today stands at 3.3 percent. …
The U.S. migrant stock hovered at close to 14 percent of its population throughout globalization’s first wave before falling precipitously. That share has rebounded since 1970 and in 2015 stands a fraction short of its historical high at 13 percent. …
Figure 4
…both the absolute number and global share of migration flows has remained relatively stable in the past two decades. …a lower age of migration, longer life expectancy for migrants, and/or lower return rates. …
CONCLUSION
Table 1: Benchmarking globalization across two waves
… The past two decades have been described as an era of hyper-globalization during which both the level and rate of global integration was judged as having intensified. Based on our analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that this period is over. … Our speculative assessment is that the coming years will be characterized either by stabilization in the level of globalization, or further growth in the degree of integration but at a more modest pace than in the past.

The case for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (10/4/2016) | @solis_msolis @BrookingsFP


Indexes Vol.4 (The Global Competitiveness Index 2016-2017 – methodology, et al.)

Here are our excerpts concerning #GCI methodology, et al. of @wef’s The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 (w PDF).

PDF
CHAPTER 1.1 Competitiveness Agendas to Reignite Growth: Findings from the Global Competitiveness Index p5-11
Monetary policy is not enough: Insufficient competitiveness is a constraint for reigniting growth worldwide
… Figure 2 shows how economies that perform poorly in the GCI have seen their central banks boost their balance sheets more than better-performing economies, and yet those with higher competitiveness have recovered faster from the financial crisis and ensuing recession, achieving faster growth rates. The fact that monetary stimulus has been more effective and growth has been higher in more competitive economies, regardless of fiscal policies followed, suggests that the constraints may be on the supply side. Improving the conditions for businesses to flourish and increase their productivity is therefore the main policy challenge for advanced and emerging economies alike.
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At the dawn of the Fourth Industrial Revolution era, technology and innovation are increasingly driving development
… Innovation and business sophistication are more closely associated with income levels in general, and in emerging economies and commodity-exporting economies in particular, than they used to be. Figure 3 shows how, since 2010, for these two groups, GDP per capita has become more closely correlated with the GCI’s technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovation pillars than it is with the infrastructure, health and primary education, and market-related pillars (goods markets efficiency, financial market development, and labor market efficiency). These results illustrate how sources of productivity within firms and production units that are related to their ability to incorporate new technologies into their production processes, and that change the ways in which those firms and units perform tasks, are playing a larger role than investment in basic physical and human capital and well-functioning factor and goods markets, frequently thought to be sufficient to reignite growth. It also shows how the price changes experienced since the end of the commodity cycle and faster technological change are creating incentives for firms and policymakers to engage in more innovative activities.
figure45
Declining openness is endangering future growth and prosperity
An open, trading economy generates incentives to innovate and invest in new technologies because firms are exposed to competition and new ideas and can benefit from the technology transfer that comes from mports and foreign investment. … protectionist measures, especially non-tariff barriers, have increased and global trade has not recovered since the global trade slowdown following the financial crisis. Figure 4 illustrates that, according to GCI data, economies in all income groups have become less open since 2007, driven mainly by non-tariff barriers, including increased legal and normative requirements. Figure 5 shows that economies that are open to foreign competition (as measured by the foreign competition subpillar of the GCI) are also more innovative, suggesting the importance of openness for innovation. …

Appendix A: Methodology and Computation of the Global Competitiveness Index 2016–2017 p35-37
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1st pillar: Institutions
The institutional environment of a country depends on the efficiency and the behavior of both public and private stakeholders. The legal and administrative framework within which individuals, firms, and governments interact determines the quality of the public institutions of a country and has a strong bearing on competitiveness and growth. It influences investment decisions and the organization of production and plays a key role in the ways in which societies distribute the benefits and bear the costs of development strategies and policies. Good private institutions are also important for the sound and sustainable development of an economy. The 2007–08 global financial crisis, along with numerous corporate scandals, has highlighted the relevance of accounting and reporting standards and transparency for preventing fraud and mismanagement, ensuring good governance, and maintaining investor and consumer confidence.
6th pillar: Goods market efficiency
Countries with efficient goods markets are well positioned to produce the right mix of products and services given their particular supply-and-demand conditions, as well as to ensure that these goods can be most effectively traded in the economy. Healthy market competition, both domestic and foreign, is important in driving market efficiency, and thus business productivity, by ensuring that the most efficient firms, producing goods demanded by the market, are those that thrive. Market efficiency also depends on demand conditions such as customer orientation and buyer sophistication. For cultural or historical reasons, customers may be more demanding in some countries than in others. This can create an important competitive advantage, as it forces companies to be more innovative and customer-oriented and thus imposes the discipline necessary for efficiency to be achieved in the market.
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7th pillar: Labor market efficiency
The efficiency and flexibility of the labor market are critical for ensuring that workers are allocated to their most effective use in the economy and provided with incentives to give their best effort in their jobs. Labor markets must therefore have the flexibility to shift workers from one economic activity to another rapidly and at low cost, and to allow for wage fluctuations without much social disruption. Efficient labor markets must also ensure clear strong incentives for employees and promote meritocracy at the workplace, and they must provide equity in the business environment between women and men. Taken together these factors have a positive effect on worker performance and the attractiveness of the country for talent, two aspects of the labor market that are growing more important as talent shortages loom on the horizon.
8th pillar: Financial market development
An efficient financial sector allocates the resources saved by a nation’s population, as well as those entering the economy from abroad, to the entrepreneurial or investment projects with the highest expected rates of return rather than to the politically connected. Business investment is critical to productivity. Therefore economies require sophisticated financial markets that can make capital available for private-sector investment from such sources as loans from a sound banking sector, well-regulated securities exchanges, venture capital, and other financial products. In order to fulfill all those functions, the banking sector needs to be trustworthy and transparent, and—as has been made so clear recently—financial markets need appropriate regulation to protect investors and other actors in the economy at large.
11th pillar: Business sophistication
Business sophistication concerns two elements that are intricately linked: the quality of a country’s overall business networks and the quality of individual firms’ operations and strategies. These factors are especially important for countries at an advanced stage of development when, to a large extent, the more basic sources of productivity improvements have been exhausted. The quality of a country’s business networks and supporting industries, as measured by the quantity and quality of local suppliers and the extent of their interaction, is important for a variety of reasons. When companies and suppliers from a particular sector are interconnected in geographically proximate groups, called clusters, efficiency is heightened, greater opportunities for innovation in processes and products are created, and barriers to entry for new firms are reduced.
12th pillar: Innovation
The last pillar focuses on innovation. Innovation is particularly important for economies as they approach the frontiers of knowledge, and the possibility of generating more value by merely integrating and adapting exogenous technologies tends to disappear. In these economies, firms must design and develop cutting-edge products and processes to maintain a competitive edge and move toward even higher value-added activities. This progression requires an environment that is conducive to innovative activity and supported by both the public and the private sectors. In particular, it means sufficient investment in research and development (R&D), especially by the private sector; the presence of high-quality scientific research institutionsthat can generate the basic knowledge needed to build the new technologies; extensive collaboration in research and technological developments between universities and industry; and the protection of intellectual property.

Appendix B: Global Competitiveness Index 2016–2017 rankings p43-50
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CHAPTER 1.2 Modernizing the Measurement of Drivers of Prosperity in Light of the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Updated Global Competitiveness Index
p56-57 SELECTED ISSUES: DISCUSSION AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Four subindexes
Innovation
table4-p61
According to the latest thinking, innovation occurs in an ecosystem where businesses, regulations, and social norms promote connectivity, creativity, entrepreneurship, collaboration, and the adoption of the latest technologies to generate new ideas and bring new products and business models to market. These concepts are measured by four pillars: technological adoption, market size, business dynamism, and innovation capacity. … As long as new ideas cannot find a practical implementation they might contribute to knowledge accumulation but they do not immediately translate into advances in human welfare. In some cases finding a practical application for a new idea is just a matter of time, because technological progress in other fields has to occur before these ideas can be put into practical use. It is, however, crucial for a country to develop the skills and the conditions that can ignite the process of transforming abstract innovation into new products and processes.

Appendix: Updated Global Competitiveness Index Structure p63-75

CHAPTER 1.3 The Executive Opinion
Survey: The Voice of the Business Community
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UK Vol.55 (The death of neoliberalism and the crisis in western politics)

Here is an article, The death of neoliberalism and the crisis in western politics: In the early 1980s the author was one of the first to herald the emerging dominance of neoliberalism in the west. Here he argues that this doctrine is now faltering. But what happens next? (21 August 2016) | @martjacques. Excerpts are on our own.

The western financial crisis of 2007-8 was the worst since 1931, yet its immediate repercussions were surprisingly modest. The crisis challenged the foundation stones of the long-dominant neoliberal ideology but it seemed to emerge largely unscathed. … Subsequent economic policy, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has relied overwhelmingly on monetary policy, especially quantitative easing. It has failed. …
… Although it failed the test of the real world, bequeathing the worst economic disaster for seven decades, politically and intellectually it remained the only show in town. Parties of the right, centre and left had all bought into its philosophy, New Labour a classic in point. They knew no other way of thinking or doing: it had become the common sense. It was, as Antonio Gramsci put it, hegemonic. But that hegemony cannot and will not survive the test of the real world.
… The effect of the financial crisis was to undermine faith and trust in the competence of the governing elites. It marked the beginnings of a wider political crisis.

… They go to the heart of the neoliberal project that dates from the late 70s and the political rise of Reagan and Thatcher, and embraced at its core the idea of a global free market in goods, services and capital. The depression-era system of bank regulation was dismantled, in the US in the 1990s and in Britain in 1986, thereby creating the conditions for the 2008 crisis. …
It should be noted that, by historical standards, the neoliberal era has not had a particularly good track record. The most dynamic period of postwar western growth was that between the end of the war and the early 70s, the era of welfare capitalism and Keynesianism, when the growth rate was double that of the neoliberal period from 1980 to the present.
… And the problem has grown more serious since the financial crisis. On average, between 65-70% of households in 25 high-income economies experienced stagnant or falling real incomes between 2005 and 2014.
The reasons are not difficult to explain. The hyper-globalisation era has been systematically stacked in favour of capital against labour: international trading agreements, drawn up in great secrecy, with business on the inside and the unions and citizens excluded…
As Thomas Piketty has shown, in the absence of countervailing pressures, capitalism naturally gravitates towards increasing inequality. In the period between 1945 and the late 70s, Cold War competition was arguably the biggest such constraint. …

… This popular revolt is often described, in a somewhat denigratory and dismissive fashion, as populism. Or, as Francis Fukuyama writes in a recent excellentessay in Foreign Affairs: “‘Populism’ is the label that political elites attach to policies supported by ordinary citizens that they don’t like.” …
…a cri de coeur from those who feel they have lost out and been left behind, whose living standards have stagnated or worse since the 1980s, who feel dislocated by large-scale immigration over which they have no control and who face an increasingly insecure and casualised labour market. …
… For many decades, the idea of the “working class” was marginal to American political discourse. Most Americans described themselves as middle class, a reflection of the aspirational pulse at the heart of American society. According to a Gallup poll, in 2000 only 33% of Americans called themselves working class; by 2015 the figure was 48%, almost half the population. …
The re-emergence of class should not be confused with the labour movement. …

The neoliberal era is being undermined from two directions. First, if its record of economic growth has never been particularly strong, it is now dismal. … Economists such as Larry Summers believe that the prospect for the future is most likely one of secular stagnation.
…the recovery has been so weak and fragile… the neoliberal era has delivered the west back into the kind of crisis-ridden world that we last experienced in the 1930s. … Second, those who have lost out in the neoliberal era are no longer prepared to acquiesce in their fate – they are increasingly in open revolt. We are witnessing the end of the neoliberal era. It is not dead, but it is in its early death throes, just as the social-democratic era was during the 1970s.
… From the mid-70s through the 80s, the economic debate was increasingly dominated by monetarists and free marketeers. But since the western financial crisis, the centre of gravity of the intellectual debate has shifted profoundly. This is most obvious in the United States, with economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, Dani Rodrik and Jeffrey Sachs becoming increasingly influential. … Thomas Piketty … Tony Atkinson and Angus Deaton … Ha-Joon Chang …

… But the zeitgeist had changed. The membership, especially the young who had joined the party on an unprecedented scale, wanted a complete break with New Labour. One of the reasons why the left has failed to emerge as the leader of the new mood of working-class disillusionment is that most social democratic parties became, in varying degrees, disciples of neoliberalism and uber-globalisation. …
But as David Marquand observed in a review for the New Statesman, what is the point of a social democratic party if it doesn’t represent the less fortunate, the underprivileged and the losers? New Labour deserted those who needed them, who historically they were supposed to represent. …
… Labour, like everyone else, is obliged to think anew. The membership in their antipathy to New Labour turned to someone who had never accepted the latter, who was the polar opposite in almost every respect of Blair, and embodying an authenticity and decency which Blair patently did not. …
Corbyn is not a product of the new times, he is a throwback to the late 70s and early 80s. That is both his strength and also his weakness. He is uncontaminated by the New Labour legacy because he has never accepted it. But nor, it would seem, does he understand the nature of the new era. …

… the condition of the Conservatives is not a great deal better. … It has no idea in which direction to move after Brexit. …
… Meanwhile, the Conservatives seem to have little understanding that the neoliberal era is in its death throes.

… Donald Trump … His message was straightforwardly anti-globalisation. He believes that the interests of the working class have been sacrificed in favour of the big corporations that have been encouraged to invest around the world and thereby deprive American workers of their jobs.
He proposes that US corporations should be required to invest their cash reserves in the US. …
… Given that their wages have been falling for most of the last 40 years, it is extraordinary how their interests have been neglected by the political class. Increasingly, they have voted Republican, but the Republicans have long been captured by the super-rich and Wall Street, whose interests, as hyper-globalisers, have run directly counter to those of the white working class. …
… As in the case of the Republicans, the Democrats have long supported a neoliberal, pro-globalisation strategy, notwithstanding the concerns of its trade union base. Both the Republicans and the Democrats now find themselves deeply polarised between the pro- and anti-globalisers, an entirely new development not witnessed since the shift towards neoliberalism under Reagan almost 40 years ago.
… He points to Japan and South Korea, and Nato’s European members as prime examples. …
…Trump’s position represents a major critique of America as the world’s hegemon. His arguments mark a radical break with the neoliberal, hyper-globalisation ideology that has reigned since the early 1980s and with the foreign policy orthodoxy of most of the postwar period. These arguments must be taken seriously. They should not be lightly dismissed just because of their authorship. But Trump is no man of the left. He is a populist of the right. …
Trump may well… But this does not mean that the forces opposed to hyper-globalisation… will have lost the argument and are set to decline. In little more than 12 months, Trump and Sanders have transformed the nature and terms of the argument. Far from being on the wane, the arguments of the critics of hyper-globalisation are steadily gaining ground. … And, above all else, what will continue to drive opposition to the hyper-globalisers is inequality.


Ireland Vol.7 (FDI and Irish Economic Development over Four Stages of European Integration)

Here is also a paper, FDI and Irish Economic Development over Four Stages of European Integration (PDF, January 2006) | Frank Barry, University College Dublin. Underlines, italicization, excerpts, et al. are on our own.

  1. Introduction

Ireland is the most FDI-intensive economy in Europe.  Foreign-owned firms account for almost 50 percent of Irish manufacturing employment.  This compares to an average figure of 23 for the Western European EU member states and a figure of 33 for the three largest Central and Eastern European economies.  Of the 17 EU countries plus the US and Norway for which OECD (2005, E7) provides data, Ireland also records the highest share of services-sector employment in foreign-owned firms.  These figures are reflected in the value of the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI).  Per head of population, the Irish inward FDI stock is a multiple of the EU average.

The distinguishing feature of the country’s development strategy over the last four decades of outward orientation has been the emphasis placed on attracting FDI.  The country had been remarkably successful in this regard even before the “Celtic Tiger era” of the 1990s and beyond.  Having stumbled upon the strategy, it turned out with hindsight to accord well with Ireland’s advantages:  its Atlantic location and English-speaking environment, relatively low labour costs by Western European standards, cultural connections with the US and Western European standards of governance.

The present paper analyses the co-evolution of institutional features of the Irish economic environment and the types of FDI available to European economies. We divide the period of Irish outward orientation into four distinct phases.

The first phase of Irish trade integration with Continental Europe began in the late 1950s when the country moved away from protectionism, dropped its restrictions on foreign ownership of industry and adopted a zero rate of corporation tax on manufactured exports.  These moves drew in substantial numbers of US firms who exported into mainland Europe (as opposed to the UK, which remains to this day the dominant export destination of most Irish domestic firms) even though substantial tariff barriers remained against Irish-produced goods.  Increased openness saw the country adopt the main proposals of an influential OECD report on primary and secondary education in 1965, which sparked a dramatic educational expansion at all levels.

The second phase began when Ireland joined the EU in 1973.  This brought a substantial increase in FDI inflows which – in response to the upgrading of the Irish tertiary educational system – began to locate in higher-technology sectors.  Macroeconomic instability over the period of the oil shocks however prevented Irish convergence on average Western European living standards over this period.

The third integration phase was driven by the Single European Market, the global high-tech boom and domestic policy adjustments in Ireland.  The outlawing of restrictive public procurement practices on the part of EU governments allowed Ireland’s locational advantages come more strongly to the fore; the low-corporation tax environment proved especially beneficial to high-tech MNCs who are better able to exploit its benefits; Ireland’s continued educational upgrading remained an important magnet for such firms, while fiscal consolidation, EU regional aid and the institutions of social partnership brought further competitiveness gains.  Furthermore, the EU-enforced inter-sectoral harmonisation of corporation tax rates in Ireland brought the Irish rate on services down dramatically just as global services-sector offshoring began in earnest.

The fourth phase arose as a consequence of Ireland’s convergence on average Western European living standards over the Celtic Tiger era and the accession of other low corporation-tax states to the EU.  This required Ireland to focus more on developing its national system of innovation in order to target the increasingly technology-sourcing foreign direct investment flowing into and across Europe.

  1. Phase 1: from Protectionism to EU Accession (1958-1973)

Ireland remained protectionist for about a decade after most of the rest of Western Europe had moved towards freer trade. The post-war boom of the 1950s saw Western Europe achieving growth rates of almost 6 percent per annum while protectionist Ireland stagnated with a growth rate of less than 2 percent, and an employment growth rate of less than 1 percent.  The need to import the more sophisticated capital and consumer goods that the country could not produce for itself led to balance of payments crises and macroeconomic instability, exactly as happened in protectionist Spain at around this time. The depressed economy of the 1950s saw more than 400,000 Irish people emigrate, out of a total population of less than 3 million.

By the end of the 1950s it was clear that economic policy would need to be completely overhauled.  The First Programme for Economic Expansion, which removed protectionism, encouraged foreign direct investment and promoted exports, was introduced in 1958.  The Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, which aimed to liberalise trade with the country’s major trading partner of the time, the United Kingdom, came into force in 1966, and both countries acceded to the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.  The move towards openness was accompanied by the introduction of a zero tax rate on profits derived from manufactured exports and a liberalisation of the law on foreign ownership of companies. As the bulk of the country’s exports at that time were agricultural in nature, there was little diminution of the tax base when the concessionary tax rate was adopted.

O’Hearn (1987) has estimated employment levels in the new foreign firms that entered Ireland to avail of the zero tax rate on manufactured exports.  By the time of EU entry these firms accounted for slightly more than half of all foreign-firm employment in manufacturing, with the remainder accounted for by the mainly UK firms that had entered Ireland to cater to the home market, whether under protectionism or in the outward-oriented era. …

…most of the growth prior to EU entry was in traditional or low-tech sectors such as Textiles and Clothing, Metals Industries (such as aluminium extrusions, shipbuilding, cranes, metal nuts), Pulp and Paper, and Rubber and Plastics.

The FDI inflows of this period led to Ireland developing a revealed comparative advantage (at the SITC-1 level) in Chemicals (whose share of exports grew from less than one half of 1 percent at the end of the 1950s to 6 percent at the time of EU entry) and in “manufactured goods classified by material” and “miscellaneous manufactured articles”.

The growth in foreign industry also contributed to a substantial diversification of Irish exports away from the UK market, with the then 6-country EU share of manufacturing exports rising by 10 percentage points between the late 1950s and the early 1970s.

It is of interest to note that though the numbers of new foreign firms establishing operations in Ireland accelerated as EU accession drew closer, the impact of EU membership on inbound FDI would have been unclear a priori, since accession entailed the loss of Ireland’s preferential position in the UK market.

The increased intellectual openness of the period saw Ireland (and later Austria) volunteer to allow the OECD conduct a survey of the entire national education system.   An important feature of the subsequent report, issued in 1965, was that – almost for the first time – technocratic expertise was now to be heard alongside the party political and denominational interests which had previously dominated ministerial councils (Logan, 1999).  The report was scathing in its assessment of the Irish system, noting that over half of Irish children left school at or before the age of thirteen.  This finding generated newspaper headlines and presaged the introduction of ‘free’ second-level education and free access to special transport networks for all second-level school pupils in 1967.  These measures sparked a dramatic educational expansion over the course of the 1970s and subsequently.

Notwithstanding Ireland’s early successes in attracting FDI, there was no convergence on average Western European living standards over this period, nor indeed until the late 1980s.  This is arguably ascribable to Ireland’s “regional economy” character, where, because of the historic ease of emigration to the UK, Ireland can be thought to have little control over its net-of-tax labour costs (though there were substantial insider-outsider problems in the labour market also).  This would have prevented Ireland from industrialising through the development of low-wage consumer goods exports as each of the other traditionally less developed Western European economies – Portugal, Spain and Greece – did in the 1960s…

  1. Phase 2: From EU Accession to the Single Market Era (1973-87)

Although Ireland was already relatively FDI-intensive at the time of EU entry, the number of jobs in foreign-owned manufacturing industry grew by 23 percent between 1973 and 1980, before declining subsequently as a consequence of macroeconomic mismanagement.

Although Ireland’s low corporation-tax environment is particularly attractive to high technology firms, the increasing technological intensity… would not have been possible without the educational advance touched upon in the last section.

The structure of the Irish education system that emerged in the wake of the OECD report is unusual in that while Ireland just matches the OECD mean in terms of those with university qualifications, it has far higher proportions than the average OECD country with specific post-secondary and sub-degree tertiary educational qualifications…

The post-secondary education system that emerged in Ireland was based on a realisation that, unlike in the UK – whose early industrialisation had ensured the evolution of a well-developed system to provide an intermediate layer of technicians – the education system in Ireland would need to provide this intermediate layer from scratch if human resources were to be available to sustain the industrial expansion… that followed on from Ireland’s relatively late trade-liberalisation-driven industrialisation.

The main components of the technical-education system developed in Ireland over the course of the 1970s were the Regional Technical Colleges (later rebranded as Institutes of Technology), for which there was no UK model.  These offered subdegree programmes of shorter duration than those at universities and concentrated in the fields of engineering and business studies, and their curricula had a practical orientation designed to be responsive to the needs of local industry and business.

From having had a tiny short-cycle third-level sector before 1970, by 1981 Ireland had internationally, after the Netherlands, the highest proportion of third-level students taking sub-degree courses.  Since the late 1970s, furthermore, the universities themselves – at the behest of the national development agency, the IDA – had begun to accept increased responsibility for ensuring that manpower needs were met.  The Manpower Consultative Committee was established in 1978 to provide a forum for dialogue between the IDA and the education system.  The state agency, concerned by the looming disparity between electronics graduate outflows and its own demand projections, convinced the government to fund a massive expansion in educational capacity in these areas.  The output of engineering graduates, as a result, increased by 40 percent between 1978 and 1983, while the output from computer science increased tenfold over the same short period.  The IDA in turn was able to use the rapidity of this response – exemplified by the immediate introduction of a range of one-year conversion courses to furnish science graduates with electronics qualifications –  as a further selling point to foreign investors; MacSharry and White (2000).

…the major expansions were in computing equipment and electronic components, pharmaceuticals and medical and optical devices, and these expansions continued into the following “Celtic Tiger” era.

Once again over this period however, notwithstanding the continued success in upgrading the country’s sectoral FDI allocation, no convergence was recorded on average Western European living standards.  Unlike in the previous era (1960-73) however, this lack of convergence was replicated across all the poorer Western European economies… Barry (2003) identifies deficient macroeconomic policymaking across all these four countries in the wake of the oil shocks as a common factor behind their weak performance, suggesting that poorer countries may be structurally less capable of adhering to appropriate monetary and fiscal policies in the event of a downturn in the world economy.  Convergence is also known to be more difficult to achieve when the encompassing world economy is performing poorly.

  1. Phase 3: The Single Market, Services Offshoring and the Celtic Tiger

In this phase, running from 1987 to the present, all four cohesion economies converged substantially on average Western European living standards, with Ireland’s performance being particularly dramatic. The various factors behind the Irish performance are discussed in detail elsewhere, e.g. in Barry (2004).  Here we focus solely on the contribution of FDI.

Manufacturing FDI into and within Europe expanded in the late 1980s. …with respect to US investments in Europe, with the US Department of Commerce Survey of Current Business (March 1991) attributing much of this to the lead up to the introduction of the Single European Market in 1992.  The figure also shows that Ireland captured a growing share of US investments in Europe. MacSharry and White (2000) explain this latter effect by describing how several larger EU countries, in the pre-Single Market era, “had suggested to potential investors that publicly funded purchases of their products might be blacklisted if the new investment was located in Ireland” (rather than in the countries from which the threatening noises issued).   With the outlawing of restrictive public procurement practices under the Single Market initiative, the attractiveness of Ireland as a destination for FDI increased.  This effect would undoubtedly have been dampened without the concurrent restoration of macroeconomic stability.

The increasing share of high-tech sectors in European manufacturing over the 1990s also helped, as did the high profitability of the era, since both increase the attractiveness of a low corporation-tax environment.  Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) argue, furthermore, that US foreign investment has become more sensitive to differences in host country taxes in recent years, and Ireland has had – until the recent enlargement – the lowest rate of corporation tax in the EU.  The Single Market programme may also have allowed Ireland achieve a critical mass of US firms in certain sectors, allowing agglomeration and demonstration effects to come into play (Barry, Görg and Strobl, 2003).

Thus the number of jobs in foreign-owned manufacturing in Ireland expanded by almost 50 percent between 1987 and 2000.

Combined with this increase in manufacturing FDI, Ireland also began to attract increasing services-sector FDI inflows (Grimes and White, 2005).  Starting from a base close to zero in the late 1980s, by the new millennium, foreign-firm employment in each of Ireland’s strong FDI-intensive manufacturing sectors is now matched by foreign-firm employment in several offshore services sectors located in Ireland.  Thus computer software now matches hardware, international financial services matches pharmaceuticals and other business-process offshored (BPO) activities match employment levels in instrument engineering.  Furthermore, as Barry and Van Egeraat (2005) show, as computer hardware firms have shifted their manufacturing facilities to Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, they have upgraded their operations in Ireland into services activities.

An indicator of Ireland recent successes in offshore services… Though Ireland has only around 1 percent of the EU15 population, it attracted 50 percent of new shared services projects in the EU15 and 8 percent of regional headquarters projects in the period to which the data refer.

It is well known that the share of services in international FDI flows has been increasing over recent decades (UNCTAD 2004).  Ireland’s ability to attract an increased share of services was facilitated by substantial reductions in the rate of corporation tax on services over the course of the 1980s and 1990s… These changes were generally made of the behest of the European Commission.   Export Profits Tax Relief, for example, began to be phased out in 1978, to be replaced by a special 10 percent rate for manufacturing industry.  From 1987 this special rate was extended to qualifying activities carried out at the newly opened International Financial Services Centre in Dublin. Most other market services meanwhile continued to be subject to the standard 32 percent rate that prevailed at that time.  The European Commission had been pushing for some time for tax harmonisation across sectors, implicitly hoping that Ireland’s rate would be pushed much closer to the EU average.  The Irish government instead decided in 1998 on a harmonised rate of 12.5 percent –to be instituted from 2003 – which yielded substantial benefits to most services sectors in order to cushion the impact on manufacturing.

Table 7: Ireland’s corporation tax regime

  • 1956: Finance Act introduces Export Profits Tax Relief (EPTR), primarily for manufacturing industry, with 50 percent tax remission on profits (increased to 100 percent two years later). The measure provided full relief for fifteen years and tapering relief for a further five years.
  • 1969: EPTR extended to 1989-90.
  • 1978: Government abolishes EPTR and replaces it with a special 10 percent rate of corporation profits tax for all manufacturing industry from 1981-2000. Those qualifying for export-tax relief before 1981 continue to benefit until 1990.
  • 1987: Financial Services Act establishes International Financial Services Centre in Dublin. Profits of qualifying activities carried out from the Centre are taxed at 10 percent until 2005.
  • 1990: Government extends the 10 percent corporation profits tax rate to 2010.
  • 1998: Agreement with European Commission on universal 12.5 percent corporation tax for all trading companies from 2003. All existing commitments to the 10 percent tax rates for manufacturing industry to the year 2010 to be honoured. The current 28 percent standard rate applying to most Services to be reduced by 4 percent annually in 2000, 2001 and 2002, and by 3.5 percent in 2003, giving a 12.5 percent rate at that date.

The Finance Act 2004, furthermore, established a new headquarters regime aimed at attracting international corporations to establish their regional HQ in Dublin.  This has further served to attract other activities such as shared services and treasury management (Finance Dublin Yearbook, 2004).

  1. Phase 4: Science, Technology and Innovation Policy and the Offshoring of R&D Functions

Offshoring of R&D facilities is a growing phenomenon.  Kuemmerle (1999a) tracked 32 MNCs in the pharmaceutical and electronics industries and found that their overseas R&D staff increased from 6 percent in 1965 to more than 25 percent today, while the number of overseas R&D labs increased from 14 to 84.  His study distinguishes between “home-base-exploiting” R&D sites (which are associated with traditional FDI, where firms set up overseas to exploit on a larger stage the advantages, such as brand names, that they had already accumulated) and “home-base-augmenting” or technology-sourcing cites.  The former are found to be more likely to be located close to existing factories and important markets, while the latter are more likely to be located close to universities.  The proportion of R&D labs that Kuemmerle categorises as home-base-augmenting rose from 7 percent to 40 percent over the period he studied.

The 2005 UNCTAD World Investment Report provides broader and more detailed evidence on the recent growth in global offshoring of R&D functions.  This provides the context for recent developments in science, technology and innovation (STI) policy in Ireland.

Given the growth in offshoring of R&D, along with Ireland’s convergence on average Western European living standards by the early years of the new millennium –  and perhaps also in response to the threat of increased corporation-tax competition from Central and Eastern Europe – science, technology and innovation policy has recently moved to the heart of the Irish policy agenda.

This was heralded by the release in 1996 of the first-ever Irish Government White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation.  It is underlined by the five-fold increase in investment in these areas under the current National Development Plan (2000-06), by the launch in 1998 of the Programme for Research in Third-Level Institutions (which established 24 major research centres as well as major programmes in human genomics and computational physics), by the establishment of Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) in 2000, and by the introduction of a 20 percent tax credit for incremental R&D in the Finance Act of 2004.

The origins of Science Foundation Ireland lay in a Technology Foresight Exercise organised by the state body Forfás, which asked client company executives where they saw their companies headed over the next 10–15 years, and what the Irish government could do to respond to those changes. The response was that as Ireland was no longer a low-cost manufacturing location it would have to develop more highly trained engineers, research scientists etc. to become a center for innovation, research, design and development.

The exercise proposed the establishment of a Technology Foresight Fund to promote and finance new basic and applied scientific and technological research in Ireland, and SFI was set up to administer this fund.  Besides providing awards to support scientists and engineers working in designated fields (along the lines of the US NSF), SFI has established a host of joint partnerships between third level research institutions and industry.

Within ICT alone, the last few years have registered a number of significant developments under this new strategy.  Bell Labs has announced its intention to set up a major R&D centre at Lucent Technologies’ Dublin facility, linked with the establishment of a collaborative academic centre at one of the city’s universities. Similarly, Hewlett-Packard announced the establishment of a world-class Technology Development Centre at its manufacturing facility outside Dublin, while its European Software Centre entered into collaboration with NUI-Galway in establishing the Digital Enterprise Research Institute.  Intel has established an innovation centre at its main site outside Dublin and increased its investment in its research centre near Limerick.  It has also partnered three Irish universities in an academic Centre for Research on Adaptive Nanostructures and Nanodevices.  IBM over the same period announced significant investments in its R&D software facility in Dublin – a decision influenced, according to one of the company’s directors, by the availability of the necessary skills, the strong support of the IDA and the increasing role of SFI.  A number of similar investments have also appeared recently in the biotech and pharmachem areas.

Conclusions

Ireland’s success in attracting FDI can be ascribed to the following factors:

  • EU membership, macroeconomic stability, Western European governance standards and an English-speaking environment
  • a low corporation tax rate
  • the skills and experience of the country’s Industrial Development Agency (IDA)
  • the quality of the telecommunications infrastructure, and
  • an educational system that is integrated to a large extent with the country’s FDI-oriented development strategy.

As one of the first countries in the world to adopt an FDI-focused development strategy (in the late 1950s), the country has had an extensive period of time to fine tune its policies and institutions in line with the requirements of international FDI. This has allowed it to continue to succeed as FDI flows into Europe have shifted progressively from traditional to higher-tech manufacturing sectors through services offshoring and more recently into the offshoring of R&D functions.

Though a late starter – by Western European standards – in increasing educational throughput, Ireland by 1981 had, after the Netherlands, the highest proportion of third-level students taking sub-degree courses.  This was a relatively inexpensive option for the country for follow, a strategy arguably justified in the case of a relatively poor European country.  By international standards tertiary enrolments were heavily biased towards science and engineering, which accorded with the requirements of the MNCs that the country was trying to attract.  As convergence on Western European living standards was progressively achieved and as offshoring of R&D has grown, the emphasis has increasingly switched towards university and postgraduate education.

As shown in the appendix, the country’s IDA has also functioned effectively as a learning organisation through its transnational strategic networks. The strong focus on the importance of FDI in Ireland and the position of the IDA in the policymaking hierarchy ensure that the system is configured to respond rapidly to emerging market opportunities as well as changing factor-market conditions in Ireland.

One example, discussed earlier, concerns the pace of response to the looming disparity, once recognised, between electronics graduate outflows and the IDA’s demand projections for such graduates. Another example is provided by the response to an EU Directive in the 1980s which allowed financial services companies, once established and registered with the regulatory authorities of one EU member state, to operate in any other member state. The directive freed firms to locate in countries where they found the regulations to be most favourable. Ireland was the second country after Luxembourg to implement the directive, in 1989. In addition the authorities decided to forego VAT and inheritance taxes on certain investment fund activities and two further items of legislation were enacted in 1990 to facilitate the development of investment funds. The industry’s activities in Ireland expanded dramatically in response and by 2005 the country had become one of the world’s leading locations for the domicile and administration of investment funds (Barry, Thebault and Wojcik, 2006).