Here is just a part of (analytical) tweets concerning the Brexit through early AM 29 June (BST). Excerpts are on our own.
16 things you need to know about the process of leaving the EU | @ConUnit_UCL
… 8. The process of withdrawal will involve three sets of negotiations:
First will be the negotiation of the withdrawal terms themselves. These will likely include, for example, an agreement on the rights of UK citizens already resident in other member states and of EU citizens resident in the UK. As Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott has explained, those rights – contrary to what some have said – are for the most part not protected under existing international law.
Second, it will be necessary to negotiate a trade deal with the EU. The official Vote Leave campaign confirmed that it wanted such a deal and correctly pointed out that everyone’s interests would be served by having one. … But there will be greater difficulties in services. Open Europe (which campaigns for EU reform and was neutral in the referendum) highlights particular difficulties in financial services, where it rates the chances of maintaining current levels of access to the EU as ‘low’.
Third, the UK will have to negotiate the terms of its membership of the WTO and will want also to negotiate trade deals with the over 50 countries that currently have such deals with the EU, as the existing arrangements will no longer apply to the UK from the moment of Brexit. The WTO itself has warned that this will not be straightforward: the UK will not be allowed just to ‘cut and paste’ the terms of WTO membership that it currently has through its EU membership. Similarly, while we might hope that other countries will agree quickly to extend the EU rules to the UK, we cannot presume that all will – and the UK itself might want different terms in some cases.
What does triggering Article 50 mean for the UK? Our @alanjrenwick explains | @ConUnit_UCL
… 3. The terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the nature of our future relationship with the EU will be worked out through negotiations with the remaining 27 member states, as set out in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.
4. Article 50 skews the balance of power in the negotiations in favour of the continuing member states. That is because of the two-year rule and the unanimity requirement for extensions to that period.
5. It is sensible that the Prime Minister has left triggering Article 50 to his successor.
6. It is vanishingly unlikely that the UK could withdraw without triggering Article 50 at all.
7. Both sides in the campaign have agreed that this whole process will take several years, during which the UK will remain in the EU. …
… Scenario 1: avoiding Article 50 to avoid Brexit
… Boris Johnson said ‘There is only one way to get the change we need, and that is to vote to go, because all EU history shows that they only really listen to a population when it says No.’ …
Scenario 2: avoiding Article 50 to secure better Brexit terms
… Indeed, the Vote Leave campaign appears to recognise … ‘We do not necessarily have to use Article 50 – we may agree with the EU another path that is in both our interests.’ …
Constitution Unit briefing paper: ‘Brexit: Its Consequences for Devolution and the Union’ | @DanielGover
… Under the Sewel Convention, however, the UK government has said that it will not normally legislate on a devolved matter without the consent of the devolved legislature, and similarly always sought the consent of the devolved legislatures, before extending their powers… Sionaidh Douglas-Scott suggested that if they wished to express their opposition to Brexit, or to increase their leverage during the Brexit negotiations, the devolved assemblies might be reluctant to grant legislative consent to the widening of their powers implied in removing the EU law constraint. This would take us into uncharted constitutional territory. …
Will Brexit lead to the break up of the UK? via @ConUnit_UCL | @Huw_Pritchard
… First, forecasts of the financial viability of an independent Scotland depend heavily on the oil price… Second, if an independent Scotland joined (or remained in) the EU, while England and Wales headed for Brexit, that might require for the first time the creation of a hard land border between England and Scotland. Third, if Scotland has to re-apply to join the EU, it may be required to join the Euro, which is a requirement for all new member states. This last factor might be a reason for Scotland seeking to hold an independence referendum soon, before the UK leaves the EU, so that Scotland does not have to re-apply from outside. The Scottish Parliament does not have a clear power to hold an independence referendum, because under the Scotland Act 1998 the constitution is a reserved matter…
IFS Director Paul Johnson reflects on the role & impact of economists in the referendum debate | @EconUCL
… Of course, other things mattered, and mattered enormously, but it is clear that economists’ warnings were not understood or believed by many. So we economists need to be asking ourselves why that was the case, why our near-unanimity did not cut through. In short, we need to understand the abject failure of our profession to persuade the public about the consequences of a Leave vote. …
Political and legal consequences of Brexit for the UK and the EU | @ConUnit_UCL
This interesting analysis by Joshua Rozenberg @guardian cites Lord Lisvane on our blog | @ConUnit_UCL
… So I would expect the UK’s negotiations with Brussels – ahead of an article 50 notification – to continue into next year. If there is a significantly better deal on offer, the new prime minister might choose to put it to the people – not, I suspect, by holding another referendum but by calling an early general election.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 allows for this in two possible ways. One would require the support of two-thirds of the House of Commons. The other can be done by passing a vote of confidence on a simple majority…
… my own view is that the government will require, at the very least, a majority vote in the House of Commons before proceeding. One might have argued that a kamikaze prime minister could have triggered article 50 immediately after the referendum result was declared, using his prerogative powers. Those powers are used to sign treaties but not, I would argue, to put them into effect in the UK. In any event, there is a growing constitutional convention that prerogative powers are subject to parliamentary approval, as we saw with the Commons vote in August 2013 against air strikes on Syria.
… Lord Lisvane, the former clerk to the House of Commons, has pointed out that it is not as simple as repealing the European Communities Act 1972, under which the UK joined what is now the EU.
As well as our analysis, here’s @ProfMarkElliott’s excellent briefing on constitutional fallout from #EUref result | @ConUnit_UCL
First… as a matter of international law, the UK as a State continues to be subject to its obligations under the EU treaties, and that, under the 1972 Act, EU law remains applicable in the UK and has priority over UK law. Legally and constitutionally, nothing has changed yet. …
Second… Once the Member State makes the decision to withdraw and gives the European Council notice of its intention to leave, the clock begins running and — subject to two exceptions — the treaties cease to apply to the departing Member State after two years. The first exception is that the two-year rule does not apply if the departing State reaches agreement on the terms of departure before the expiry of the two-year period. The second exception is that the European Council — with the agreement of the departing State — can agree to extend the negotiation period beyond two years.
Third… The legislation that provided for a referendum to be held said nothing whatever about the effect of the outcome of the referendum, and the result does not place the Government under any legal obligation to secure Brexit. … Rather, the will of the people has been expressed through an advisory referendum, and the making of the decision whether to withdraw remains a matter for the Government. However… Political reality is something else entirely. …
Do people tend to vote against change in referendums? | @UCL_EI
… Looking at all national…referendums from democracies since 1990…, we can consider whether the status-quo option tends to win. We find that actually the change option won a majority of the votes cast in 186 out of 268 referendums, i.e. 69 per cent of the time.
On the other hand, that figure might be misleading. Many countries have extra thresholds for a vote for change to count as valid: either that turnout must exceed a certain minimum or that support for change must pass a minimum proportion of the eligible electorate. Once we take this into account, only 106 of the 268 referendums (40 per cent) have actually passed.
The question therefore arises of which of these measures more accurately reflects how often publics are willing to back change. …
It’s Brexit. As the UK – and Europe – wakes up to a new reality, here is a first round of reactions from UCL staff | @UCL_EI
UCL Provost’s video message about the EU Referendum result, reassuring UCL staff and students from the EU | @uclspp
Leaving the EU: UCL’s statement | @ucl
Lastly, our final #EUref forecast which predicts that Remain will win 52-48 | @ConUnit_UCL
200 academics led by @alanjrenwick @ConUnit_UCL sign letter criticising deliberate misinformation in EU Referendum | @uclnews
Brexit: what’s going to happen to our money now we’re leaving the EU? @swatdhingraLSE cited | @CEP_LSE
…the collapse in the pound would likely lead to a 3% rise in inflation, to between 4% and 4.5% by late 2017.
… Remain argued we could be in for a year-long recession, with at least 500,000 jobs lost and GDP around 3.6% lower than if we’d stayed in the EU. Real wages could be nearly 3% lower now, coming to a reduction of £800 a year for someone working full-time on the average wage…
… Britain will now be less attractive to foreign investors, with trade taking a knock of up to 2.6%. Manufacturing would also suffer, with car production dropping by 12% and car prices rising by 2% on average…
The EU isn’t snookering Britain. Britain is hoodwinking the EU. Comment from @johnvanreenen | @CEP_LSE
How bad will Brexit get? @johnvanreenen & other economists & economic organisations’ views, via @voxdotcom | @LSEEcon
Should We Stay or Should We Go?: The economic consequences of leaving the EU [PDF] | Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano and Thomas Sampson
… On average, trade agreements the EU has entered into over the past two decades have increased the quality of UK imports from its FTA partners by 26% and lowered the quality-adjusted price of imports by 19%… Overall, consumer prices fell by 0.5% for UK consumers as a result of FTAs with trade partners that are not EU member states, saving UK consumers £5.3 billion per year.
…Part of the attraction of the UK for foreign companies is as an export platform to the rest of the EU, so if the UK is outside the trading bloc, this position is likely to be threatened. This matters because foreign multinationals tend to be high productivity firms and they bring new technologies and management skills
with them. There is also some evidence of positive productivity spillovers from FDI undertaken in the UK. Indeed, given the large sunk costs involved in FDI, the uncertainty generated by the possibility of an in-or-out referendum may have a negative impact on investment in the run-up to the vote…
Would it fly? A possible Article 50 route to a second referendum… | @lsebrexitvote
External perspectives on Brexit? Prof Kevin Featherstone’s LSE Commission report | @LSEEI
[PDF] External Perspectives on the UK’s membership of the European Union: Report of the hearing held on 1st March, 2016 | LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe (Rapporteur: Kevin Featherstone (LSE))
• The immediate ‘Brexit’ impact would be shock and uncertainty over how it can be managed. The best strategy for Britain’s partners would be to wait for London to present its proposals for a future relationship. Importantly the 27 are unlikely to agree a first offer.
• The alternatives to EU membership (following the Norwegian, Swiss, or Canadian models) are unclear, would be costly for the UK and produce few advantages. The search for a different solution might set precedents for new framework agreements with other countries like Turkey and Ukraine.
• Economically, both sides will have an interest in trying to reach a trading deal as soon as possible, if the political climate allows it.
• Brexit will threaten an important market for continental exporters.
Likewise, the EU27 represent a major market for UK exports.
• On the EU side, member states will lose a major net contributor to the EU budget. They may well seek a high price for continued access to the single market.
• Financially, the general uncertainty of a Brexit vote is likely to discourage FDI into Britain.
• The prospect of restrictions on free movement between the UK and the rest of the EU would likely entail economic costs for both sides.
• Without Britain, the EU might become more ‘inward-looking’. In Council decision-making with qualified majority voting, France will become more pivotal in a number of areas. Britain is a long-standing advocate of freer trade and meaningful structural reforms. The relevant coalitions supporting such policies in EU meetings may be significantly weakened.
• The EU would lose a member with one of its biggest military and diplomatic capacities, is its main advocate of interventionism, and which has the strongest link with Washington. ‘Brexit’ will weaken Europe’s ability to stand up to Putin’s aggression, its response to the
challenges of jihadism, and its rapport with East Asia.
• Politically, the domestic impact for Britain’s partners will be a boost to the extremes and to populists who advocate a block on Europe’s development or even their own exit.
• The presidential prospects of Marine Le Pen in France will look brighter and the voices of the far right in places like Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece and Poland will become louder.
• Following a ‘Brexit’ vote, the taboo over ‘GREXIT’ may begin to be lifted.
• Perhaps because other member states have been slow to react to the prospect of ‘Brexit’, a ‘no’ vote will shake the EU suddenly and deeply. It will pile on the agony amidst the migration and debt crises and deepen the general air of self-doubt.
After shock #eurefresult, what happens next? Full guide to Brexit negotiations from LSE’s foreign policy think tank Dr @timothyloliver | @lseideas
NEGOTIATION 1: UK Political
NEGOTIATION 2: UK Governance
NEGOTIATION 3: UK and non-EU Countries
NEGOTIATION 4: UK and the EU
NEGOTIATION 5: Within the EU
NEGOTIATION 6: EU Reform
Negotiation 7: The EU and the rest of Europe
Negotiation 8: The EU and the rest of the World
Negotiation 9: Ongoing EU business
Austria: Making use of UK-EU tensions for domestic purposes.
Belgium: Support for the UK staying in the EU, but European integration has priority.
Bulgaria: Brexit would be like UEFA without England’s national team and Wayne Rooney’s goals.
Croatia: a strong desire to see the UK stay.
Czech Republic: A United Europe is the Priority.
Denmark: Quiet but clear support for a close UK-EU arrangement.
Estonia: Practical questions for the Estonian EU Presidency.
Finland: Seeking good EU-UK relations, but the EU is the first priority.
France: Brexit or not, the EU shall not recede.
Germany: Thinking less about the UK and EU-UK relations, and more about the EU as a whole.
Greece: Concerns about the unity of the EU and Eurozone.
Hungary: Seeking a quick exit deal.
Ireland: An exercise in damage limitation.
Italy: Supports EU Integration with or without the UK.
Latvia: Safeguarding the EU project.
Lithuania: Brexit could have a hazardous impact on “ever closer union”.
Luxembourg: Protecting European Integration and Financial Services.
Malta: One of the Countries Likely to be most affected by Brexit.
Netherlands: Helpful, but no blank check.
Poland: Going the extra mile for Britain but not at all costs.
Portugal: Balancing a centuries-old alliance with a modern commitment to the EU.
Romania: Continued free movement to the UK will be the ultimate redline.
Slovakia: Quiet anticipation at the helm of the EU Council.
Slovenia: Hoping for a remain vote.
Spain: Brexit will be seen through domestic politics.
Sweden: Prioritising geopolitics and cultural proximity with the UK.
#LSEBrexitVote #EUref: A kingdom of many parts: analysing how Londoners and the English view the EU is key Dr @timothyloliver | @LSEpoliticsblog
To be or not to be in Europe: is that the question? Britain’s European question and an in/out referendum [PDF] | @timothyloliver
…whether the decision is to stay in or leave the EU, in order not to raise false expectations in both Britain and the EU the referendum must then be followed by better management of the European question. Failure to do so would allow the poison to return,
meaning the referendum would have been nothing more than a placebo.
So how can Britain’s European question be better managed? Here we might look to the debate in Scotland about its relationship with the rest of Britain. As James Mitchell has argued, the ‘Scottish question’—one of party politics, identity, constitution and political economy—can never be entirely answered, either through independence or through remaining in the United Kingdom…
Delaying talks with the rest of the EU is fraught with economic risk, warns @LSEEI Iain Begg | @lsebrexitvote
… A particular concern is the growing deficit on the current account of the balance of payments, which reached 5.2% of GDP in 2015 and, in the absence of shocks during 2016, was expected to stabilise at this level. … One of the last analyses issued prior to the referendum by the Treasury set out two scenarios for these effects, labelled respectively as ‘shock’ and ‘severe shock’. In both cases, three channels of negative effects were identified, with the differences between the scenarios arising from the intensity of the effects. They are: the uncertainty about the terms of a new deal between the UK, the remainder of the EU (rEU) and other parts of the world; the transitional costs of shifting to a new regime for trade and investment; and the effects on jobs and growth of financial stability.
Brexit against the wishes of Scotland and Northern Ireland violates the UK’s constitution | @LSEEuroppblog
… EU law is incorporated directly into the devolution statutes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998, for example, provides that acts of the Scottish Parliament that are incompatible with EU law are ‘not law’. A similar provision, section 6(2)(d), appears in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Indeed, the status of the UK and Ireland as EU member states and signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights was fundamental to the negotiation of the Belfast or ‘Good Friday’ Agreement.
Amending the devolution legislation would be technically easy, but politically hazardous. It would add fuel to the fire stoked up by Scottish demands for independence. It would place ‘a bomb under the Irish peace process’. If Westminster is serious about Brexit it will have to terminate the devolution settlement it has so carefully crafted since before 1997…
Why Brexit Might Not Happen at All via @JohnCassidy | @LSEEurocrisis
… One possibility being floated by some pro-E.U. campaigners is a vote in the House of Commons against invoking Article 50. …under the British system, sovereignty rests in Parliament, and so the Leave vote was purely advisory.
… A more likely outcome is a general election, a second referendum, or both. In 2011, Britain switched to a system of five-year fixed-term Parliaments, and under that system the next election isn’t due until 2020. But the Brexit crisis has already generated calls for the fixed term to be junked.
The UK is Reaping What the British Media Have Been Sowing for a Long Time by @Maria_Kyriakid | @LSEEurocrisis
… Rupert Murdoch’s media have been the ringleaders of a blatant and well-sustained anti-EU campaign throughout the years of his reign in the British media landscape, a hostility based on Murdoch’s inclination for low taxes and weak media regulation.
…More media space and attention has been devoted to apparent internal conflicts within the Left over the last months rather than the eminent risk of a Brexit… What was needed was a more sustained coverage of the significance of the EU…
@borisjohnson: I cannot stress too much that Britain is part of Europe – and always will be | @LSEEurocrisis
The Future of Europe: So What if the British Are Leaving? via @SPIEGELONLINE | @LSEEurocrisis
… It is an irony of history that even if the British do not get the deal Prime Minister David Cameron negotiated with the other EU leaders, the remaining 27 countries could still implement some of its provisions. For example, a Romanian worker in Germany, whose children still live in Romania, should probably not be entitled to generous German child benefits. …
From our archive: Has the EU failed us, or have we failed to forge a European identity? by @prentoulis | @LSEEurocrisis
…There has been little enthusiasm in Britain for the ‘spirit’ of the Union, no desire for anything more than an instrumental relationship.
…Only a very small part of what the European project is or could be, is seen as relevant for Britain: it is good for business, and, yes, it may help maintain Britain’s position in the world – and one sometimes has to join the ‘allies’ in their dubious foreign endeavours. But it would be un-British to get too involved…
To be fair, it is not only Britain which is keen to retreat to its national borders and prioritize its national interests. The recent Swedish and Danish proposals that amount to the cancellation of Schengen are a self interested response to what actually is a European-wide challenge…
…Perhaps its biggest failure has been its inability to forge a European identity capable of transcending national borders. The emergence of new nationalisms (exploited skilfully by the far right), is an extremely worrying result of this failure.
Who won the referendum? via @openDemocracy by @profAFinlayson | @LSEEurocrisis
…a good way of understanding the politics of the UK right now is in terms of five different kinds of reaction to these cultural and economic changes…
Firstly, there are those people who like and benefit from both the cultural and economic effects… Most of these people voted Remain.
Secondly, there are people who like and benefit from the cultural effects of globalisation but not the economic ones… Remain.
Thirdly, there are people who like or benefit from the economic effects of globalisation but not the cultural effects… Leave.
Fourthly, there are those people who don’t like and have not benefited from either the cultural or economic effects of globalisation… Leave.
The Leave campaign much more clearly understood that the campaign was not really about the EU. It focused on cultural experiences and attitudes – hostility to the rules and regulations of social liberalisation, national pride and racial prejudice and wrapped an appeal to economic experiences within it…
The fifth group is those who like and benefit from both cultural and economic globalisation – but not as much as they would like… For these people the EU is a brake on progress: it is too slow and cumbersome, reliant as it is on face-to-face meetings, consultation and consensus, rules and procedures… they believe that movement should be freely determined by economic demand rather than the kinds of old-fashioned rights which enable EU citizens to go anywhere in the EU…
…They want to weaken the forces that prevent them from shaping the future as they imagine it must be: the sentimental Left, the statist EU, the traditional Conservative party…
Can Brexit Be Overturned? What Brits Are Asking Each Other Today via @business | @LSEEurocrisis
Thoughts on the sociology of Brexit | @LSEEurocrisis
1.THE GEOGRAPHY REFLECTS THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE 1970S, NOT THE 2010S
2.HANDOUTS DON’T PRODUCE GRATITUDE
3.BREXIT WAS NOT FUELLED BY A VISION OF THE FUTURE
…many Leavers believed that withdrawing from the EU wouldn’t really change things one way or the other, but they still wanted to do it… The contemporary populist promise to make Britain or American ‘great again’ … is not a pledge or a policy platform; it’s not to be measured in terms of results. When made by the likes of Boris Johnson, it’s not even clear if it’s meant seriously or not. It’s more an offer of a collective real-time halucination, that can be indulged in like a video game.
4.WE NOW LIVE IN THE AGE OF DATA, NOT FACTS
…What is a ‘fact’ exactly?…
…The attempt to reduce politics to a utilitarian science (most often, to neo-classical economics) eventually backfires, once the science in question then starts to become politicised. ‘Evidence-based policy’ is now far too long in the tooth to be treated entirely credulously, and people tacitly understand that it often involves a lot of ‘policy-based evidence’…
5.THE LEAST ‘ENSLAVED’ NATION IN THE EU JUST THREW OFF ITS ‘SHACKLES’
A Divided and Broken post-EUropean Britain via @ellie_knott | @LSEEurocrisis
The Disunited Kingdom: Scotland is dragged out by England New referendum highly likely via @TheEconomist | @LSEEurocrisis
Brexit vote sparks huge uncertainty for UK universities via @timeshighered @SamuelJPElliott | @LSEEurocrisis
“This outcome provides a real challenge for our sector. Science is an area where the relationship between the UK and the EU was particularly beneficial. Not least because scientists won billions of pounds of research funding for the UK, above and beyond what we put in. (€8.8bn between 2007 and 2013.) In addition, free movement of people in the EU made it easy for scientists to travel, collaborate and share ideas with the best in Europe and for companies and universities in the UK to easily access top talent from Europe.”
The downfall of David Cameron: a European tragedy | @LSEEurocrisis
…Instead, fatally as it has now transpired, he was always a “Eurosceptic – but not as Eurosceptic as you are”, as he put it to his first political boss, the former chancellor Norman Lamont. Cameron’s lifelong soft Euroscepticism meant he had no answer to the hardliners on Europe once the issue had become turbocharged by austerity and immigration…
The 2010 election, which was in most respects a triumph for Cameron, ensured ever more frantic juggling. Going into coalition with the pro-European Liberal Democrats meant the referendum on UK membership of the EU that many Conservatives continued to advocate was put in the deep freeze. The coalition’s official policy was that there would be no in/out referendum and that only Cameron and Nick Clegg could settle European policy between them.
…The hard right’s revenge came in October 2011 when the MP David Nuttall’s motion for a referendum triggered the largest Tory postwar revolt on Europe, with 81 Eurosceptics voting against the government.
Two months later, Cameron tried to assuage his rebels by vetoing a eurozone rescue plan at an EU summit in Brussels. The clashes left Cameron isolated on both fronts…
“He’s so busy wondering how to get through the next few weeks that he could endanger Britain’s international position for the next few decades. It’s all very very risky,”…“You may be right. But what else can I do? My backbenchers are unbelievably Eurosceptic and Ukip are breathing down my neck.” After a long buildup, Cameron finally made his referendum pledge in 2013…
Three years ago, in a comment on Cameron’s referendum pledge in the Bloomberg speech, Tony Blair likened it to a comedy western of the 1970s. “It reminds me a bit of the Mel Brooks comedy Blazing Saddles where the sheriff says at one point as he holds a gun to his own head: ‘If you don’t do what I want I’ll blow my brains out,’” Blair warned. This week, Cameron has done just that.
Brexit leaves Greece dangling precariously via @MacroPolis_gr by @NickMalkoutzis | @LSEEurocrisis
…Overall, the International Monetary Fund sees the spillover effect from a Brexit on the Greek economy at close to 0.5 percent of GDP under the adverse scenario. For many eurozone economies this may seem like a rounding error but for Greece, which is in line for a 0.3 percent of GDP contraction this year, it could be enough to derail its attempts to meet the fiscal targets in its adjustment programme…
A message to the LSE community after the EU Referendum result | @LSEnews
A message to the LSE community after #EURef result from LSE Director @craigjcalhoun & Interim Director Julia Black | @LSEnews
Kevin Featherstone “There has rarely been a more interesting or important time to study Europe” | @LSEEI
Impact of Brexit – #HigherEd & Research? See @annecorb LSE Commission report | @LSEEI
‘Remain’ reflects the sector’s concerns, ‘leave’ sets out to appeal to those who want the big picture, not the detail… ‘Leave’ has not made a plausible case…
LSE Commission report @IainBeggLSE – Economic Impact of Brexit | @LSEEI
Brexit Analysis No.8 #BrexitOrNot BREXIT 2016: Policy Analysis from the Centre for Economic Performance @CEP_LSE
Brexit Analysis No.7 @CEP_LSE Who Bears the Pain? How the costs of Brexit would be distributed across income groups
Brexit Analysis No.6 ‘ECONOMISTS FOR BREXIT’: A critique from @CEP_LSE
Brexit Analysis No.5 @CEP_LSE Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK
Brexit Analysis No.4 UK Treasury analysis of ‘long-term economic impact of EU membership+alternatives’: @CEP_LSE
Brexit Analysis No.3 @CEP_LSE The impact of Brexit on foreign investment in the UK
Brexit Analysis No.2 @CEP_LSE The consequences of Brexit for UK trade and living standards
Brexit Analysis No.1 @CEP_LSE Life after Brexit : What are the UK’s options outside the European Union?
#VoteRemain? Not sure? Help is at hand! BREXIT 2016: Policy Analysis from @CEP_LSE @swatdhingraLSE @johnvanreenen +
PDF: include the above No.1-8.
Scenarios of a new UK-EU relationship [w PDF]: A ‘soft’ Brexit, by @swatdhingraLSE | @LSEEcon
… Just from the channel of reduced trade, the effects of Brexit would be equivalent to a fall in British income of between 1.3% and 2.6%. And once we include back of the envelope calculations for the long-run effects of Brexit on productivity, the decline in income increases to between 6.3% and 9.5%. Some of these losses can
be reduced by future trade and investment arrangements with the EU after a soft Brexit. But the possible political or economic benefits of Brexit, such as better regulation, would have to be very large to fully outweigh such losses.
Foreign investors love Britain – but Brexit would end the affair | @LSEpoliticsblog
… There are at least three reasons:
First, being fully in the single market makes the UK an attractive export platform for multinationals as they do not face the potentially large costs from tariff and non-tariff barriers when exporting to the rest of the EU.
Second, multinationals have complex supply chains and many co-ordination costs between their headquarters and local branches. These would become more difficult to manage if the UK left the EU.
Third, uncertainty over the shape of the future trade arrangements between the UK and EU would also tend to dampen FDI. …
What Brexit might do to the British economy @swatdhingraLSE via @NewsHour on @YouTube | @CEP_LSE
@swatdhingraLSE says Brexit could damage the UK-India trade relationship | @The_IGC
UK areas with stagnant wages are most anti-EU @s_machin_ via @FT | @CEP_LSE
The Great Pushback: Western Politics and Dynamics of Exclusion | @LSEEurocrisis
Britain riding the tectonic plates via @openDemocracy| @LSEEurocrisis
EU referendum: economic message lost on voters @TheIFS @CEP_LSE @NIESRorg | @ESRCpress
‘This result should not come as a shock’ @sarahobolt @LSEEI | @lsebrexitvote
…We also know that referendums are highly unpredictable, and that voters often vote against proposals put to them by the government and supported by mainstream political parties and experts. …
… One reason why referendum outcomes are particularly unpredictable is that they present ordinary citizens with an opportunity to “stick it” to the political establishment. A division found in many referendums, including this one, is thus one between “the ordinary people” and “the elite”. This populist argument was successfully exploited by the Leave camp who portrayed the referendum as a chance for ordinary citizens to “take back control” from the elites in Brussels. …
Why I hope the UK will decide to Remain in the EU. My latest #EUref blog @LSEEuroppblog. | @DanMulhall
…a UK exit from the EU carries many risks – for Ireland, for our relations with the UK, for North-South ties in Ireland and for Europe. The current open border between North and South in Ireland could not be guaranteed to continue unchanged in a post-Brexit scenario. In the event of the UK leaving, we would also miss the productive partnership we have developed within the EU, where our two countries have discovered that we have very similar approaches to many of the issues on the EU policy agenda…
“Why Britain could have a great future outside a broken EU” via @MailOnline | @LSEEurocrisis
… Or take Italy, a country with an economy roughly comparable in size to our own. Its growth rate over the past eight years has been just 3 per cent. In the same period, free from the shackles of the euro, Britain has grown 35 per cent.
… We needn’t look far for the explanation. For not only is the euro destroying livelihoods, but the madness that is the free movement of peoples has brought waves of migrants sweeping across Europe, depressing wages, putting immense strain on housing and public services, undermining our security against criminals and terrorists — and making communities fear for their traditional ways of life.
Is the EU really run by unelected bureaucrats? by @simonjhix via @LSEEuroppblog | @LSEEurocrisis
…the Commission President and the individual Commissioners are not directly elected by the peoples of Europe.
First, the Commission’s power to propose legislation is much weaker than it at first seems… A Commission proposal only becomes law if it is approved by both a qualified-majority in the EU Council (unanimity in many sensitive areas) and a simple majority in the European Parliament…
Second, the Commission President and the Commissioners are indirectly elected. Under Article 17 of the EU treaty, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission President is formally proposed by the European Council (the 28 heads of government of the EU member states), by a qualified-majority vote, and is then ‘elected’ by a majority vote in the European Parliament…
Then, once the Commission President is chosen, each EU member state nominates a Commissioner, and each Commissioner is then subject to a hearing in one of the committees of the European Parliament. If a committee issues a ‘negative opinion’ the candidate is usually withdrawn by the government concerned. After the hearings, the team of 28 is then subject to an up/down ‘investiture vote’ by a simple majority of the MEPs. …
New EU referendum polls suggest Remain is taking back the lead | @LSEEurocrisis
UK economy would be seriously weakened by Brexit, by Prof Nick Stern via @telebusiness @STICERD_LSE | @LSEEcon
Brexit: should the UK stay or walk away? Thomas Sampson interviewed by Radio New Zealand about the EU Referendum | @LSEEcon
Reading News With Economists: EU Referendum – Dr Thomas Sampson. By @EquiEcon | @LSEEcon
The ‘Britain Alone’ scenario: CEP@LSE’s critique of ‘Economists for Brexit’ | @LSEEuroppblog
Why Britain’s #EUref poses a challenge for the Labour Party. My piece in tomorrow’s @guardian | @GoodwinMJ
Left wingers for Brexit need to wake up to what they’re about to do via @ConversationUK | @LSEEurocrisis
UKIP’s ‘unethical’ anti-immigration poster @AJEnglish | @LSEEurocrisis
Le Pen hails Brexit victory and calls for referendum on EU in France | @LSEEuroppblog
Damaging consequences of Brexit: directors of three top economic research institutes in agreement, @LSEpoliticsblog | @econromesh
Brexit 2016 blogs: Comment+analysis by @CEP_LSE academics concerning the Referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU
Mervyn King talks to MoneyWeek about the EU referendum, monetary policy, & the IMF | @LSEEcon
In Feb 2015, a panel of @LSELaw experts discussed ‘Leaving the EU?’ | @LSELaw
